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Abstract 
 
 
The current context is one marked by twin crises: a crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and a 
crisis of the liberal-democratic state. The failure of the western economies to overcome 
deflation, rising public and private debt, high unemployment and low investment rates 
in the post-Global Financial Crisis has fuelled debate on whether neoliberalism remains 
viable way to organise the economy. Concurrently, the aspiration of democracy is facing 
multiple challenges: from the failure of referenda to instigate democratic change, as seen 
in Greece; and conversely the success of referenda to limit political freedoms, as seen in 
Turkey. We are seeing rising anti-establishment and anti-statist movements across the 
world, alongside the use of constitutional and legal mechanisms to limit the scope of 
democratic politics. Responding to these material conditions, the concept of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ has been presented as a way to understand the current 
conjuncture. But surely neoliberalism – and capitalism more generally – always presented 
with authoritarian tendencies? On what grounds can it be argued, that there has been a 
‘qualitative change’ in the way the state attempts to cohere the neoliberal project post-
2007? This thesis argues that by separating the current moment of authoritarianism from 
a broader history of authoritarian tendencies, a ‘violent abstraction’ is made; the actual 
causal mechanisms producing the current crisis are obscured. If this periodisation is 
jettisoned, however, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ presents the potential to refocus 
attention on the way that authoritarian state transformations across neoliberal history have 
dialectically strengthened and weakened the state. This dialectic offers a new perspective 
on the origins of the current crisis of the state, as apparent in countries as diverse as 
Britain, the US, and Hungary. By moving past the ‘violent abstraction’ of this 
periodisation, a renewed focus on state violence under neoliberalism offers a real 
contribution to our understanding of the current moment. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
We are witnessing the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism, which is rooted in the 
reconfiguring of the state into a less democratic entity through constitutional and 
legal changes that seek to insulate it from social and political conflict (Bruff, 2014: 
113). 
 
 
The exceptional thing about the type of government called democracy is that it 
demanded people see that nothing which is human is carved in stone, that 
everything is built on the shifting sands of time and place… Forgetting [this], or 
remembering the wrong things, is dangerous for democracy, [and] things that 
seem timeless are never so (Keane, 2009: xii-iii). 
 
 
 
The current context is one marked by twin crises: a crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and a 
crisis of the liberal-democratic state. The failure of the economy to overcome deflation, 
rising public and private debt, high unemployment and low investment rates in the post-
Global Financial Crisis has fuelled debate as to whether neoliberalism remains a viable 
system of economic management. Concurrently, democracy has faced multiple 
challenges, from the failure of referenda to instigate democratic change, as seen in 
Greece, and inversely the success of referenda to limit political freedoms, as seen in 
Turkey. These salient moments of authoritarianism are paralleled by rising anti-
establishment and anti-statist movements across the world, and the use of constitutional 
and legal mechanisms to limit the scope of democratic politics – all of which constitutes 
a deep crisis of the state, in many places. Responding to these material conditions, 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ has been presented as a way to understand the twin crisis 
of the current conjuncture. ‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’ was first put forward by Bruff 
(2014) to understand changes to the state and the durability of neoliberalism. In 
particular, Bruff (2014: 116, 124) has noted a ‘shift toward constitutional and legal 
mechanisms and a move away from seeking consent’ in the construction and 
reproduction of neoliberal capitalism, in a process that ‘simultaneously strengthens and 
weakens the state’. As a conceptual apparatus with which to understand our current 
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conjuncture, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ has since been developed further in the edited 
volume States of Discipline: Authoritarian neoliberalism and the contested reproduction of capitalist 
order (Tansel, 2017). This thesis aims to develop a sympathetic critique of this emergent 
concept: critical in the sense that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ lacks conceptual and 
historical specificity; sympathetic in the sense that Bruff et al offer a suggestive reading 
of the history of neoliberalism, and through that history shine light on some of the 
generative mechanisms of the current crisis.  
 
 
Context 
 
Claims that the state and the economy are both in crisis, and that these changes demand 
new conceptual tools, are contentious – consider briefly the context from which these 
claims have emerged. Across the global North, voter turn-out is decreasing, while 
popular opinion is increasingly anti-democratic and anti-establishmentarian (Mair, 
2013). Similarly, just as many citizens have become disconnected from political society, 
or the state, the state has been changing itself: trade agreements are isolating certain 
policy levers away from democratic control (Sinclair, 2015); balanced budget 
amendments have constitutionally limited the scope of fiscal policy in various countries, 
including the US, Hong Kong, Germany, and Switzerland (Danniger, 2002: 8); 
resounding national referenda have been over-ruled when in conflict with regional 
agreements, as we saw in Greece in 2015 (Sotiris, 2017); and conversely, other referenda 
have been used to paradoxically limit the scope of democracy, as seen in Turkey in 2017 
(Shaheen, 2017).  Turkey is among a number of ‘democratic’ states to be seen as 
transforming along authoritarian lines, such as Hungary and the Philippines. Hungary 
has recently seen academic freedoms curtailed, and the detention of asylum seekers, 
amongst other limitations of political freedoms (Karasz, 2017; Lyman, 2017). Under 
President Duterte in the Philippines, state violence has been even more extreme, with 
widespread claims of extrajudicial killing, and clear violations of the independence of 
the legal system (Santos, 2016; Apostol, 2017). Far from seeing the ‘end of history’ and 
the triumph of liberal democracy as projected at the close of the Cold War (Fukuyama, 
1992), we have rather seen the ‘revenge of history’ (Milne, 2013), as both capitalism and 
democracy have fallen into question. 
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Responding to these material conditions, and others besides, a swathe of literature has 
emerged, to consider the current crisis of ‘democracy’ (for example, Anderson, 2006; 
Hay, 2007; Keane, 2009; Allan, 2014; Brown, 2015; Streeck, 2015). Without entering an 
extended consideration of the nature of democracy, whether it exists or can exist, we 
can at least note the real changes occurring across states whereby popular input into 
policy making has been curtailed in significant ways. Even the blunt quantitative 
methodology of Freedom House identifies the erosion of democratic processes around the 
world – after a steady rise in the number of countries rated as ‘free’ during the 20th 
century, 2016 saw the eleventh consecutive year of decline in ‘freedom’ (Freedom 
House, 2017). The epigraph above, drawn from John Keane’s The Life and Death of 
Democracy (2009: xii), emphasises that democracy, as a form of social organisation, is 
historically specific, rather than a universalising norm: ‘nothing that is human is carved 
in stone [and] everything is built on the shifting sands of time and place’. There have 
been, are, and will continue to be alternative forms of social organisation. Is democracy’s 
star on the wane? 
 
This is a complex question to address. Runciman (2013) argues that the nature of 
democracy makes it particularly difficult to diagnose the severity of its crises – an 
illustration of this is the long history of premature proclamations of democratic demise: 
 
Democracies have always been full of people worried that things are about to go wrong, that 
the system is in crisis and its rivals are waiting to pounce. The onward march of democracy 
has been accompanied by a constant drumbeat of intellectual anxiety. Maybe all the good 
news is just too good to be true. Maybe democracy’s run of luck is about to come to an end. 
The political history of democracy is a success story. But the intellectual history of democracy 
is very hard to reconcile with this. It is preoccupied with the prospect of failure (Runciman, 
2013: xi-xii).  
 
Whether one accepts that democracy is ‘successful’ or not, Runciman points to the 
paradox of seemingly continuous claims that the end of democracy is just around the 
corner, and the historical evidence that it has not (yet) ended. We would be wise to keep 
this caution in mind. This is raised to reiterate the purpose of this thesis: we are not here 
to empirically prove (or disprove) that democracy is in crisis. Rather, the aim is to probe 
and historicise the claims made by others; to consider whether claims about the current 
crisis reify general tendencies – that is, overemphasise the novelty of current 
developments – and in so doing obscure generative mechanisms through ‘violent 
abstraction’. 
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Parallel to the crisis of democracy, the continued reproduction of capitalism is in doubt, 
and yet also intractably difficult to predict. Despite the difficulties associated with other 
arguments that capitalism has surely run its course, such as Mandel’s ‘late capitalism’ 
(1975), we now have the end of capitalism being anticipated again, by the likes of Streeck 
(2016) and Mason (2016), among others. Not only is there a lack of accord on 
capitalism’s prospects, we also disagree on its history; in addition to the difficulty of 
predicting the prospects of capitalism, the question of periodising capitalist development 
is similarly problematic. The past few decades of political economic research have been 
marked by continuous ‘endings’ and ‘beginnings’. As noted by Albo, we have in recent 
years heard of ‘the end of corporatism, the end of the nation state, the end of Modell 
Deutschland, and so on’ (Albo, 2005: 63). Those announcing forms of ‘the new’, 
meanwhile, have provided ‘numerous forecasts of a ‘new capitalism’: post-Fordism, 
cosmopolitan democracy, diversified quality production, the borderless world, and so 
on’ (ibid). If each of these claims is indeed true, then it would seem that history is always 
ending and beginning, and never simply being, in which case, why bother periodising at 
all? Others argue against the periodisation of capitalist development for other reasons 
entirely, such as Althusser (2015: 181), who argued that our social system changes not 
as a whole, but that different spheres of social organisation have different rates and logics 
of change. The appropriate periodisation of capitalist history is hugely contentious, with 
some eschewing the legitimacy of the task entirely.  
 
 
‘Authoritarian Neoliberalism’ 
 
The recent claim that we are witnessing the ‘rise of authoritarian neoliberalism’ (Bruff, 
2014) responds to each of these issues – the apparent crisis of contemporary democratic 
capitalism, the difficulty of accurately diagnosing how critical democracy’s ailments are, 
and the messiness of periodising capitalism. Responding especially to the durability of 
neoliberalism in Europe in the face of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, Bruff 
suggested that this resilience should be understood as being supported by particular 
changes to the state, ‘rooted in the reconfiguring of the state into a less democratic entity 
through constitutional and legal changes that seek to insulate it from social and political 
conflict’ (Bruff, 2014: 113). This claim – the specificity, accuracy, and utility thereof – is 
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the central concern of this thesis. Crucially, these changes to states since 2007 (i.e. during 
and after the GFC) are seen, by those who present the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism, as ‘qualitatively distinct’ to historical examples of authoritarianism, 
despite the role authoritarianism has played in the history of neoliberalisation, and the 
history of capitalist development more generally. Is this periodisation-claim an accurate 
or useful one?  
 
Consider Bruff’s argument in more detail: 
 
In the absence of a hegemonic aura, neoliberal practices are less able to garner the consent 
or even the reluctant acquiescence necessary for more “normal” modes of governance. Of 
particular importance… is the increasing frequency with which constitutional and legal 
changes, in the name of economic “necessity”, are seeking to reshape the purpose of the 
state and associated institutions (Bruff, 2014: 116). 
 
‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’ is an emerging concept, but has been quickly and widely 
embraced as a way to understand the current conjuncture. Considering contextual 
developments in Hungary, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Greece, and the Philippines (and other 
places besides), one can certainly appreciate the heuristic resonance of the concept as a 
way to explain the apparently-contradictory process of neoliberalisation and rising 
authoritarianism. The most significant example of the embrace of the framework is in 
the recent volume, States of Discipline: Authoritarian neoliberalism and the contested reproduction 
of capitalist order1, edited by Cemal Burak Tansel (2017). ‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’ is a 
conceptual framework that attempts to explain the current crises of democracy and 
capitalism as internally related, and generative of a marked pivot in the way the state 
manages the continued reproduction of capitalist social relations. The article ‘The Rise 
of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’ (Bruff, 2014) has been cited one hundred and four 
times2; eight of these citations emerged in May 2017 alone, indicating the speed at which 
the concept is becoming established. Since 2014, the concept has been featured in 
several national and international conferences3. The ‘context of authoritarian 
                                                          
1 Contributions to this volume have spanned various empirical applications, including: food production as a tool for 
social disciplining (Rioux, 2017); the migration crisis of the Mediterranean (Manunza, 2017); the anti-democratic nature 
of the European Social Model framework (Bruff, 2017); the Greek austerity crisis and the implications for sovereignty 
under the EMS (Sotiris, 2017); the continued entrenchment of the current Erdoğan government in Turkey (Ozden, 
Akca and Bekmen, 2017); the curtailment of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Morocco (De Smet and Bogaert, 2017); 
patronage networks and corruption across the Cambodian state (Springer, 2017); and the authoritarian neoliberalism 
of China’s marketization (Lim, 2017). 
2 According to Google Scholar, at time of writing. 
3 A series of panels on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ were planned for the European International Studies Association 
conference in Izmir, September 2016, before the conference was cancelled due to turmoil in Turkey at the time. The 
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neoliberalism’ (McBridge and Mitrea, 2017: 1) is becoming a common frame for the 
current context, and yet very little – if any – of this conceptual embrace is of a critical 
bent. These scholastic developments are, themselves, expressions of the material 
conditions of the current conjuncture. The significance of all of this is that there is a 
growing trend to understand the material conditions of the current conjuncture through the lens of 
authoritarian neoliberalism.  
 
It is important to note that ‘authoritarian’ here is used in a way that differs from its 
meaning in orthodox political-science: ‘Government distinguished by a high degree of 
state power and discretion and, most often, the absence of procedures for popular 
consent or for guarding individual rights’ (Calhoun, 2002, online). Rather than seeing 
authoritarianism and democracy as antithetical, a more nuanced understanding is 
presented.  Drawing on the concept of ‘authoritarian statism’ (Poulantzas, 1978) – and 
on Stuart Hall’s ‘authoritarian populism’ (1988) – the two forms of social organisation 
can be seen as potentially congruent, albeit in a contradictory fashion. Rather than simply 
being defined through the absence of elections, for Poulantzas (1978: 203) authoritarian 
statism was marked by ‘intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic 
life combined with radical decline of the institutions of political democracy’. As Tansel 
argues, we should not  
 
follow a definition of authoritarianism in which the coercive apparatuses of the state are 
privileged and understood as external to liberal democracy. Subscribing to a coercion-oriented 
understanding of authoritarianism risks… obscuring the ways in which authoritarian state 
power is enmeshed with capital accumulation… As opposed to enshrining an ossified 
separation of liberal democracy and authoritarianism, we maintain that it is important to 
recognize that state responses to the economic and political crises of capitalism can – and 
increasingly do – assume similar forms both in formal democracies and in traditionally 
defined authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, the authoritarian bent in state practices can work 
in tandem with institutions and legal frameworks that sustain a ‘minimalist’ democracy’ 
(Tansel, 2017: 11, emphasis in original).  
 
In this sense, we should not see ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as an alternative to democracy, 
waiting to take the place of democracy as this supposedly outmoded form of 
government withers, but rather a constitutive part of the current crisis of capitalist 
democracies.  
 
                                                          
concept was also featured on two panels at the concurrent International Initiative for the Promotion of Political 
Economy conference, in Lisbon. An early form of the argument made in this thesis were presented at the latter. 
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If the neoliberalism of the current conjuncture has changed into a more authoritarian 
form, however, this begs the question of what is ‘neoliberalism’ in general; and what is 
it about ‘neoliberalism’ that allows or facilitates change? Dedicated monographs could 
(and have been) written, attempting to answer each of these questions. But while an 
exhaustive account cannot be given here, an indicative sketch of the concept must be 
given. Thankfully, Bruff and I share a significant amount of common ground in relation 
to both of these questions. Let us first consider ‘what is neoliberalism’. 
 
‘Neoliberalism’ is difficult to define. It has been described variously as: a form of 
governmentality, which reshapes the subject, emphasising competition as the principle 
against which all decisions should be made (Dardot and Laval, 2013); as the practice of 
reducing the role of the state in all spheres of life, instead prioritising the market as the 
main tool of social organisation (Steger and Roy, 2010); as an institutional response to 
the crisis of the 1970s, which attempted to solve issues of inflation and overly-aggressive 
wage claims (Braithwaite, 2008); as an ontological and epistemological project, centred 
on the positivist claims of neoclassical economics (Mirowski, 2013); and as many other 
things besides. Although each of these distinct definitions of neoliberalism holds some 
germ of truth, they are also ultimately flawed (see Konings, 2010: Cahill, 2014).  
 
Against these definitions of neoliberalism, this thesis takes the historical materialist 
conception as the most useful – often discussed under the rubric of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Cahill, 2010; Ryan, 2015). In this view, 
neoliberalism is seen as a form of economic and political management, defined by a 
reshaping of the state. This reshaping is paradoxical, in that increased marketisation in 
some spheres – the provision of social services, especially – is contradicted by active 
state intervention in other spheres – such as defence, and the subsidisation of fossil fuel 
mining and power generation. This approach takes particular issue with those who see 
neoliberalism as a reduction in the size or power of the state (i.e. Steger and Roy, 2010). 
The state does, of course, shift and change over time, and in various places. The 
specificity of this approach is drawn from the class-based nature of these intervention, 
as well as their relationship to previous phases of class struggle. Emblematic of this view 
is David Harvey, who famously argued that neoliberalism should be seen as a ‘political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elites’ (Harvey, 2005: 19), after the protracted crisis of accumulation of the 
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1970s (see Brenner, 2006). Importantly, Bruff’s treatment of neoliberalism falls within 
this frame, as he joined scholars such as Konings (2010) and Cahill (2007) in rejecting 
those approaches to neoliberalism which ‘continue to pay lip service to neoliberalism’s 
rhetorical and ideological valorization of the “free market”’ (Bruff, 2014: 114), instead 
emphasising the central role of the state in shaping and driving the process of 
neoliberalisation. 
 
Key to this historical-materialist conception of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is an 
understanding of the unevenness of neoliberalism. In fact, this approach rejects the idea 
of an ‘ideal-typical’ example or case of neoliberalism, or even the idea that the neoliberal 
project could ever be ‘finished’. It is for this reason that ‘neoliberalisation’ is emphasised 
as a process – one which is patterned by the context in which it unfolds, resulting in both 
spatial and temporal variegation. It has been noted that neoliberalism both creates crises, 
and then uses those crises to ‘fail forward’, and shift course (Peck, Theodore, and 
Brenner, 2012). This author firmly agrees with this approach, which treats neoliberalism 
as a process rather than a fixed state. While we cannot get into the detail of what 
mechanisms might drive and shape this process over time and space, this aspect of the 
‘actually existing’ neoliberalism framework sits uneasily with Bruff’s concept of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. If neoliberalism has always changed over time, then ought 
we disaggregate the neoliberal phase of capitalist development into sub-periods? This 
brings us to two points: 1) this thesis, and the work of Bruff, have a broadly similar 
understanding of neoliberalism, both falling within the frame of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’, and 2) that this common ground raises again the question of why this 
current period should be elevated through the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
 
Moving neoliberalism-in-general aside, let us remind ourselves of the central claims 
surrounding ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Bruff’s concept rests of four key claims: 1) 
that neoliberalism has lost its ‘hegemonic aura’ in the post-2007 context (2014: 116); 2) 
that the state has managed this crisis by transforming along increasingly authoritarian 
lines, by both foreclosing debate, as well as coercively repressing protest (ibid); 3) that 
this rise in authoritarianism is distinct from previous moments of authoritarianism under 
neoliberalism, due to both the increased frequency of these moments, and the necessary 
role this state form is playing in reproducing neoliberalism in the face of contestation 
(ibid); and 4) that this process is a contradictory one, as these violent and anti-democratic 
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interventions simultaneously strengthen the state, and weaken it, and that these 
contradictions present possibilities for progressive opposition (2014: 124-126). 
 
Crucially, the treatment of authoritarian statist transformation presented by Poulantzas, 
and further emphasised by Bruff, is not determined or uncontested: ‘the state is 
emphatically not a predetermined entity whose function is to act in a monolithic manner 
in the name of capital (Bruff, 2014: 119). Part of this ontology of the state is that changes 
in the way the state patterns the reproduction of capitalist social relations are not 
automatic, and that these transformations can create their own dialectical contradictions. 
For Poulantzas (1978: 246), authoritarian statism ‘is partially responsible for creating 
new forms of popular struggle’. Following from this, Bruff (2014: 120) argues that ‘an 
increasingly authoritarian state is simultaneously strengthened and weakened by the shift 
toward coercion’. This dynamic – a ‘strengthening-weakening dynamic’, for short – is a 
crucial aspect of the theorisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Rather than universally 
reinforcing the state’s ability to ensure accumulation and reproduction, this process is a 
contested one which creates its own dislocatory forces within the state, and between the 
state and civil society. The details of what mechanisms might bear out this dynamic are, 
however, not fully explained.  Throughout the thesis, we will reflect upon the motion of 
this dialectic, as well as consider its significance within the broader theorisation of the 
current conjuncture.  
 
 
Sympathetic Critique 
 
And so, we have a broad literature pointing to various empirical indicators and examples, 
all arguing that liberal democracy is in crisis. In that context, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
has been introduced as a framework to understand the current conjuncture, and then 
been subsequently applied to cases as varied as Greek austerity, and Cambodian 
patronage. This thesis will argue, however, that such a hasty embrace of an embryonic 
concept is problematic, and that further theorisation is necessary. In particular, there is 
an immediate issue with the claim that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ represents a 
qualitative change from pre-Global Financial Crisis trends. In his Rethinking Marxism 
article, Bruff asserted that  
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Authoritarian neoliberalism does not represent a wholesale break from pre-2007 neoliberal 
practices, yet it is qualitatively distinct, due to the way in which neoliberalism’s authoritarian 
tendencies… have come to the fore through a shift toward constitutional and legal 
mechanisms and a move away from seeking consent for hegemonic projects (Bruff, 2014: 
116, emphasis in original). 
 
Here ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is presented as a periodisation claim – something that 
is qualitatively distinct from earlier, pre-2007 forms of state organisation of the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. It is also significant that this argument is 
effectively based on a quantity theory of change – i.e. the current period is qualitatively 
distinct because of a quantitative shift toward more authoritarian statism. And yet surely 
this is a process which cannot be quantified? If it was, the methods of Freedom House 
would be sufficient to evidence Bruff’s claims.  
 
Although ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ makes other contentious claims, this is the most 
problematic. Even those with only a limited understanding of the subject will surely 
respond “hasn’t neoliberalism always had authoritarian tendencies”? The typical point of 
genesis for neoliberalism is usually drawn at the Pinochet government in Chile, before 
then emerging in the global North in the form of Thatcherism and Reaganism (see 
Harvey, 2005). Pinochet’s government is widely accepted as authoritarian, with Marcus 
Taylor (2002: 52) even describing this form of government with the terms ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ more than a decade before Bruff’s conceptualisation. Thatcher, too, has 
been characterised as ‘authoritarian’ in various different ways – but especially through 
the framework of ‘authoritarian statism’, which has ‘had a crucial bearing on how 
Thatcherism itself has been explained’ (Gamble, 1994: 181). In fact, Gamble described 
Thatcher’s government as being marked by ‘a shift away from consent towards coercion’ 
(ibid). This is precisely the same claim being made by Bruff, more than two decades 
earlier. This is what we might call a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ against the idea of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ as something somehow distinct from the previous forms of 
authoritarianism which have comingled with the process of neoliberalisation, and is the 
principal starting point of for our analysis. 
 
The claim that the authoritarianism of the period post-2007 is somehow different is not 
the only contentious one within Bruff’s framework. As quoted above, Bruff (2014: 116) 
sees ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as responding, at least in part, to ‘the absence of a 
hegemonic aura’ surrounding neoliberal practice since the GFC. This would seem to 
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imply that the claim of qualitative difference in the post-2007 context hinges on the idea 
that prior forms of neoliberalism were uncontested. Surely a more accurate history of 
neoliberalisation would tell of ongoing struggles between those forces pushing for 
neoliberal-type policies, and those groups being disenfranchised by that process? To be 
clear, this issue is not the central one of this thesis – it is raised simply to highlight that 
there are other entry-points for criticism of the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
Rather than presenting a long list of niggling qualms, we will instead focus on two 
significant, and related challenges to the concept – historical specificity, and 
periodisation.  
 
It is not, however, completely clear whether ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ should be seen 
as a periodisation claim or not. While on the one hand this process is seen as 
‘qualitatively distinct’, elsewhere Bruff (2014: 125) retreats somewhat, offering that ‘the 
attempted “authoritarian fix” is potentially more of a sticking plaster than anything more 
epochal’. Further to this, many of the case studies in States of Discipline (Springer, 2017; 
Lim, 2017) do not emphasise the same post-2007 departure, instead framing 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as a useful lens through which to recast the entire history 
of neoliberalisation. This is noted in Tansel’s editorial, where he suggests that ‘retracing 
the histories of neoliberalisation in those cases through the lens of authoritarian 
neoliberalism becomes paramount to contextualise and understand’ changes in the state 
over a broader period (Tansel, 2017: 13). In this sense, perhaps we should see this 
emerging approach as a contribution to the broad and extant debates around the 
appropriate definition of neoliberalism in general – alongside ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002), neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (Dardot and Laval, 
2013), or neoliberalism as an ‘epistemic community’ (Plewhe and Mirowski, 2009) – 
rather than a periodisation claim. Despite this ambiguity, this thesis will engage with the 
claim that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ presents as something ‘qualitatively distinct’. This 
is the way that the framework was originally conceptualised, then echoed in Tansel’s 
contribution (Tansel, 2017: 3), and which remains the most prominent treatment of the 
term.  
 
The overarching research question this thesis seeks to answer is this: does the conceptual 
framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ contribute to a theoretically and practically 
useful understanding of the present conjuncture? If ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ cannot 
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forcefully articulate the difference between the authoritarian statism of Poulantzas’s day, 
and the authoritarian statism which supposedly operates in the post-2007 era, then it 
will struggle theoretically and strategically. An even more pointed challenge is raised with 
Sayer’s concept of a ‘violent abstraction’ (1987). The framework of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ is itself an abstraction, emphasising some aspects of history, while de-
emphasing others. Abstraction is, of course, a necessary step in any attempt to 
understand a complex social totality; the question is whether a particular abstraction 
clarifies or obscures? A ‘violent abstraction’, however, is one which obscures some or 
all of the causal mechanisms the abstraction seeks to reveal. For Sayer (1987: 149), 
‘theory should be abandoned if it gets in the way of knowledge’. One error along the 
road to theory which must vitiate the utility of that theory is the failure to develop 
‘propositions’ toward an actual ‘explanation’:  
giving a causal explanation necessarily involves ‘elaborating’ a theory of causal mechanisms. It 
is only such a theory which makes a series of propositions into an explanation… We do not 
explain things such as Protestantism or law by their functionality but their genealogy (Sayer, 
1987: 125, emphasis in original).  
 
Sayer’s test also demands more of our theorisation – we must be able to articulate what 
led to the change, and why. If we separate out the post-2007 period as distinct because 
it has “more authoritarianism”, then this runs the risk of obscuring the history of 
neoliberalism which led to this development. The question, then, is this: is the concept 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ a useful abstraction, or a ‘violent’ one? 
 
 
Outline of Structure 
 
The first chapter of this thesis will elaborate the theoretical challenges facing the concept 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. In claiming that authoritarian neoliberalism is expressed, 
in part, by the diminishing expectations that people hold for the power of politics and 
democracy (Bruff, 2014: 115-116), the specificity of the term immediately comes into 
question. This is due to the considerable conceptual overlap between ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ and extant concepts such as ‘de-politicisation’ (Burnham, 2001; Flinders 
and Wood, 2014) and ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill, 2008) which both highlight similar 
state practices to those described by Bruff, seen by these scholars as occurring prior to 
2008. After teasing out these overlaps, we will then go further to consider ‘de-
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politicisation’ in its ultimate form – the separation of the political from the economic 
under capitalism (Wood, 1981; Brenner, 1977). These spaces of conceptual overlap raise 
questions regarding the specificity of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ which are yet to be 
answered – not only in terms of the specificity of our concepts, but also in terms of the 
material conditions which these conceptual and theoretical developments were a 
response to. Going further, this chapter will also consider the approach of ‘uneven and 
combined development’ (Banaji, 2010; Rioux, 2013; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015). 
From this perspective, the often-violent history of capitalism, particularly in the 
experience of the global South, vitiates the clean separation of the political from the 
economic maintained by Political Marxism. This alternate approach also challenges 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, albeit from a different angle. That is to say, that violent 
history of capitalist development – in particular, the coevolution of capitalist social 
relations under authoritarian states, such as the case of Japan or Germany – also 
challenges the specificity of our concept-in-question. In short, this first chapter will be 
a deepening of the critique of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ beyond initial, surface-level 
reactions, highlighting theoretical challenges to the concept, as well as the contested 
material conditions which drove the development of these frameworks in the first 
instance. In engaging with these other literatures, however, some insights can also be 
drawn which might usefully augment ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. By drawing on the 
perspective of Political Marxism, mechanisms will be outlined which might bear out the 
‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic which Poulantzas (1978: 248) associated with 
authoritarian statism. Finally, in order to ameliorate the tension between Political 
Marxism, and the ‘uneven and combined development’ approach, we will arrive at a 
resolution which gives us an important epistemological insight into the process of 
abstraction. Through the theory of internal relations (Ollman, 2003; 2015), and the 
concept of ‘vantage point’, we can return to the issue at hand – the periodisation claims 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
 
The second chapter will develop the methodological tools necessary to properly evaluate 
these open questions – in particular, different approaches to the challenge of periodising 
capitalist development. Fundamentally, any attempt to separate the totality of capitalist 
history into different phases is an abstraction, or a ‘vantage point’. Jessop (2001: 284) 
emphasises that we can only periodise ‘at the level of abstraction and complexity at 
which they are studied’ – it follows from this that as ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
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attempts to explain changes occurring at the level of the state, then we necessarily must trace 
a method of periodisation which is sensitive to state theory. As such, this chapter must 
first analyse the role of the state in capitalist societies, before arriving at the issue of 
periodisation. This discussion is not only relevant to the task of periodisation, however. 
As a sympathetic critique, this thesis also seeks to consider the strengths of the 
‘authoritarian-neoliberal’ frame – specifically, the argument that authoritarian-type state 
transformations are inherently unstable. Through discussion around the state as 
‘relatively autonomous’ from the interests of capital, certain insights may be drawn 
which might substantiate the ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic associated with 
authoritarian-type state transformations (Poulantzas, 1978: 248). In particular, the 
requirements for states to both secure capital accumulation, and to maintain broader 
legitimacy (O’Connor, 1973), speaks to this dynamic.  
 
We then arrive at the issue of periodisation. By first considering ‘long wave’ approaches 
to the periodisation of capitalism (Braudel, 1984; Arrighi, 2010), a necessary point can 
be established: periodisation does not hinge on universalising frames, in which all 
developments, across a world system, are tied to that period. As such, when 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is challenged on its periodisation, it is not being assumed 
that the framework makes this kind of claim. Rather, as we will find through 
consideration of Gramscian and regulationist approaches to the task of periodisation, 
periods can absolutely be variegated across different spatial levels of analysis. Other 
significant insights drawn out from these latter approaches are the distinction between 
‘conjunctural’ and ‘organic’ periods, as well as the necessity to relate periods back to the 
issues of accumulation and reproduction. These nuances of periodisation are overlooked 
in the hasty conceptualisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, and the authors of this 
approach would do well to return to these fundamental debates. 
 
The third chapter, then, will be an attempt to bring the theoretical and methodological 
insights of the former two chapters to bear on the actual history of neoliberalism. It will do 
so by considering three empirical ‘moments’ of authoritarianism within the neoliberal 
frame: Pinochet’s Chile, Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, and the Greek experience 
of authoritarianism under the framework of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
Each of these ‘moments’ will be treated as indicative – they are not exhaustive histories, 
nor do they claim to be. They should, however, be seen as indicative of broader trends 
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–  other moments of authoritarianism within the broad history of neoliberalism are as 
diverse as the repression of political freedoms in order to drive wide programmes of 
privatisation in Suharto’s Indonesia (see Blakeley, 2009: 88-91), through to the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of neoliberalism under the WTO and multilateral trade 
agreements (Sinclair, 2015; Cahill, 2014), with a wide array of examples between. There 
are many possible examples of authoritarianism in the past four decades which we might 
choose to focus on, but these three – Chile, the UK, and the EU – have been chosen 
for particular reasons. The reason for the first and second cases is that these are the 
examples which will most likely be used by critics of the framework. As part of the 
widespread genesis narrative of neoliberalism, Pinochet and Thatcher have both been 
characterised as authoritarian in some way – these two cases must be considered if a 
judgement is to be developed on the periodisation of authoritarian neoliberalism. The 
third case is necessary, as the structure of the EU is given as the definitional example of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ by Bruff (2014) himself, in the original theorisation of the 
concept. If the claims of Bruff (2014), Tansel (2017), and others supporting the claim 
that there has been a ‘qualitative’ change in the nature of neoliberalism, ‘towards’ 
coercion, since the Global Financial Crisis, then there must be an apparent difference in 
the authoritarianism of the first two ‘moments’ compared to the third. With this very 
brief history of authoritarianism under neoliberalism, the theoretical challenges to the 
specificity of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ are compounded by the historical. And so, 
with this history in mind, we will return to the claims made by Bruff and others, 
rearticulating the extant conceptualisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. With these 
claims fresh in our minds, the tools developed in previous chapters will finally be 
brought to bear. 
 
Argument 
The argument being developed is that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ cannot be sustained 
as a period in its own right – the framework as it has been articulated to date presents 
neither a methodology, nor evidence, to support the claim that contemporary 
authoritarian state transformation is ‘qualitatively different’ to the kinds which preceded 
2007. If those claims are jettisoned, however, Gramsci’s insights regarding ‘conjunctural’ 
verses ‘organic movements’ push us to consider whether authoritarian neoliberalisation 
might be better conceived as a product of the broader process of neoliberalisation, 
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convulsing through a period of organic crisis, rather than as a period in its own right. 
This Gramscian perspective is also closely related to the real contribution offered by this 
emergent framework: through its focus on changes to the state which concurrently 
strengthen and weaken it, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ puts a name to a particular 
contradiction. By considering the durability of authoritarian-type state transformations, 
in part by returning to the work of Poulantzas, the framework of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ offers a useful vantage point from which to consider the current crisis. 
By focussing less on drawing arbitrary lines of periodisation, and more on the generative 
mechanisms which are creating change, a real contribution can be made to our 
understanding of our current global political economy.  
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Chapter One 
Depoliticisation: Theory, history, and challenges  
 
The durability of neoliberalism as a form of social and economic management post-2007 
has challenged assumptions of scholars who regarded the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
as a turning point. Some have explained this durability through the lens of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. For Bruff (2014: 115-16), this process can ‘be observed in the 
reconfiguring of the state and institutional power in an attempt to insulate certain 
policies and institutional practices from social and political dissent’. This is achieved (in 
part) through a ‘recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and appropriate 
for nonmarket institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations in the process’. It is 
precisely that ‘recalibration’ of the ‘expectations’ we have for the political process that 
this chapter is concerned with.  Defining ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ in this way, 
however, poses a challenge to the novelty of Bruff’s conceptualisation –  I would argue 
that this process of ‘reducing expectations’ is already the focus of much research under 
the banner of ‘depoliticisation’. Further, other literatures around disciplinary 
neoliberalism and new constitutionalism (Gill, 2008) would also seem to describe a 
similar process. For Burnham (2001: 129) ‘depoliticisation’ is best understood as ‘politics 
at one remove’ – a process whereby changes ‘market expectations regarding the 
effectiveness and credibility of policy-making’. The similarities between these 
approaches should be immediately apparent, and present a direct challenge to the 
emerging literature surrounding ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
 
The implications of this conceptual overlap are significant, and go far beyond charging 
authors with developing synonymous and superfluous neologisms. Fundamentally, the 
concern here is the material conditions which are the subjects of these various attempts 
at theorisation; ultimately these conceptual issues indicate a deeper issue regarding 
historical specificity. Burnham (2001) argues that the New Labour government of Tony 
Blair pursued a state strategy of ‘depoliticisation’ whereby certain spheres of policy-
making were quarantined away from popular contestation. And yet, according to Bruff, 
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‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ – a process that would seem to at least overlap with the 
extant concept of ‘depoliticisation’ – is ‘qualitatively distinct’ from the forms of 
authoritarianism present before 2007, and the GFC. And so, a critical interrogation of 
the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ demands a consideration of the existing 
literature around ‘depoliticisation’, as well as a consideration of the implications of these 
contesting concepts for historical specificity, and the possibility of periodisation. 
 
This thesis is, however, a sympathetic critique of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
Ultimately, the argument to be developed throughout the thesis is that the claim that 
there has been a ‘qualitative change’ in the way states attempt to reproduce neoliberal 
capitalism cannot be sustained. This does not mean that the framework does not offer 
other insights into the conditions and processes of social reproduction in the current 
conjuncture. For this reason, the secondary aim of the thesis is to tease out those aspects 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ which reveal, rather than obscure. This leads to the 
question: are there conditions or processes, which have been analysed under the rubric 
of ‘depoliticisation’, that might usefully augment the emerging conceptualisation of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’? And so, as we move through a survey of ‘depoliticisation’, 
consideration will be given to the positive implications of any conceptual overlap with 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, as well as the negative. Thus this chapter argues that 1) 
depoliticisation is a process closely related to that of  ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, that 
2) this conceptual overlap challenges the historical specificity of this process that is 
supposedly ‘qualitatively distinct’ in the post-GFC period, and that 3) as well as 
challenging ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, by surveying the concept of ‘depoliticisation’, 
utility may be added to our emerging concept, as the more-advanced debate around 
depoliticisation offers suggestive signposts for further research into the more-useful 
aspects of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
 
In pursuing this third point, we are essentially concerned with the durability of 
depoliticisation as a state strategy. Consider a question raised by Bruff (2014:125) 
himself: ‘whether the contradictions inherent to authoritarian neoliberalism—especially 
with regard to the strengthening/weakening of the state—have created conditions in 
which progressive and radical politics can begin to reverse the tide of the last three 
decades’? Building on Poulantzas (1978: 241-247), Bruff suggests that these 
authoritarian changes to the state dialectically strengthen and weaken the state, as the 
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contradictions inherent to this process create fractures within which progressive politics 
might struggle for change. Elsewhere Bruff (2016: 149) has restated the question of 
whether the contradictions inherent to this strengthening/weakening of the state ‘have 
created conditions in which progressive and radical politics can begin to reverse the tide 
of the last three decades’? Here that question is supplemented, querying precisely what 
the mechanisms whereby these authoritarian changes could result in a weakening of the 
state – how might these contradictions present? Poulantzas’s original framework is light 
on the ground with fully articulated mechanisms that might articulate this dialectic, 
beyond a sharpening of the ‘generic elements of political crisis’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 241) 
– indeed, the chapter dedicated to this apparent ‘tendency’ is only six pages long. The 
speculative comments within Poulantzas’s theorisation point toward a leftward 
politicisation of state bureaucrats, and returns to rank-and-file democratic organisation; 
I would hazard that these tendencies were contextually specific, and that further research 
is needed to consider how these contradictions might present today. It is this final 
question, whether the ‘strengthening/weakening’ dynamic offers hope of successful challenge to 
authoritarian-type developments, which an engagement with the literature around 
depoliticisation, and the social property relations approach, will speak to. 
 
Through this chapter, two things will become apparent. First, the widespread usage of 
‘depoliticisation’, and the fundamental nature of ‘depoliticisation’ within Political 
Marxism, will both throw up challenges for the periodisation of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. Bruff (2014: 115-116) implies that depoliticisation is a part of the process 
and period of authoritarian neoliberalism despite the fact that the separation of the 
‘political’ from the ‘economic’ under capitalism has been treated as definitional to 
capitalist development (Brenner, 1977; Wood, 1981). From another perspective, 
however, that ‘separationism’ creates a misleading narrative of the origins of capitalism, 
with scholars of the post-colonial and ‘uneven and combined development’ approaches, 
who highlight that the use of political power has always been central to expanding and 
maintaining capitalist social relations (Banaji, 2010; Rioux, 2013; Anievas and 
Nişancıoğlu, 2015).  This complicates our periodisation further. Research from this 
perspective emphasises that capitalist social relations are not only reproduced through a 
clean separation of the political and the economic, but that violence has a central role in 
this reproduction, particularly in the global South. By bringing this literature into the 
conversation, this chapter presents a challenge to the concept of ‘authoritarian 
29 
 
neoliberalism’ on two fronts: reduced expectations in the scope of non-market 
institutions are definitional to capitalism, and the overt use of (coercive) political power 
to maintain capitalist social relations would also seem to have a significant historical role.  
Whichever way one cuts it, the material conditions of the current conjuncture, which 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ presents as qualitatively distinct, would seem to have 
existed in many places and at many different times in the history of capitalist 
development. Treating things as new that are not obscures our understanding of these 
very processes. One such process which might be obscured in this way is the 
‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic which has been attributed to these processes of 
state-change – first by Poulantzas (1978), and later invoked by Bruff (2014). In this way, 
this chapter will dialectically weaken, and then strengthen, the case for ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ as a useful concept. Thus, a consideration of depoliticisation in its many 
forms allows for a whistle-stop tour of the history and theory of capitalist development, 
and the process by which the boundaries of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are 
(re)drawn. By bringing the emergent concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ into these 
historical and theoretical literatures, we will be better placed to understand those very 
conditions which prompted this wave of conceptualisation.  
 
 
Politics ‘at one remove’ 
If we are to make the claim that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ refers to similar processes 
as does ‘depoliticisation’, then we had best survey the latter. Depoliticisation is, however, 
a difficult concept to map, as the process to which it refers is not always labelled as such: 
the separation of the Church from the state, the creation of an independent judiciary 
and the associated development of ‘inalienable rights’, all the way through to removing 
the control of monetary policy from democratically elected representatives – all of these 
processes can be seen, retrospectively as ‘depoliticisation’, but might not be traditionally 
conceived of as such. As John Lilburne stood in front of the Court of Star Chamber in 
London in 1637 and refused to answer questions based on secret allegations (Peirce, 
2010: x) posed by a court comprised of largely political figures, in the absence of a jury, 
his defence was resting on the idea that the legal system should not be a political system 
– that is, it should be depoliticised. But while we may identify this process as such, there 
is no established canon of literature which comprehensively defines the term, beyond 
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the idea of making something which was once ‘political’ no longer so. This is not to say 
there is not a literature associated with the term: indeed, there are several.4 Unfortunately, 
as is often the case with such trans-disciplinary terms, its meaning is imprecise. Often 
(e.g. Wong, et al, 2004) imprecision is taken to its extreme, as the concept is deployed 
with no theoretical basis or content beyond ‘making something less political’. Although 
a comprehensive review of that problematic literature is beyond us here, some of that 
unevenness can be captured by comparing Marxian (Burnham, 2001; 2014) and non-
Marxian (Buller and Flinders, 2005; Flinders and Buller, 2006) contributions to the 
analysis of British politics. 
 
In his analysis of Tony Blair’s New Labour government, Burnham arrived at 
‘depoliticisation’ as the defining characteristic of the Third Way. Burnham provides a 
useful starting point for our discussion: 
 
In essence, depoliticisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making. State managers retain, in many instances, arm’s length control over 
crucial economic and social processes, whilst simultaneously benefiting from the distancing 
effects of depoliticisation. As a form of politics it seeks to change market expectations 
regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy-making in addition to shielding the 
government from the consequences of unpopular policies (Burnham, 2001: 129, original 
emphasis).  
 
This encapsulates the key themes of depoliticisation: it is a ‘governing strategy’ 
(consciously or unconsciously) deployed by state managers and elites in order to shield 
the state from particular demands. This relates to the legitimacy of the state, discussed 
further in the second chapter of this thesis (see also O’Connor, 1973: 6). Presenting 
depoliticisation as politics ‘at one remove’ is an important aspect of Burnham’s 
definition. A shift in institutional structures, or popular expectations, that appears to 
remove a particular area of policy from democratic political contestation does not make 
this policy area or institution apolitical. Rather, the political nature of a particular set of 
social relations, which have apparently been depoliticised, is retained in essence – while 
the character of those relations might shift, they remain political. It is the fetishising 
nature of capitalism that presents these relations as apolitical in appearance.  
 
                                                          
4 For a useful survey of this literature, see ‘Table 1’ in Flinders and Buller (2006: 294). 
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Congruent with Burnham’s concept of depoliticisation, we find several treatments of 
the process whereby the boundary between the political process and the economic 
sphere is redrawn. One such example is the rise of central banking and inflation-
targeting as the only goal of monetary policy. In the words of Saad-Filho (2007: 89), 
these related processes ‘constrain the choice of economic policy priorities and the use 
of the available policy tools… and limit the demands of the working class’. And yet, 
rejecting an apolitical reading of monetary policy, as he argues that ‘monetary policy 
regimes are irreducibly political’. This is an example of depoliticisation in its institutional 
form. In a general discussion of the process within the neoliberal context, Cahill gives 
us another congruent concept in the form of ‘institutional embeddedness’. For Cahill, 
institutional embedding is ‘the development of institutional frameworks that predispose 
states to neoliberal policy practices’. The process involves enshrining a  
 
regulatory bias towards neoliberalism through formal rules that privilege neoliberal policy 
practices, including various forms of competition policy as well as new rules governing the 
conduct of fiscal and monetary policy… neoliberal practices are institutionally embedded by 
quarantining such practices from popular deliberation (Cahill, 2014: 106). 
 
This ‘quarantining’ is immediately connotative of both Burnham’s depoliticisation, Saad-
Filho’s characterisation of the institutionalisation of monetarism, as well as Bruff’s 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Continuing with this conceptual mosaic, take also Stephen 
Gill’s ‘new constitutionalism’. Depoliticisation is seen to redraw the boundaries between 
politics and the economy; ‘new constitutionalism’ is a process which involves the 
‘insulation of key aspects of the economy from the influence of politicians or the mass 
of citizens by imposing, internally and externally, ‘binding constraints’ on the conduct 
of fiscal, monetary and trade and investment policies’ (Gill, 2008: 132). Indeed, the 
constitutional-legal nature of many such restructurings has been the focus of Stephen 
Gill and others utilising the ‘new constitutionalism’ framework for some time (Gill, 
1990, 1998, 2008; Gill and Cutler, 2015; Sinclair, 2015).  
 
At this point, it has been shown that there is a broad swathe of literature which relates 
to the limitation of the ‘political’, and that at each turn scholars have found material 
conditions which would seem broadly similar to those Bruff describes as defining 
features of post-2007 global political economy. Here it is worth returning to Bruff’s 
conceptualisation, in order to highlight precisely how significant this broad literature on 
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the institutional expressions of depoliticisation is to the specificity of authoritarian 
neoliberalism: 
 
Under authoritarian neoliberalism dominant social groups are less interested in neutralizing 
resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromise that maintain their 
hegemony favouring instead the explicit exclusion and marginalisation of subordinate social 
groups through the constitutionally and legally engineered self-disempowerment of 
nominally democratic institutions, governments, and parliaments (Bruff, 2014: 116). 
 
 And yet Bruff continues, seemingly dismissing these parallels: 
Unlike Stephen Gill’s (2008) ostensibly similar account of “disciplinary” neoliberalism, which 
instrumentalizes the law as a tool of the powerful (especially transnational capital), I argue 
that any attempted reshaping of the legal framework is a multilinear, uneven, and 
contradictory process…the authoritarian neoliberal response could further heighten this 
[post-2007 legitimation] crisis by way of the state’s reconfiguration into a less open and 
democratic entity (Bruff, 2014: 116). 
 
This distinction is not entirely clear. Even if it is the case that contradiction and tensions 
between various fractions of capital are absent from Gill’s analysis (and I do not think 
this is a fair charge), surely all Bruff is suggesting here is a nuancing of an existing 
concept? There is no reason to think the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ is so rigid 
as to exclude additional emphasis on the contradictory nature of this process. By setting 
itself in contention with new constitutionalism, and other extant treatments of 
institutionalised depoliticisation, authoritarian neoliberalism is picking semantic fights 
with friends, rather than seeking collaboration for strategic leveraging. These extant 
theorisations do present a challenge for the novelty of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
More importantly, it is not just the novelty of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as a concept 
with which we are concerned, but rather claims that these processes observed after 2007 
are somehow different to those that came before. At this point, it would seem difficult 
to sustain that claim, but we put this aside until a methodology for periodisation can be 
developed in Chapter Two. What we can say about this literature at this point, is that it 
does emphasise that depoliticisation is not limited to ‘expectations’, or other ideological-
discursive limitations on the political – it is also borne out, and embedded, through 
lasting institutional changes. Crucially, while these changes are not immutable, they do 
calcify the state apparatus, lending a path-dependant aspect to neoliberalisation: ‘not 
only does such institutional embedding further strengthen the power of capital, thus 
complementing the embeddedness of the neoliberal policy regime in a set of class 
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relations which privilege capital, it also gives added durability to neoliberalism, making 
it highly resistant to change’ (Cahill, 2014: 117). 
 
‘Depoliticisation’ is used to describe both institutional and discursive processes, whereby 
the expectations placed on states and state-representatives are reduced. This process is 
entirely congruent with Bruff’s claim that authoritarian neoliberalism operates, in part, 
through a ‘recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and appropriate for 
nonmarket institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations in the process’ (2014: 115-
16), to repeat the above quotation. Noting this conceptual overlap, our understanding 
of authoritarian neoliberalism could be supplemented thus: one of the mechanisms whereby 
the state is ‘reconfigured into a less democratic entity’ under authoritarian neoliberalism is that of 
depoliticisation, in both its institutional and discursive forms. But surely, this is a rather obvious 
statement, even if Bruff failed to make this conceptual overlap explicit in his original 
conceptualisation? I would argue that this observation compounds questions already 
raised as to the historical specificity of designating the post-global financial crisis context 
as the ‘rise’ of authoritarian neoliberalism – if depoliticisation has been a strategy since 
Blair (and arguably earlier, as we shall see) where is the justification for a new break in 
our periodisation of capitalism? These questions will be addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 
of this thesis. First, however, let us start with a more modest consideration: can anything 
be added to our understanding of authoritarian neoliberalism from the literature 
surrounding depoliticisation? 
 
 
The durability of depoliticisation 
 
Existing studies of depoliticisation help to articulate the contradictions inherent to this 
process. If ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ effectively describes a similar process, then our 
understanding of the material conditions that prompted Bruff’s theorisation – the many 
challenges to democracy in the current conjuncture – would be deepened through a 
consideration of this existing literature. Fundamentally, the process of depoliticisation is 
a contradictory one, which creates fractures in the state; contradictions which are the 
mechanisms, I would argue, that bear out the ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic 
articulated by Poulantzas. This can be seen, conversely, by considering the absence of 
dialectical method in non-Marxist accounts of this same process. Following on from 
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Burnham’s characterisation of Third Way New Labour as a government relying on the 
strategy of depoliticisation, Jim Buller and Matthew Flinders (2005) join the discussion 
with an account of some of the contextual reasons for the strategic selection of this 
approach to governance. Their contribution is collegial, agreeing with and building on 
Burnham’s; indeed, there is nothing overtly ‘wrong’ with their article – it is in their 
silence on particular points, however, that the explanatory power of Buller and Flinders’ 
narrative begins to falter. Buller and Flinders assert (unerringly) that depoliticisation in 
the UK context was not a ‘necessary’ or ‘inevitable’ governance trajectory, but rather ‘a 
gradual playing out of internal contradictions between discretionary policy instruments 
and the institutional context surrounding their operation… They were, in part, a product 
of human agency, as policy makers failed to appreciate the structural prerequisites for 
the successful implementation of [their] politicised governing strategy’ (2005: 540).  
 
What do they mean by the statement that there were ‘structural prerequisites’ for a 
‘politicised governing strategy’? What Buller and Flinders are discussing here is the 
breakdown of Keynesianism – something they attribute to the fact that ‘State managers in 
Britain have historically governed on a structural terrain which has penalised the 
development of interventionist strategies in the industrial sphere’ (2005: 538). Although 
this conversation in depoliticisation studies within the United Kingdom is quite collegial 
and sympathetic (see Burnham, 2001; Buller and Flinders, 2005; Burnham 2006; Buller 
and Flinders, 2006; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Burnham, 2014), I see these two 
approaches – Marxian and non-Marxian – in contention. The non-Marxian account is 
unable to explain why politicisation strategies in the form of Keynesianism broke down, 
precisely because they do not have an appreciation of the dialectics of class and state. 
Thus, their analyses of depoliticisation (as opposed to politicisation) also fail to locate 
contradiction within the process and the causal mechanisms underlying 
‘depoliticisation’. Without a grounding in the fundamental basis of class – and the 
contradictions therein – these mainstream conceptions of depoliticisation fail to 
articulate convincing reasons for the adoption of this state strategy, as they fall back on 
the assumption that depoliticisation is the simple product of the free will of man. They 
see depoliticisation as voluntarist.  
 
By failing to situate class – and, in particular, the class-character of the state – in their 
analysis, they fail to fully explain what these ‘contradictions’ between institutions and 
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their contexts are. It was not simply the existence of ‘institutions’ which necessitated 
contradiction, but rather the class-character of those institutions; to discuss the 
breakdown of Keynesianism, and state responses thereafter, without reference to the 
specificities of the balance of class forces during that conjuncture is a fatal omission (see 
Brenner, 2006: 165-166; Gamble and Walton, 1976: 11). ‘Crudely put’, in the words of 
Werner Bonefeld (2010: 17), ‘the purpose of capital is to accumulate extracted surplus 
value, and the state is the political form of this purpose’– while this state-ontological 
claim is itself problematic, and will be the focus of discussion further on, it makes the 
necessary point: the ‘structural terrain’ discussed by Buller and Flinders did not constrain 
politicisation because it was political, but because it was a political strategy that was against 
the interests of capital. The implication of this argument is that the state strategies which 
have promoted neoliberalism are apolitical, whereas the Keynesian strategies which 
preceded them failed due to their political nature. Elsewhere, these same authors reduce 
depoliticisation down to ‘a means of reducing certain political transaction costs’ 
(Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296). Here they empty the concept of utility even further, as 
the structural imperatives of the state as guarantor of accumulation and manager of 
crises thereof are ignored, instead prioritising the opportunism – and voluntarism – of 
individual actors who, at this point, have no class identity. It is for precisely this reason 
that Isaac (1987: 80) defines power as ‘those capacities to act possessed by social agents 
in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate’; power is shaped by and 
specific to the structural context in which an agent is situated. Any treatment that seeks 
to explain a conjunctural turn to depoliticisation as a state strategy, while failing to give 
adequate weighting to the very social relations that define the power exercised by those 
agents and institutions, will fall short of a theoretically or strategically useful analysis.  
 
A strength of the Marxian reading of ‘depoliticisation’, as represented by Burnham, is 
an ability to comment on the contradictions created by depoliticisation strategies. This 
strength can be usefully projected across, adding nuance to Bruff’s concept of 
authoritarian neoliberalism, beyond a simple reliance on the work of Poulantzas. Bruff’s 
argument relies on Poulantzas’s (1978: 245) ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic, 
whereby authoritarian-type state changes are seen to simultaneously ‘strengthen and 
weaken the state’ (Bruff, 2014: 124, emphasis in original). Elsewhere Bruff (2016: 149) 
has left open the question as to whether the contradictions inherent to this 
strengthening/weakening of the state ‘have created conditions in which progressive and 
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radical politics can begin to reverse the tide of the last three decades’. In this thesis, that 
question is supplemented, querying precisely what are the mechanisms whereby these 
authoritarian changes could result in a ‘weakening’ of the state – how might these 
contradictions present? Poulantzas’s original framework is light on the ground with fully 
articulated mechanisms that might explain this dialectic, beyond a sharpening of the 
‘generic elements of political crisis’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 241) – indeed, the chapter 
dedicated to this apparent ‘tendency’ is only six pages long. Rather than providing 
answers, Poulantzas raises a key question: how durable is the strategy of ‘authoritarian 
statism’? Even if we reject the claim that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as experienced 
since 2007 is somehow ‘distinct’ from the authoritarianism that came before (as this 
thesis aims to do), this does not reduce the relevance of this question. If ‘authoritarian 
statism’ is present in the current conjuncture, then a political-economic understanding 
of that conjuncture would be deepened if we also understood the sustainability of this 
process.  The argument made by this chapter is that while Poulantzas askes a crucial 
question regarding the durability of authoritarian-type state strategies, he does not 
articulate all the mechanisms that might realise a weakening of the state – but that these 
mechanisms are not wholly unknown. Through this consideration of Burnham’s work 
on ‘depoliticisation’, we have seen just such a mechanism: the appearance of state 
strategies as being grounded in class, which leads us to a consideration of the state. Let 
us go through this in more detail.  
 
A theoretical contribution to this question can be found by returning to Burnham’s 
treatment of ‘depoliticisation’. While discussing overtly authoritarian changes as a result 
to the ongoing crisis in Europe, Burnham argued that 
 
such moves represent not the logical extension but rather failure of depoliticisation strategies 
and result in the immediate politicisation of social relations escalating further the likelihood 
of [class] conflict. The politicisation of social relations calls into question not only the content 
of policies but the separation of state and civil society that Marx understood as constitutive 
of capitalism (Burnham, 2014: 203).  
 
This is the heart of the contradiction of depoliticisation – and authoritarian 
neoliberalism – as a dialectical process: as intervention ‘within the economy’ (not to 
accept this apparent separation) is foreclosed through depoliticisation, the state 
apparatus becomes less responsive to popular demands. As this occurs, the apparent 
neutrality of the state is undermined, as its actual class-character is more-fully revealed. 
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This argument is made in historical light by Ellen Meiksins Wood, who argued that 
‘insofar as capital in its mounting crises demands, and obtains, the state’s complicity in 
its anti-social purposes, that state may increasingly become a prime target of resistance 
in advanced capitalist countries – as it has been in every successful modern revolution’ 
(1981: 94-5). By bringing Wood in here, however, we mention the elephant in the room. 
In the social property relations approach, the ultimate form of depoliticisation is the 
apparent separation of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’, and this is a defining feature of 
the development of capitalism. Or, as Wood puts it, under capitalism ‘a spatially separate 
political sphere may intervene in the economy, but the economy itself is evacuated of 
social content and is, as it were, depoliticized’ (1981: 68). And so, while Wood adds 
depth to our understanding of the contradictions inherent to depoliticisation, the 
tradition she hails from would seem to present the most serious challenge to the 
historical specificity of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ yet. If the duration of capitalist 
history has been marked by a shifting boundary between the ‘political’ and the 
‘economic’, then on what grounds can we make the claim (as Bruff does) that limitations 
to those issues considered as ‘political’ in the current context are a departure from 
previous trends? We turn now to consider the implications of the social property 
relations approach (or Political Marxism, as it is also known) for our emergent concept 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, in order to deepen the challenge to its historical 
specificity. 
 
The ‘political’ and the ‘economic’: depoliticisation through separation 
One of the fundamental tasks of historical materialism is to understand the historical 
specificity of capitalism; to ask ‘what is it that makes capitalism distinct from other 
modes of social organisation?’ In answer to that question, Ellen Meiksins Wood argued 
that  
Capitalism differs from other social forms because… appropriators cannot rely on ‘extra-
economic’ powers of appropriation by means of direct coercion – such as the military, 
political, and judicial powers that enable feudal lords to extract surplus labour from peasants 
– but must depend on the purely ‘economic’ mechanisms of the market (Wood, 2002: 2).  
 
This is not to the exclusion of ‘extra-economic’ power; rather, there is a division of 
labour between the ‘two moments of capitalist exploitation – appropriation and 
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coercion’ (Wood, 1981: 81). In this view, under non-capitalist social orders there is no 
distinction between these moments; the appropriator of surplus is also the one 
threatening coercion, and that these moments occur concurrently – encapsulated within 
the actions of the feudal lord, or the slave owner. The historical specificity of capitalism 
is found in the way these two moments are seemingly separated: 
Although the coercive force of the ‘political’ sphere is ultimately necessary to sustain private 
property and the power of appropriation, ‘economic’ need supplies the immediate 
compulsion that forces the worker to transfer surplus labour to the capitalist in order to gain 
access to the means of production (Wood, 1981: 81). 
 
The foundational nature of this separation is reinforced by looking back to Marx, and 
primitive accumulation. Marx describes primitive accumulation as ‘nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Capital I, 
1973: 668). The enclosure movement itself is not a sufficient definition of capitalism, 
however – the worker must also be removed from the means of subsistence, in order to 
create the insidious compulsion, which propels labour toward the commodification of 
its labour-power (Wood, 2007: 145). When this moment is generalised across a society, 
the transition from a society with markets to a market society is complete; the worker is given 
a false choice between selling their labour power or starvation – indeed, ‘formally free 
wage-labourers are set apart from slaves and serfs more by their illusion of having greater 
real freedom than by the relatively greater real freedom which they do in fact enjoy!’ 
(Bhandari, 2008: 74). Robert Brenner concurs on this point, articulating the transition 
from the existence of markets to the totalisation of capitalist social relations: 
What therefore accounts for capitalist economic development is that the class 
(property/surplus extraction) structure of the economy as a whole determines that the 
reproduction carried out by its component ‘units’ is dependent upon their ability to increase 
their production (accumulate) ... In contrast, pre-capitalist economies, even those in which 
trade is widespread, can develop only within definite limits, because the class structure of the 
economy as a whole determines that their component units—specifically those producing 
the means of subsistence and means of production, i.e. means of survival and reproduction, 
rather than luxuries—neither can nor must systematically increase the forces of production, 
the productivity of labour, in order to reproduce themselves (Brenner, 1977: 32-33, original 
emphasis). 
 
Essentially, the point here is that when market compulsion becomes generalised this 
then creates structural accumulation imperatives for capital, thus locking in place the 
dialectical process that is the circuit of capital, and the resultant contradictions and crises 
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which result (Heilbroner, 2011: 266-268). We will return to these Political Marxist 
axioms later on. First, however, it is the apparent separation of those two moments – 
the ‘political’ moment of coercion and the ‘economic’ moment of appropriation – with 
which we are here concerned. This is because, in Wood’s own words, this separation 
constitutes the ‘depoliticisation’ of surplus appropriation; from this viewpoint 
depoliticisation is part of the origins and essence of capitalism. Put in Bruff’s language, this is 
surely the ultimate ‘recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and appropriate 
for nonmarket institutions to engage in’. Does this make the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ redundant? In order to answer this question, further analysis is required. 
Indeed, the methodology of periodisation as it relates to the state and crises will be the 
specific focus of the second chapter.  
 
This chapter is developing the argument that the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
lacks historical specificity. Although there are no published critiques of this emergent 
concept at this early stage, surely this critique has been the knee-jerk reaction of many, 
due to the salient role of authoritarianism within the genesis of neoliberalism: Pinochet’s 
Chile (see Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2005: 28) is the typical case, but Indonesia under Suharto 
is also an excellent example. What we find here is that the challenge to the specificity of 
authoritarian neoliberalism is actually much deeper, when one considers the crucial role of 
depoliticisation under capitalism in general. Put again, the critique of specificity can not 
only be made on the basis of pre-existing authoritarian state forms – the implications of 
depoliticisation are relevant here as well. Not only are there many examples of 
depoliticisation as a ‘governing strategy’ before the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (e.g. 
Burnham, 2001) – the conjuncture Bruff points towards as a qualitative break in state 
strategies of managing and reproducing capitalism (Bruff, 2014: 120) – but the apparent 
separation of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ depoliticises the ultimate act of 
authoritarianism: the workplace appropriation of surplus labour. This is a conceptual 
‘blind spot’ for authoritarian neoliberalism, and teasing out the ways in which extant 
debates around depoliticisation – and, through extrapolation, the historical specificity of 
capitalism – is an important part of developing the concept as an empirical research 
agenda. 
 
‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’ is, ultimately, a theory of the capitalistic state in the current 
context. Although the general conditions of capitalist social relations, as discussed by 
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Wood, do challenge the emergent concept, ultimately we need to bring this discussion 
into conversation with the state as well. As mentioned above, we shall return throughout 
this thesis to the theory of the state, as the state is fundamentally bound up with 
questions of crisis and period – the focus of Chapter Two. To provide a first ‘cut’ of the 
state, however, let us work through Wood’s own conception of how the state interacts 
with the political/economic separation. Taking the foundation of social property 
relations, we can dissolve further the apparent separation which vulgar economics is so 
often befuddled by. For Wood the ‘juridical-political ‘sphere’’ is ‘implicated in the 
productive ‘base’’: 
 
from an historical point of view even political institutions like village and state enter directly 
into the constitution of productive relations and are in a sense prior to them (even where 
these institutions are not the direct instruments of surplus-appropriation) to the extent that 
relations of production are historically constituted by the configuration of political power 
that determines the outcome of class conflict (Wood, 1981: 80).  
 
The state is not only patterned by the class struggle, but then reconditions ongoing 
struggle through an institutionalisation of the balance of class power, whilst 
simultaneously allowing, promoting, and shaping the productive process itself – classic 
examples of this principle include the maintenance and extension of private property 
rights, and the fundamental frameworks of employment law (see Poulantzas, 1978; 
Miliband, 1969; Bonefeld, 2010). By seeing the state, production, and class struggle as 
internally related in this way we can argue that while state forms may be more or less 
authoritarian, or be more or less popular-democratic, the ultimate act of 
authoritarianism remains within the workplace itself – an authoritarianism which is 
depoliticised through the apparent demarcation of the economic sphere which is, itself, 
achieved through the character (and perception thereof) of the state. 
 
In terms of our understanding of the ‘political’, however, we see that the political 
institution of capitalism – the state – is not deterministically instituted to act at the behest 
of capital.  Rather, the state has ‘relative autonomy’ to act independently from the 
interests of capital, within certain bounds; relative autonomy explains this paradoxical 
treatment of the ‘political’. The ‘political’ does not have a determined class character. 
This is seen particularly in the democratic iteration of the juridical-political institutional 
arrangement. Conservative forces would have no need to limit the scope of democracy 
in fear of radical, popular concessions (Zizek, 2010: 392) if the state really was just an 
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executive for the interests of capital. Now, to be certain, the treatment of the state as 
‘relatively autonomous’ does not solve all issues of state theorisation – under this 
treatment questions remain as to why the state might be more or less autonomous at 
particular points in time, in different places. ‘Relative autonomy’ does, however, help us 
to locate the state between the separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’. It shows 
us that that which is ‘democratic’ is not necessarily progressive. For example, the related 
Gramscian concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘passive revolution’ attempt to explain why 
popular movements and democratic processes can deepen capitalist social relations, 
rather than challenge them (see Morton, 2007; Thomas, 2009). But, in any case, the first 
line of ‘defence’ against democratic contestation’s radical potential is simply the apparent 
separation of the ‘political’ from the ‘economic’, which comprises Political Marxism’s 
abstract definition of capitalism. While formal democratic freedoms do not necessarily 
ensure progressive outcomes, the contingently radical potential of this framework is 
limited in the first instance simply by the apparent separation of the political from the 
economic.  
 
Here again we find increased utility for our conceptualisation of authoritarian 
neoliberalism through an explicit connection with the concept of depoliticisation. 
Marx’s dialectical method often returned to familiar concepts armed with fresh 
understandings – so too here do we return to our starting point with Ellen Meiksins 
Wood. Just as above, Burnham was seen to provide a mechanism for the claimed 
‘strengthening-weakening’ dialectic set in motion by the authoritarian ‘fix’, so too does 
Wood nuance this argument. Take the following quote from Democracy Against Capitalism: 
 
Economic struggle has been inseparable from political conflict and where the state, as a more 
visibly centralized and universal class enemy, has served as a focus for mass struggle. Even 
in more developed capitalist societies, mass militancy tends to emerge in response to ‘extra-
economic’ compulsion, particularly in the form of oppressive action by the state, and also 
varies in promotion to the state’s involvement in conflicts over the terms and conditions of 
work (Wood, 1995: 46).  
 
That is, when popular demands on the state apparatus exceed those that are possible at 
that point in time, given the necessity of maintaining capital accumulation, the state’s 
‘autonomy’ is revealed as false. This becomes especially interesting when contrasted with 
non-Western expressions of the state, from the Hegelian perspective of contradictions 
driving history (see Desai, 2004: 28):  
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If the primitive state was the controller of economic resources and the major appropriator 
and distributor of surplus product, the advanced ‘Asiatic’ state may represent a more or less 
natural development out of that primitive form – the appropriating redistributive public 
power at its highest stage of development. Seen in this light, it is not so much the 
‘hypertrophy’ of the ‘Asiatic’ state that needs to be explained. What requires explanation is 
the aberrant, uniquely ‘autonomous’ development of the economic sphere that eventually 
issued in capitalism (Wood, 1981: 86).  
 
Thus, if we take ‘class’ and ‘state’ as being the poles of contradiction, within the Asiatic 
case the two remained close (that is, not in tension). The specific separation in the 
Western case drew that contradiction into starker relief, driving historical development, 
and resulting in ongoing struggle of the articulation and rearticulation of the boundary 
between the two spheres. This might even be argued to constitute one of the driving 
forces behind uneven and combined development – at the very least though, this will 
provide a point of reference for discussions around eurocentrism further on.   
 
So, then, we can argue that the state is a contested space, but one which ultimately 
returns to the position of reproducing capitalist social relations. This is what is meant 
by the phrase ‘relative autonomy of the state’ – absolute autonomy would see the state 
freed from the structural necessity of reproducing capitalism. Put another way, the 
obscured ‘economic’ role of the state supports private surplus appropriation, 
highlighting the fact that the separation of the political and economic occurs only in 
appearance. This is borne out in practice through the moment of class struggle. While 
there may be struggles over the rate of exploitation (i.e. wage rate) or intensity of work 
(work conditions) within the workplace, these do not equate to a generalised, collective 
struggle. In the instances where struggle does become generalised, breaking out of the 
confines of the workplace and into the streets, and other public spaces – whether as a 
strike, or as a riot, as both are playing their part in the post-global financial crisis context 
(Clover, 2016). Indeed, the parallel developments of Western ‘Occupy’ movements, and 
spatialised resistance through the Arab Spring, has been the catalyst for much of the 
literature embracing ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as the conceptual frame for the current 
period (Tuğal, 2016; Tansel, ed. 2017). Both historically, and contemporaneously, it is in 
these situations that the state becomes the class enemy, struggling in proxy for capital, 
simply in their attempts to maintain “law and order”. Again, this is clearly articulated by 
Wood:  
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It is not capital itself but the state that conducts class conflict when it intermittently breaks 
outside the walls and takes more violent form. The armed power of capital thus usually 
remains in the background; and when class domination makes itself felt as direct and 
personal coercive force, it appears in the guise of an ‘autonomous’ and ‘neutral’ state (Wood, 
1981: 93).   
 
It may seem esoteric to continually speak of “separation in appearance, but not in 
essence”. But in this instance, we see a material expression of that distinction – one that 
holds direct implications for considerations of ‘authoritarian’ state forms. It is in this 
material basis that we find the real power of fetishism under capitalism, as the essence is 
obscured through reference to real ‘half-truths’ in the apparent form. In the case that 
struggles break out of the workplace and are materially suppressed, it is the state that – 
in the case of advanced capitalist states, at least – is seen as the antagonist in that 
expression of struggle. It is in that moment the class character of the state may be 
perceived by members of that struggling collective of labour. And yet the separation 
between the moment of coercion and the moment of surplus appropriation means that 
such struggles do not challenge the depoliticisation of social property relations – that 
pressure is largely deflected toward the state. In this way, a more-authoritarian state can 
be seen as a depoliticising state: not only in the sense that areas of policy are removed 
from the realm of popular control, but also in the sense that direct coercion reinforces 
the depoliticisation of exploitation achieved through the separation of the ‘political’ and 
‘economic’.  
 
This process can be seen as a dynamic that might (contingently) operationalise the 
‘strengthening-weakening’ claim of Poulantzas, upon which Bruff’s conception of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ rests:  
 
insofar as capital in its mounting crises demands, and obtains, the state’s complicity in its 
anti-social purposes, that state may increasingly become a prime target of resistance in 
advanced capitalist countries – as it has been in every successful modern revolution. The 
effect of this may be to overcome the particularism and the ‘economism’ imposed on the 
class struggle by the capitalist system of production, with its differentiation of the economic 
and the political’ (Wood, 1981: 94-5, emphasis added).  
 
Both the apparent separation of the ‘political’ and ‘economic’, and the state’s role in 
maintaining that appearance (particularly in the case of direct repression of class 
struggle), are threatened by authoritarian-type state interference. The separation of the 
political and the economic threatens to collapse as the state is seen more-and-more not 
44 
 
to be as ‘autonomous’ as first thought. This is not just a theoretical supposition. Some 
of the most tumultuous processes of change and revolution have occurred when the 
state becomes the target of popular struggle. In the words of E. J. Hobsbawm (1964: 
112), writing on the implications of the French Revolution: ‘the political models created 
by the Revolution of 1789 served to give discontent a specific object, to turn unrest into 
revolution, and above all to link all Europe in a single movement’. Whether this 
threatens the state in continuum is unclear. The state may simply transition into a 
traditional totalitarian-type regime – an argument which is supported by Poulantzas 
(1974: 72) in his analysis of fascism: ‘The inability of any class or class fraction to impose 
its hegemony is what characterises the conjuncture of fascism’. Put differently, if the 
crisis of legitimation created by observable interventions by the state into the economic 
sphere can create the conditions in which more authoritarianism is the only solution. 
None of this is determined, however. The purpose here is simply to emphasise that the 
fractures created by the ‘strengthening-weakening’ of the state are not necessarily 
progressive.  
 
 
This Chapter has looked to 1) deepen the critique of the claim by adherents to the 
concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is constituted by historical specificity, by 
highlighting the fundamental nature of depoliticisation under capitalistic social property 
relations, and 2) to also strengthen the utility of the concept, by highlighting the ways in 
which contradiction, as discussed in this extant literature, might provide mechanisms 
for the strengthening-weakening of the state. Before moving on to consider more closely 
the methodologies of periodisation, however, there is another argument which must be 
brought into the conversation: the charges of ahistoricism and eurocentrism, which have 
both been levelled at the social property relations approach. This should be considered, 
for if depoliticisation through separation presents a challenge for our conceptualisation 
of authoritarian neoliberalism, then surely the more-open theoretical and historical 
categories of this critical approach – which, importantly, see a greater historical role for 
both state and non-state violence in capitalist development – present an even greater 
provocation? If Political Marxism obscures the inherent violence of capitalism, then 
surely a framework which reifies the violence of the current period as “different” also 
obscures the nature of capitalist social relations? 
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Theory against history 
Subaltern and post-colonial theorists, such as Jairus Banaji and Sébastien Rioux, have 
criticised the social property relations approach, on the grounds that this approach gives 
methodological prioritisation to theory over history. Speaking on the separation of the 
‘political’ and ‘economic’ within capitalism, Banaji labelled this approach ‘a methodology 
of forced abstractions, which identified relations of production with particular forms of 
exploitation, the concept of ‘historical specificity’ was radically impoverished’ (Banaji, 
2010: 54), as he argued that ‘the line between freedom and coercion is impossible to 
draw’ (2010: 134). Taking up this same line is Rioux, who focuses on the continued and 
expanding role of ‘unfree’ labour under capitalism – defined as ‘forced labour, bonded 
labour, child labour, slave labour, famine slavery, indentured servants, involuntary 
domestic servitude, sexual servitude, child soldiers, and the like’ (Rioux, 2013: 93). For 
Rioux, neoliberal policies have created a socioeconomic context that has acted as a fertile 
bed for the increase of these extra-economic exploitative social relations, due in part to 
the conditions of precarity, uncertainty, and general economic hardship experienced by 
many in the periphery. The social property relations approach draws a contradistinction 
with capitalism and pre-capitalist forms by arguing that capitalism uniquely separates the 
political from the economic, with the appropriation of surplus value taking place in the 
economic sphere between formally-free wage-labourers and their employers. This 
definition sits uncomfortably with the continued and increasing role of indentured 
labour in the accumulation process, however, as Rioux explains: ‘according to political 
Marxism, then, so-called ‘unfree’ labour or ‘extra-economic’ coercion is antithetical to 
capital’s logic of unfree accumulation and therefore non-capitalist by definition’ (2013: 
94). This is seen to be problematic, due to the continued – and possibly expanding – 
role for coercion and violent, particularly in subaltern experiences of capitalism. Not 
only is this problematic for the historicity of the social property relations, but it is also a 
problem for the specificity of authoritarian neoliberalism! That is, violence and state 
suppression would, in this view, seem to be integral to both neoliberalism and capitalism 
more generally. In this way, critique of authoritarian neoliberalism as a useful concept is 
deepened.  
 
Rioux later draws in Hannes Lacher, bringing the state into this broader question of the 
mode of production. To trace Rioux’s criticism, we too should consider Lacher’s 
intervention, in which he asserted the importance of 
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Conceptualiz[ing] institutional orders such as the state and the market as social relations, and 
even more specifically as production relations… For the relations of production which are 
at the ‘base’ of society must encompass all those structures and institutions which we have 
discovered to be social relations. In that sense, capital as a social relation encompasses not 
only the market, but also the state. To go further: the autonomous political form of the state 
is a relation of production (Lacher, 2006: 39). 
This understanding of the state as political, and overall social, and yet inextricably linked 
with production, is particularly important. As well as being guilty of an Anglo-centric 
focus, which in turn leads to an ahistorical explanation of the role of coercion in the 
development of capitalism, the claim by post-colonial theorists is that Political Marxism 
partially obscures the state; or, at least, it narrows our view of it. From this perspective, 
there would seem to be a paradox in Wood’s treatment of the state. For Wood (1981: 
92): ‘[under capitalism] direct political coercion is excluded from the process of surplus-
extraction and removed to a state that generally intervenes only indirectly in the relations 
of production…’. The paradox in Wood’s ‘separationism’, evident in this quotation, is 
this: the state is the location of the ‘political’, removed from the direct appropriation of 
the production process; and yet we are also encouraged to look beyond the ‘appearance’ 
of separation to see the two as both political. What, then, is the real role of the state? Is 
it simply another location in a series of similarly political moments? Or is it still a distinct 
location, but one with characteristics beyond the dualism of the ‘political’ and the 
‘economic’? And if it falls within the latter, what is this new differentiation? Put more 
simply, if the separation of coercion from appropriation is simply a useful veil for the 
reproduction of capitalistic social relations, then how do we conceive of the state behind 
that veil? Per this reading of Political Marxism, within the political/economic 
dichotomy, the state either must be ‘political’ or ‘economic’. If it is ‘political’, it cannot 
have a surplus-extractive role – this overlaps with the problemitisation outlined above. 
In the words of Rioux: ‘Although the state continues to be essential to the maintenance 
of the whole system, its role is relegated to that of guardian of an otherwise insulated 
economic realm of capitalist exploitation’ (2013: 99). Already, with the detailed 
engagement with Wood above, it should be apparent that this is something of an 
oversimplification – nevertheless, it is a key part of the critique of Political Marxism. 
 
The subtitle of Wood’s Democracy against capitalism (1995) – ‘renewing historical materialism’ 
– is significant. Despite this commitment to historicism, this approach has been labelled 
as ahistorical: ‘the central problem with Political Marxism: that conceptual abstractions 
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and empirical realities do not correspond to each other (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 
31). The criticism here is that by prioritising theoretical closure over empirical analysis, 
the social property relations approach of Wood and Brenner results in a ‘violent 
abstraction’. An example of this is how Rioux takes issue with Brenner’s account of the 
origins of capitalism, seeing it as theoretically pre-determined: 
 
Implicit to Brenner’s approach is that he already knows what he is looking for – that is, the 
dispossession of peasants from their means of subsistence and the break-up of extra-
economic coercion. By definition, then, the transition to capitalism must be an agrarian 
phenomenon disconnected from commercial development (Rioux, 2013: 100). 
 
Rioux’s criticism continues, arguing that Charles Post’s (2011) characterisation of 
plantation-slavery as non-capitalist renders such a narrow scope as to obscure 
significant, violent experiences, which – for him – also constitute the history of 
capitalism. Similarly, Rioux also argues that Wood’s characterisation of the British 
Empire as non-capitalist, is seen as a further example of this over-emphasis on theory, 
at the expense of a dialectical engagement with history: ‘In this ‘history deja constituee’, to 
borrow Banaji’s felicitous expression, history is reread through the prism of a static 
method of self-confirmation as it filters history according to a predefined theoretical 
grid’ (Rioux, 2013: 101). 
 
Then there is the issue of eurocentrism. Banaji highlights the way in which Southern 
experiences of the emergence of capitalist forms were distinct from that of Britain – 
distinct in a way that proves problematic for the conception that there is a neat 
separation of the ‘political’ and ‘economic’ under capitalism. In a way, Wood and 
Brenner can be seen as reproducing the errors of Marx himself, with Marx ‘reducing 
Asiatic regimes to the bipolar simplicity of a mass of village-communities on one side 
and an all-powerful sovereign on the other’ (Banaji, 2010: 17). From mischaracterising 
the prehistory of ‘Asiatic’ capitalism to try and fit it within European experiences of 
feudalism, we move to the issues surrounding colonialism and the continued role of the 
‘extra-economic’, for ‘if the capitalist enterprises which dominated most of colonial 
Africa and large parts of Asia utilised coercive forms of exploitation, we must ask 
whether the laws of motion of capital are not, within certain limits, compatible with 
‘barbarous forms of labour’ (Banaji, 2010: 63). Just as Rioux focuses on the role of 
‘unfree’ labour within global neoliberal capitalism, so too has the history of capitalism 
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been defined by ‘uneven and combined development’ of the ‘political-economic’ 
separation, with some spaces of capitalism requiring more or less violence in order to 
ensure accumulation. Further, the uneven and combined development approach would 
emphasise that these distinct experiences are internally related – that they are 
constituent, causal parts of a world-system totality. The too-often Anglo-centric history 
of historical materialism ignores these spaces in which appropriation occurs outside of 
the economic ‘moment’. Crucially, Banaji and others argue, despite not fitting the 
theoretical ‘schema’ of Political Marxism, that these moments must be included in our 
conception of ‘capitalism’. 
 
Joining Banaji and Rioux in criticising Political Marxism’s euro-(or Anglo-)centrism are 
Cemal Burak Tansel (2015), and Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu (2015). For 
Tansel (2015: 79), the Political Marxism of Brenner especially is ‘imbued with a stringent 
conception of the history of capitalism and the modern states-system within which their 
origins, development and expansion are predominantly explained through an exclusively 
European lens’. Anievas and Nişancıoğlu give three reasons as to why such a lens is 
problematic: 
 
First, it conceives of the origins and sources of capitalist modernity as a product of 
developments primarily internal to Europe… By positing a strong ‘inside-out’ model of social 
causality (or methodological internalism – whereby European development is conceptualised as 
endogenous and self-propelling) Europe is conceived as the permanent ‘core’ and ‘prime 
mover’ of history… This second normative assumption of Eurocentrism can be termed 
historical priority, which articulates the historical distinction between tradition and modernity 
through a spatial separation of ‘West’ from ‘East’… From these two assumptions emerges a 
third predictive proposition: that the European experience of modernity is a universal stage 
of development through which all societies must pass. This stadial assumption posits a linear 
developmentalism… (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 4-5). 
  
This excerpt is worth reproducing at length, as these three interrelated problems of 
eurocentrism should be addressed – methodological internalism, historical priority, and 
linear developmentalism. Regarding the former, there would seem to be an inability for 
Political Marxism to locate the ‘international’ as a causal or constituent factor in its 
model.  
 
Bringing this problematic forward in time, consider how it intersects with authoritarian 
neoliberalism: although the separation of the ‘political’ from the ‘economic’ may be a 
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defining feature of the experience of capitalism in advanced capitalist states, the 
depoliticisiation that this constitutes does not have a clear understanding of the 
depoliticisation of the relations between states. Here we essentially have an issue of relative 
vantage point. By focussing on the unique character of market compulsion within the 
wage-labour relation, the approach of Political Marxism abstracts away from the ‘state’. 
Similarly, even a consideration of depoliticisation which is conscious of the way states 
might pattern that ‘separation’ differently in distinct contexts does not necessarily 
encompass depoliticisation in a global or regional context. How then are we to 
understand the recent experience of Greece within the European Union? – a moment 
of authoritarian statism discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. An answer is 
provided elsewhere by Jessop, who distinguishes between depoliticisation at the levels 
of ‘polity, politics, and policy’ (see Jessop, 2014: 210) – Greece’s inability to follow the 
popular rejection of austerity occurred due to depoliticisation at the level of ‘polity’. 
Political Marxism is operating at such a high level of abstraction that it is insensitive to 
such specificities. This surely is a limitation of Political Marxism? Regarding the latter 
two criticisms – ‘historical priority’ and ‘linear developmentalism’ – the issue raised is 
whether theoretical abstractions of the social property relations approach can 
incorporate the ways in which historical examples of ‘unfree’ labour, war, violence, and 
other forms of extra-economic appropriation or mediations thereof are actually 
necessary ‘others’ to allow the reproduction of the ‘core’: 
 
What the Political Marxist conception of capitalism thus erases are the various transitional 
or mediated forms of labour and regimes, involving different combinations of modes of 
production. Indeed, the idea of ‘combined development’ – as an amalgamation of 
differentiated modes of production within a social formation – is absent from the Political 
Marxist discourse, which unduly abstracts from the messy and contradictory reality of ‘really 
existing’ capitalisms (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015: 30-31). 
 
Whether as ‘uneven and combined development’, or even dependency theory, there are 
many approaches which argue that the experience of capitalism in the advanced capitalist 
states are causally constituted by international structures of inequity and extraction. As 
argued by Andre Gunder Frank, ‘contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the 
historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between satellite 
underdeveloped and the now-developed metropolitan countries’ (Frank, 1970: 5).  The 
problem is made stark by considering the following: can all countries in an international 
capitalist system maintain a pristine separation of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ 
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simultaneously? This is a question to which Political Marxism would seem to have no 
answer. 
 
But what does this criticism of Political Marxism mean for the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’? So far, this chapter has asserted that 1) depoliticisation is a process which 
seems to describe similar material conditions to those grouped under the rubric of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, posing a challenge to the periodisation of the latter, and 2) 
that the separation of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’, which some see as definitional 
to capitalism, is also itself a form of depoliticisation, thus challenging the historical 
specificity of authoritarian neoliberalism even further. Do the criticisms of Political 
Marxism resolve this challenge to Bruff’s conceptualisation? Should Political Marxism 
be guilty of ‘violent abstraction’ (Sayer, 1987), then perhaps any challenge this approach 
poses to the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ might be void. Unfortunately for 
the proponents of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, this is not the case. If, as criticisms of 
Political Marxism maintain, there is a continued role for various forms of ‘extra-
economic’ appropriation within capitalism, perpetrated by both the state and non-state 
actors, then the historical role of violence and the general repression of freedoms would also seem to 
challenge the periodisation authoritarian neoliberalism. An authoritarian state oppresses and 
involves itself in appropriation; for the postcolonial and uneven and combined 
development approaches, this form of state can be a constitutive part of a capitalist 
world system. This, then, would seem to open up challenge to our periodisation of 
authoritarian neoliberalism on two fronts – from both ‘Political Marxists’ and from 
‘uneven and combined developmentalists’.  
 
 
Some resolutions 
 
This chapter has expanded the scope of the concept of authoritarian neoliberalism in a 
way that might attract the ire of many, making generalisations regarding not just one 
body of literature, but several. At this point, it is worth at least attempting to resolve 
some of these open contentions. This will be done through a return to the ontological 
and epistemological precepts relating to ‘essence’ and ‘appearance’ in historical 
materialism, as well as the dialectical method of shifting ‘vantage point’. Through this 
we can perhaps rescue some of the utility of Political Marxism, in the face of its many 
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critiques – to avoid ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’, so to speak. This is a 
necessary aside for two reasons. Firstly, the challenge to the specificity of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’, which is the purpose of this chapter, can only be maintained if these open 
contentions are at least somewhat resolved. And secondly, the way in which this is done 
is significant. By drawing on the theory of internal relations (Ollman, 2015), we flag the 
significance of ‘vantage point’ for an argument around periodisation – the purpose of 
the latter two chapters.  
 
One of the most fundamental aspects of Marx’s critique of capitalism was the realisation 
that ‘not unlike our subconscious, capital also instils illusions in our minds’ (Varoufakis, 
2015: 18). Marx helped us to understand that capital, by its very nature, presents itself in 
disguise, obstructing our understanding. It is this appreciation of the veiled ontology of 
the capitalist mode of production that is implied by Marx’s dualisms, 
‘appearance/essence, form/content, illusion/reality, phenomena/hidden substratum, 
form of manifestation/inner connection’ (Geras, 1971: 69), and encapsulated within the 
concept of ‘fetishism’. Fetishism is the way in which the people that comprise the 
capitalist system, and the web of social relations between them, appear in the form of 
‘things’ (Bottomore, 1983: 165). The pen on my left appears as a ‘thing’ – a pen. By 
appearing in this way, the web of social relations that produced the pen are obscured – 
the labour-power I have commodified and sold to obtain the money-capital necessary 
to buy the pen, which was produced overseas in Malaysia by a worker who, also selling 
their labour power, operates a line of machinery, mediated by the many constituent parts 
of the transport and sales chains. This then obscures further the fundamental relation 
between humans and nature, and the way in which capitalism is created in and through 
nature (Moore, 2015). The essence of the pen is the totality of social (and natural) relations 
that its production was predicated upon; the appearance of the pen is, simply, a pen. 
Fetishism, then, is an illustration of the illusory nature of capitalism. But those illusions, 
crucially, are based in a materiality. This historically specific form of illusion is important to 
note, as it compounds the general dangers of misperception associated with our 
subconscious tendency toward simplifying complex realities – not only must one be 
cautious of subconscious abstraction, one must also be aware of the way in which 
capitalism by its very nature works to avoid being perceived in its actual form. These 
methodological, epistemological and ontological precepts are crucial if we are ever to 
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pierce the fog which surrounds the issue at hand – the theoretical category of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’.  
 
As noted above, the most fundamental ontological claim Marx made about capitalism 
was that its essential nature could not be perceived through mere empirics. His criticism 
of the ‘vulgar economists’ was that they failed to grasp this fact: ‘even the best 
spokesmen of classical economy remain more or less in the grip of illusion which their 
criticism had dissolved, as cannot be otherwise from a bourgeois standpoint, and thus 
they fall more or less into inconsistencies, half-truths and unsolved contradictions’ 
(Marx, 1958 [1894]: 817). Interestingly, the implicated methodology of looking past 
appearance to deduce the ‘real’ has parallel in the discipline of physics (something which, 
for all their ‘physics-envy’, neoclassical economists have failed to grasp). In the words 
of Galileo Galilei, arguing against a geocentrist named Scipione Chiaramonti,  
 
I… have never seen nor ever expect to see, the rock fall any way but perpendicularly, just so 
do I believe that it appears to the eyes of everyone else. It is, therefor, better to put aside the 
appearance, on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason either to confirm its reality 
or to reveal its fallacy (Galilei, 1953 [1632]: 256).  
 
Here the argument is twofold: 1) that our senses cannot perceive the actual motion of 
the falling rock, and that 2) an approach to science which is based on these surface 
appearances will fail to uncover the actual motion of the falling rock. Varoufakis (2015: 
18-20) utilises another analogy from the world of physics to illustrate this, under the 
banner of ‘the parallax challenge’: a stick part-submerged in water seems from different 
angles to be bent, but the angle of the bend varies depending on where it is viewed from. 
Complicating matters further, if the water is flowing, then the stick will seem to be in 
flux. All of this obscures the ‘reality’ of the stick – that it is, in fact, straight. Speaking 
methodologically, ‘we need a theoretical leap, like the one the physicist makes, which 
will allow us to rise above incommensurable observations before landing in a conceptual 
place from which the whole thing makes perfect sense’ (Varoufakis, 2015: 18; see also 
Feyerabend, 1979: 69-80). Thus, just as established method in physics calls for one to 
look past surface appearances to understand the reality hidden beneath, so too does 
Marx. 
The purpose of historical materialism, then, is to follow in Marx’s tradition and attempt 
to uncover the essence buried under the many ‘half-true’ appearances of capital. By 
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stressing the ‘apparent’ separation of the ‘political’ and the economic’ under capitalism, 
Wood was explicitly following in this tradition. The question, then, is whether she and 
Brenner were successful in their attempt to unveil part of the essence of capitalism (for, 
as we established earlier, complete perception is impossible). A useful test here is 
provided by Norman Geras: 
‘It seems necessary… to adopt an analytic procedure, in an attempt to isolate different 
aspects of the concept and to examine them separately, even if such a procedure runs the 
risk of fragmenting what Marx conceived to be a unified phenomenon. For, if it enables us 
to clarify the aspects, taken separately, the chances of understanding their relations to one 
another, that is to say, of reconstituting them as a whole, are thereby enhanced’ (Geras, 1971: 
71).  
By separating out parts from the whole, and considering their respective ‘reality’, this 
method is that of ‘vantage point’. This is the method outlined by Geras – that by 
considering ‘class’, ‘race’, or ‘the state’, we are considering a part of a socio-historical 
totality; not taking them in isolation, or rejecting the ways in which these facets are 
internally related, but performing a necessary and temporary abstraction, before bringing 
the better-understood fragment back into relation with the whole. This method is one 
which Marx engages in continuously, as noted by Bertel Ollman (2015: 17): ‘Every 
inquiry – but also every account of its findings – begins from somewhere, and where 
that is establishes a perspective in which everything that follows finds its place, order, 
size, limits, neighbours and, to a large degree, is significance (or lack of)’. Let us consider 
this more closely. 
 
‘Vantage point’ has been mentioned at several points so far, and will continue to feature 
in the analysis of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism. As Ollman notes, a vantage point is the 
perspective from which analysis or theorisation starts. But when employed deliberately, 
this does not constitute an argument against all other possible abstractions. In Marx’s 
work, he took many ‘apparently contradictory positions’ (Ollman, 2003: 100). For 
example, capital is in different places treated as a social relation, a means of exchange 
(money capital), a class, and as value. Rather than undermining or vitiating his other 
arguments, these diverse treatments show a deliberate deployment of ‘vantage point’ 
and the theory of internal relations: 
 
They are the result of different abstractions but not of extension or level of generality. They 
are due to different abstractions of vantage point. The same relation is being viewed from 
different sides, or the same process from its different moments (Ollman, 2003: 100). 
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Here we have a nuanced variation of the ontological presuppositions of Galileo and 
Geras. Understanding that the complexity of our social world – or physical, in the case 
of Galileo – leads us to an appreciation that considering appearance alone is insufficient 
for scientific analysis. Going further, it also tells us that the same ‘essence’ will appear 
differently, when viewed from alternative angles, or, rather, ‘vantage points’. Each 
perspective will affect the ‘order, hierarchy, and priorities, distributing values, meanings, 
and degrees of relevance, and asserting a distinctive coherence between the parts’ 
(Ollman, 2003: 100). The bedrock of ontology supports one’s position on epistemology, 
from which methodology flows. If we understand the ontology of the capitalist social 
system to be something too open and overdetermined to understand in an absolute way, 
then this leads us to consider whether analysis is possible at all. The process of deliberate 
abstraction through moving ‘vantage points’ is an answer to that ontological-
epistemological quandary. This also forces us to acknowledge that we necessarily will 
have conflicting, contradictory pictures of capitalist social relations – the contention 
between the perspective of Political Marxism and that of uneven and combined 
developmentalists are just one such example of this.  
 
However, an understanding of the ‘essence/appearance’ dualism is not an historical 
‘master key’ (Miliband, 2015: 52) – that is to say, there is not just one veil to look behind, 
but many. Part of this ontological/epistemological sketch is made, inadvertently, by 
Anievas and Nişancıoğlu (2015: 32): ‘History is, of course, a messy, complex affair, full 
of accidents and contingencies and the untheorisable. A grand theory of everything is 
unlikely’. And so, moving from one vantage point to another, uncovering something 
more of the ‘real’ from each, is the only possible methodology to understand more than 
obfuscating appearances. Such a method will, of course, create aberrations – as long as 
we do so consciously and explicitly, and always return to a position of internal relations, 
then we might hope to pull off the ‘dance of the dialectic’ (Ollman, 2003). This does 
not, however, imply that all abstractions of ‘vantage point’ are as valid as each other. 
The test to be applied is whether that particular abstraction makes things clearer. Or, as 
Sayer demands, whether that abstraction obscures the causal mechanisms that it seeks 
to unveil. This test of ‘violent abstraction’, as it relates to abstractions of ‘vantage point’ 
will return throughout this thesis. 
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But what of ‘vantage point’, and the open contention raised by this chapter? This is how 
we can reconcile the contradictory treatment of the ‘state’ within the separation of the 
‘political’ and the ‘economic’ – they are both necessary abstractions. In a way, neither of them 
exist. They are simply conceptual apparatuses used to try and better understand the real. 
On one hand, not only does the state ‘not exist’ (Hay, 2014), but paradoxically, it also 
historically predates capitalism: ‘The State is older than capital, and its functions cannot 
be immediately derived from those of commodity production and circulation’ (Mandel, 
1983: 477; see also Scott, 1998), further complicating any relationship the state might 
have with capital. Perhaps it would be more useful to read the separation of the ‘political’ 
and the ‘economic’, as discussed by Political Marxism, as something which occurs at the 
level of appearance, rather than essence? As Anievas and Nişancıoğlu assert, a grand 
theory of everything is unlikely, or even impossible. Their criticism of Wood and 
Brenner would only seem to hold if one reads Political Marxism as purporting to have 
discovered just that – a reading which does not seem to be based on the actual claims 
of the approaches proponents. 
 
The explanatory power of separationism can only go so far. If your purpose is to 
understand how the boundaries are drawn between the democratic state and the 
authoritarian workplace, then this tool is incredibly useful; if you are looking to explain 
the complexities of inter-state relations, and differing levels of capitalist development 
within and between them, then it will be less useful. But this was never the purpose of 
this abstraction, as we can see through a close reading of Wood: ‘What requires 
explanation is the aberrant, uniquely ‘autonomous’ development of the economic sphere 
that eventually issued in [Western] capitalism’ (Wood, 1981: 86). Wood is explicit about 
the purpose of her abstraction, and it is worth considering this argument at length: 
 
The capitalist system was born in England. Only in England did capitalism emerge, in the 
early modern period, as an indigenous national economy, with mutually reinforcing 
agricultural and industrial sectors, in the context of a well-developed and integrated domestic 
market… England may have been the first and even the first industrial capitalism, but it 
reached its destination by a detour, almost by mistake, constitutionally weak and in unsound 
health… This model implies that there is a natural course of capitalist development which 
has little to do with the real historical processes that produced the world’s first capitalist 
system… 
  
But suppose we break out of this question-begging circle by just beginning with the simple 
fact that a capitalist economy nowhere and never developed in a more ‘modern’ or ‘bourgeois’ 
society before English capitalism… Might the very features that have been ahistorically 
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defined as the marks of modern capitalism turn out, on the contrary, to be the tokens of its 
absence? (Wood, 1991: 1-2, original emphasis). 
 
Wood, here, is emphasising the historical specificity of Western – especially English – 
capitalism. This was notably the starting point of Marx, as well: ‘The history of 
expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its 
various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods. In England 
alone, which we take as our example, has it the classic form’ (Marx, 1967: 669-670). In 
labelling English capitalism as ‘classic’, is he arguing this is the only definition of 
capitalism? Of course not – the preceding sentence shows us that Marx conceived of it 
as a useful example (or, rather, ‘vantage point’), rather than a generalizable law. The 
criticisms levelled by Banaji and others reacts against the superimposition of a 
theorisation derived from a specific historical instance of capitalist development over all 
capitalist moments. I would argue that this was never the ambition of Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, or Robert Brenner. Marx famously treated the concept of ‘capital’ in at least four 
different ways – as a social relation, as alienation, as value, and as commodities (Ollman, 
2015: 11). Rather than indicating inconsistency, they show Marx’s method of moving 
from vantage point to vantage point, showing a little more of the obscured ‘real’ from 
each. It is in this way that the seemingly incongruous theories of the ‘state’, the 
separation of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’, and of the ‘international’ can be 
maintained as all ‘real’, untrue, and necessary, all at the same time. 
 
But what does this have to do with ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’? Method ultimately 
flows from an understanding of ontology. If the ontology of the social system we are 
analysing is such that it actively evades full comprehension, then this raises important 
implications for the nature of knowledge (epistemology), and the way we go about 
acquiring that knowledge (methodology). If we, as Marxists, appreciate that 
contradictory positions can both be held as ‘true’, depending on vantage point, then this 
surely provides justification for – amongst other things – periodisation: “Of course 
authoritarianism has existed throughout capitalist development; but we can argue that 
the abstraction of emphasising the current period as different is justified as a necessary 
abstraction to explain the durability of neoliberalism”. These ontological precepts both 
justify abstraction, while also demanding that such abstractions reveal more than they 
obscure. As put forcefully by Ollman (2003: 111), ‘only an account that puts the process 
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of abstraction at the centre enables us to think adequately about change and interaction, 
which is to say, to think dialectically, and to do research and engage in political struggle 
in a thoroughly dialectical manner’. The theory of internal relations provides a useful 
way of considering conflicting perspectives, and alternative abstractions – something 
that will become necessary in following chapters, where the challenge of periodisation 
is brought to the fore. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The overarching question addressed by this thesis is whether ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ is a valid and useful way to characterise the current period of capitalism. 
As quoted at the outset of this chapter, Bruff (2014: 115-116) sees this period as being 
defined, in part, by a ‘recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and 
appropriate for nonmarket institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations in the 
process’. That this immediately connotes the process of ‘depoliticisation’ – an older and 
contested concept – would seem to put the novelty of authoritarian neoliberalism in 
doubt, not only as an original concept, but also as a historically specific set of material 
conditions. If this is expanded to include the most fundamental of all depoliticisations 
– the separation of the ‘political’ from the ‘economic’ under capitalism – then what 
might have been considered conceptual overlap threatens to collapse this neologism 
entirely. Taking a wider geographical view, even the more coercive aspects of 
authoritarianism would seem to be a part of the violent history of capitalist development.  
 
But while these points present a problematic for scholars embracing the authoritarian 
neoliberal frame, the challenges are not insurmountable. In many ways, it simply 
highlights the need to make explicit on what grounds one can justify the periodisation of capitalism. 
It is precisely this question to which we turn in the second chapter: the interrelated 
concepts of the state, crisis, and periodisation. There are two reasons for such a detailed 
sojourn into these debates is to consider the periodisation of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’, and to consider whether the ‘strengthening/weakening’ dynamic offers 
hope of successful challenge to authoritarian-type developments. Here, the interrelated 
issues of coercion, depoliticisation, and the class-character of the state offer a 
mechanism whereby such a dynamic may be realised – a mechanism which was hitherto 
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missing from our conceptualisation. Both for Peter Burnham, and for Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, depoliticisation is a contradictory process. The separation of the political and 
economic is an important illusion which plays a part in the reproduction of capitalist 
social relations. When the state quarantines policy areas away from democratic control 
(however limited), or if it directly intervenes against protest and political agitation, the 
apparent autonomy of the state is brought into question, potentially making the state 
itself a target of struggle. As Poulantzas’s analysis of fascism (1975) shows, these 
contradictions will not necessarily lead to progressive outcomes, but nevertheless, these 
processes help us to better understand what is meant by a ‘strengthening-weakening’ of 
the state.  
 
Not only has authoritarianism played an important role in capitalist development in 
general, but depoliticisation – a material process similar to the conditions theorised as 
‘qualitatively distinct’ under ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ – would seem to be a feature 
of earlier neoliberal governments, such as Tony Blair’s New Labour government. This 
leads us directly into a consideration of the problem of periodisation. In the following 
chapter, we will arrive at a method of periodisation, through a consideration of the 
related themes of state and crisis, with which we can then evaluate the claims made by 
proponents of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Applying that understanding of 
periodisation to the real history of authoritarianism under neoliberalism in the past four 
decades will be the task of chapter three. 
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Chapter Two 
State of Flux: Theories of the (capitalistic) state and 
periodisation 
 
Authoritarian statism is bound up with the periodization of capitalism into 
distinct stages and phases (Poulantzas, 1978: 204). 
I should like to point out a confusion which has neither been denounced nor 
elucidated, and which dominates the interpretation of Marxism now, and 
probably will for a long time to come: I mean expressly the confusion that surrounds 
the concept of history (Althusser, 2015 [1970]: 181, emphasis in original). 
 
Introduction 
It is widely noted that the concept of neoliberalism is an especially ambiguous one. With 
so many differing definitions, alternative genealogies, and approaches to the problem 
which feature distinct ontological and epistemological foundations, some have 
dismissed the term altogether (c.f. Dunn, 2016). In this context, qualifying the term 
further with an additional adjective (‘authoritarian’) would seem to only add to the 
conceptual cacophony, rather than offer clarification. This being so, an intervention 
which is underpinned by such a vague understanding of historiography and periodisation 
is particularly problematic, and unlikely to be embraced as a discrete research agenda. 
On the other hand, should we immediately start deploying the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ without rigorous theoretical and historical development – taking the 
conceptualisation as finished, and going about diagnosing this ill wherever we can – then 
surely the critics of the term ‘neoliberalism’ in general are right. If we skip straight to the 
application, avoiding the difficult questions of periodisation and abstraction, then Dunn 
may well be right to call for the abandonment of the term. If ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
is to be a useful framework, it must be a theoretically robust one, with an explicit 
argument as to why framing the current moment as historically different is useful and 
valid. 
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The concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ intersects with a multitude of themes, 
events and debates: Thatcherism, neoliberalism, new constitutionalism, the European 
Central Bank, the Global Financial Crisis, state coercion, hegemony, the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis, and the Occupy movement, just to name a few – and all of this in 
just sixteen pages of initial conceptualisation (Bruff, 2014). Underlying these, however, 
are two assertions, which hold significant theoretical ramification: 
Authoritarian neoliberalism does not represent a wholesale break from pre-2007 neoliberal 
practices, yet it is qualitatively distinct… (Bruff, 2014: 116),  
And, 
The attempted ‘authoritarian fix’ is potentially more of a sticking plaster than anything more 
epochal (Bruff, 2014: 125). 
These contrasting quotations raise some pressing questions, and suggestive lines of 
inquiry. On what grounds can one argue that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is ‘qualitatively 
distinct’, and yet not ‘epochal’? Is there some kind of middle-ground periodisation? A 
clearer, more-explicit theory of history is required here. And so, the task of this chapter 
is to develop a methodology of periodising capitalist development that might support 
(or disqualify) these claims. The chapter attempts to reveal the inner workings of the 
theoretical ‘black box’ behind ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ – what are the theoretical 
implications of labelling a process ‘qualitatively distinct’? 
 
To be fair, while he does not provide clear answers, Bruff does acknowledge that he is 
raising questions of periodisation. The only hint of an approach to periodisation 
employed is found in reference to the state theory of Poulantzas. For Bruff,  
The state is emphatically not a predetermined entity whose function is to act in a monolithic 
manner in the name of capital. Rather, its evolution is strongly connected to the manner in 
which class conflicts manifest themselves over time (Bruff, 2014: 119).  
 
This process is seen as an open, undetermined one, which is likely to vary along both 
spatial and temporal lines. However, periodisation is still apparently possible; Bruff 
draws on Poulantzas to assert that even in the face of such ongoing, varied change, it is 
still possible to find distinct periods within these changes in state form:  
Nevertheless, Poulantzas argues that the periodisation of the development of capitalism into 
distinct phases of history is possible, meaning that certain forms of capitalist state are likely 
(but not guaranteed) to predominate within such periods’ (Bruff, 2014: 119).  
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Yet, we cannot approach the challenge of periodisation without also, and first, 
considering the theorisation of the state – how can we understand the way the state 
might change if we do not have a working understanding of what the state actually is?  
 
Debates around the nature of the state under capitalism are far from settled. Indeed, 
attempts to develop a general theory of the state have proved so difficult that most – bar 
a few key exceptions, such as Bob Jessop (2002, 2008, 2016) – have withdrawn from the 
task since the debates in the 1970’s (of which Poulantzas was a key participant). A 
comprehensive survey of this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here we have a 
(relatively) more modest agenda: to understand perspectives on how and why the state might change 
over time. From the starting point of ‘relative autonomy’ – an important rejection of both 
liberal pluralism, and instrumentalist Marxian approaches – we can start to see how the 
state operates, paradoxically, as both separate from, and a part of, capitalist social 
relations. It is this contradictory ontology, when brought into contact with capital 
accumulation, and crises thereof, which produces change. For this, we must move 
beyond just the contributions of Poulantzas and Stuart Hall (who also feature in Bruff’s 
theorisation), to also consider the state theory of others, including O’Connor, Jessop, 
and Gramsci.  
 
Theories of the state, especially the perspective of O'Connor, lead directly into theories 
of crisis. And it is with theories of crisis that we approach theories of history. It is precisely 
on theories of history – or, more especially, ‘periodisation’ – where Bruff and the 
framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ again find themselves in troubled waters. 
Locating Bruff in debates around the appropriate way in which to break up capitalist 
development into distinct phases and periods is, relative to state theory, a more-difficult 
task. This is because Bruff is never explicit as to what he means when he says that the 
rise of authoritarian neoliberalism, although related to the neoliberalism of pre-2008, is 
‘qualitatively distinct’. As such, while the first half of this chapter can be considered a 
‘fleshing out’ of the framework already given to us, the latter half represents a departure. 
In this section, we will consider several key contributions, including: ‘long wave’ theory, 
Gramscian approaches to periodisation, and regulationist5 approaches. The purpose of 
this survey is to venture out into those broader debates, and to identify key insights from 
                                                          
5 There is semantic significance in the labels we use. Here we refer to ‘regulationist approaches’, rather than 
‘régulation theory’, as no attempt is made to distinguish between the many sub-schools within this tradition: the 
Parisian school, the Amsterdam school, West German regulationists, etc. (see Jessop, 1990). 
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each, which are then deployed in the next chapter to analyse the actual history of 
neoliberalism, and reflect on the analytical usefulness of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. 
 
Ultimately, the argument developed throughout this chapter is this: the analytical task 
of periodisation is an inherently subjective question, and ones’ answer will be dependent 
on the purpose of inquiry. (To be clear, this is not to say that capitalist history itself is 
purely contingent). If you start from the vantage point of the conjunctural agency 
of labour you will arrive at a radically distinct periodisation than if you, say, consider 
shifting gender dynamics within social reproduction, or state approaches to monetary 
policy. And while these different spheres interact and interrelate, this does not mean that 
the periodisation of one will necessarily explain change in another. When this is 
considered in relation to ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, the claims of Bruff are made 
clearer and more defensible. This position does not, however, remove all contention 
from this conceptual development – as we will highlight below, the Gramscian 
perspective especially poses an important immanent critique of Bruff’s work. What this 
methodological position does is to ensure that debates around rival periodisations 
can actually talk to each other, rather than the common alternative: talking past each 
other, without even realising it.  
 
 
Why periodise?  
 
Before launching into an exploration of state theory and periodisation, there is an 
ontological assumption regarding periodisation which must be made explicit: 
 
Such exercises have general ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects. Their 
basic ontological assumption is the paradoxical simultaneity of continuity/discontinuity in 
the flow of historical time. For, if nothing ever changed, periodization would be meaningless 
in the face of the self-identical repetition of eternity; if everything changed at random all the 
time, however, so that no sequential ordering was discernible, then chaos would render 
periodization impossible (Jessop, 2001: 283). 
Critical realism provides just such an ontological foundation from which to consider 
capitalist development. Built on the work of Roy Bhaskar (2008), critical realism sees 
the fundamentally social character of economic and political processes as generative of 
irregularity and change. For example, Tony Lawson (1997) suggests that the lack of 
observed stable economic relationships can be explained by this open-system ontology. 
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In his critique of neoclassical economics, Lawson points to this absence of historically 
stable relationships between economic variables as evidence of this unstable ontology. 
Contrasting this positivist approach, Lawson suggests that such phenomena might 
instead be in a state of ‘demi-regularity’ (or, awkwardly, ‘demi-regs’ for short):  
The significance of patterns collected under the heading of demi-regs usually turns upon 
comparisons… Moments of social upheaval, crises and disruption may be especially 
revealing in this respect… In the case of social upheavals, the contrast is largely temporal. 
And, indeed, generative mechanisms become that much more accessible at any geo-historical 
turning point (Lawson, 1997: 203-204).  
 
While Lawson – and critical realism more generally – does not present a definitive 
methodology for the periodisation of capitalist development, it is important to recognise 
the ontological assumptions which this task necessarily operates under. Further, also due 
to this shifting social ontological base, the application of these frameworks necessarily 
‘depends on the ‘objects being periodized and the levels of abstraction and complexity 
at which they are studied’ (Jessop, 2001: 284).  
 
The other insight gleaned from the critical realist approach, which directly informs the 
methodology of periodisation below, follows from the distinction between the ‘real’ and 
the ‘actual’. Periodisation is often erroneously assumed to imply clean breaks – that 
variables either stop or start presenting empirically at the end of one period, or at the 
start of another. It is quite clear that this test would make periodisation impossible. 
Markets pre- and post-dated the emergence of capitalism, and there are still remnants 
of feudal social relations comingled within our contemporary capitalist social relations 
(Wood, 2002) – the continued existence of several monarchies, for example. If history 
has never been punctuated by what Bruff (2014: 116) terms a ‘wholesale break’, then it 
would be foolish to assume that periodisation relies on such stark points of departure.  
Critical realism gives us a deeper understanding of why periodisation might still be 
justified, despite these confounding empirical examples. A demi-regularity is a 
temporary regularity expressed within the actual, and observed in the empirical. A shift 
in these demi-regularities might see the continuation of an empirical observation, while 
changing the underlying mechanisms producing that outcome or expression. This kind 
of ontological claim is, of course, highly complex and contested – we cannot go into 
detailed discussion or proof here. It is enough for our purposes here simply to note two 
things: that periodisation rests on certain ontological assumptions; and that critical 
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realism offers an ontological position which might support this task. But, crucially, using 
critical realism as a starting point does not prescribe a theoretical or empirical vantage 
point from which analysis must be made – rather, it can be seen as congruent with a 
variety of approaches. Before returning to these questions around the method of 
periodisation, however, we must first tackle the fickle object of study that is the 
capitalistic state. As emphasised above, change is not constant. In understanding 
reproduction, our starting point must be the state: it is the structures of the state that 
themselves institutionalise class compromise and domination, contributing to the 
reproduction of social structures, at least for a time. Above Jessop (2001: 284) 
emphasised that we can only periodise ‘at the level of abstraction and complexity at 
which they are studied’ – it follows from this that as ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
attempts to explain changes occurring at the level of the state, then we necessarily must trace 
a method of periodisation which is sensitive to state theory. It is to the ontology of the 
state that we now turn.  
 
Theorising the State 
Despite the normative goals of neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich von Hayek, Robert 
Nozick, and others, who argued that the state should be severely limited, the state 
remains very much extant and active under hegemonic neoliberalism. It also remains an 
intractable object of study – one which resists general theorisation. Both of these 
qualities have been recognised more-widely since the visible and perplexing responses 
of states around the world to the financial crisis of 2008. It is precisely this apparent 
‘return of the state’ which has prompted scholars to reconsider the state analytically: 
The deployment of public authority in ways that systematically benefit some interests more 
than others suggests the need for a more profound appreciation of the ways in which socio-
economic sources of power make themselves felt in the political arena (Konings, 2010: 174).  
Unfortunately, however, such realisations have usually served to re-enforce, rather than 
depart from, crude state-market dichotomies. An obvious example of this is the way in 
which Polanyi has come into vogue, but in most cases in a way that treats the pendulum 
of the ‘double movement’ in very crude, functionalist terms – with the management of 
society swinging from state, to market, back to state again (Konings, 2010). Even that 
small niche of scholars who treat the state in more sophisticated terms (e.g. Peck and 
Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Cahill, 2014) do so in a way which is more 
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concerned with material characteristics of neoliberalism, rather than engaging in general 
theorisation of the kind seen in the 1970’s: ‘Contemporary analysis is often confined to 
the concrete changes regarding the functions of the state under neoliberalism and, 
usually, sets aside explicit analysis of the general nature of the capitalist state’ 
(Humphrys, 2015: 36).  
 
The call of Konings to ‘renew state theory’ is a most welcome call to bring the state back 
into our analyses – especially considering the widespread tendency to concede the ‘new 
right’s categories of analysis – states and markets, public and private’ (Panitch, 1999: 23). 
By accepting these zero-sum dualisms, the possibility that the state and markets might 
be internally related and mutually constituted is lost. Not only do these mainstream 
approaches hold theoretically and historically problematic positions – they treat the state 
as a fundamentally resolved subject of study, and ‘makes unnecessary, indeed almost 
precludes, any special concern with its nature and role in Western-type societies’ 
(Miliband, 1969: 2). The analysis here certainly does not treat the state as a ‘solved’ 
phenomenon; we cannot fully understand the state simply by re-reading Miliband, 
Poulantzas, Jessop, or anyone else (even though these contributions are far more useful 
than many others). We can, however, find generalised theorisations which are more 
satisfying than the usual dualisms of orthodox economics and political science. The 
general and abstract can then be brought down to the level of the concrete, through a 
direct engagement with historical developments – in the words of Nicos Poulantzas 
(1978: 25), ‘A theory of the capitalist state can be elaborated only if it is brought into 
relation with the history of political struggles under capitalism’. Even if we hold that the 
ontological nature of our social world is too complex to be fully grasped by any 
individual or any theoretical framework, this does not impact our desire to build slightly 
less incomplete pictures.  
 
It is by returning to the analysis of the capitalist state that leading scholars of 
neoliberalism have arrived at more-convincing explanations of the durability of 
neoliberalism in the face of ongoing crises. As stated above, these studies certainly do 
not approach general theorisation of the capitalist state, but they do incorporate insights 
from previous debates around that theorisation, and in doing so enrich their work. This 
is seen in the work of Cahill, where ‘markets always depend upon social support 
structures in order to function. Thus, they are always embedded in social relations, but 
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such an embedding takes different forms in different historical periods and geographical 
and political contexts’ (Cahill, 2014: 58). By approaching the relationship between the 
state and capitalist markets in this way, Cahill moves past the limitations of dominant 
ideas-centred explanations of neoliberalism (e.g. Blyth, 2013; Mirowski, 2013), 
underlining the point that our theorisation of the state is of crucial importance. This 
importance is both theoretical and strategic, as noted by Clarke:  
 
Only an adequate theory of the capitalist state… can distinguish between those features of 
the capitalist state that are essential to it as a capitalist state, those features that belong to a 
particular stage of capitalist development, and those features that are contingently 
determined by the outcome of particular struggles (Clarke, 1991: 2). 
Further, and particularly relevant here, Clarke is emphasising the way in which state 
theorisation is intimately tied up with the task of periodisation. 
 
But what is the state? The apparent simplicity of this question belies its enigmatic quality: 
‘The state is such a complex theoretical object and so complicated an empirical one that 
no single theoretical approach can fully capture and explain its complexities’ (Jessop, 
2007: 132). With that epistemological limitation in mind, we can at the very least say 
what it is not. Foremost among these demonstrably problematic approaches is that of 
pluralism. Bound up with the epistemological context of the turn toward behavioralism 
and positivism in the social sciences during the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
pluralist conception of the state rose to dominance in the 1960s (Stretton, 1969), and is 
well captured in the words of Robert Dahl: 
 
business men, trade unions, politicians, consumers, farmers, voters and many other 
aggregates all have an impact on policy outcomes; that none of these aggregates is 
homogenous for all purposes; that each of them is highly influential over some scopes but 
weak over many others; and that the power to reject undesired alternatives is more common 
than the power to dominate over outcomes directly (Dahl, 1959: 36). 
In this position the state is simply seen as the forum in which these (and other) actors 
vie for their own interests. The state does not favour one group over another; in this 
view, the state operates under competitive pressure to ensure that all groups are heard, 
and that this neutrality is maintained: ‘As a result, the argument goes, no government, 
acting on behalf of the state, can fail, in the not very long run, to respond to the wishes 
and demands of competing interests. In the end, everybody, including those at the end 
of the queue, get served’ (Miliband, 1969: 2).  
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To advance a comprehensive critique of democratic-pluralist conceptions of the state 
(or the poststructuralist eschewal of it) would be tangential to the task at hand; that said, 
the very conjunctural developments which motivated the formulation of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ – and this thesis – provide an empirical demonstration of the failure of 
pluralists to account for the actual history of the state. Take an antecedent of the 
authoritarian response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, and the direct rejection of a 
democratic referendum: the constitutionalisation of inflation-targeting monetary policy 
within the structure of the European Union. The partitioning away of policy levers within 
the state apparatus, has direct implications which contradict the possibility of policy 
alternatives – a situation far outside the framework of Dahl and other pluralists. With 
this shift in state structures, it becomes ‘much harder to deliver the outcomes chosen by 
the electorate if the government can count on only one set of (fiscal) instruments, while 
monetary and exchange rate policy may be pursuing entirely different targets that may 
even compromise the achievement of other socially desirable objectives’ (Saad-Filho, 
2007: 112). Here, we see the field of the state being actively shaped by class struggle in 
such a way as to make future action difficult, if not impossible; the state cannot be a 
neutral field of struggle between equal actors if past struggles pattern the materiality of 
the state in such a way as to shape future outcomes as well. This is put well by 
Poulantzas: 
 
political domination is itself inscribed in the institutional materiality of the State. Although 
the State is not created ex nihilo by the ruling classes, nor is it simply taken over by them: 
state power (that of the bourgeoisie, in the case of the capitalist State) is written into its 
materiality. Thus while the State’s actions are not reducible to political domination, their 
composition is nevertheless marked by it (Poulantzas, 1978: 14). 
 
On this final point – that ‘the State’s actions are not reducible to political domination’ – 
we arrive at one of the historical alternatives to democratic-pluralism: historical 
materialism, and the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state. This approach appreciates the 
contradictory nature of the state, as the state is neither reduced to a neutral arbiter, nor 
a single-minded protector of the interests of capital. Let us unpack this. 
 
First, take the contradictory nature of the state. Capital is not a homogenous bloc, and 
as such, contradictions within the capitalist class will be reflected through their 
interaction within the field of the state (Poulantzas, 1975: 89) – but this is also 
insufficient. As argued by O’Connor, the state as an institution (in the broad sense of 
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the term) is both a part of capitalist social relations, but also apart from them. By this we 
mean that the state has its own internal contradictions in terms of the way in which it is 
embedded in broader society: 
 
The capitalistic state must try to fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory functions 
– accumulation and legitimization. This means that the state must try to maintain or create the 
conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must 
try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses 
its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses 
its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support (O’Connor, 1973: 6, 
emphasis in original). 
 
In Chapter One, we considered the role of the state within the separation of the political 
and the economic under capitalism. Summarising that debate, and reading it onto 
O’Connor’s theorisation, one could say, perhaps, that the state’s economic role is the 
maintenance of the conditions necessary to ensure accumulation (at varying rates, and 
punctured by crises), whereas the task of legitimisation is its political role. The balance 
between the two has many determinants. Regardless of how that boundary is drawn, 
however, let us consider what is at stake in that determination. Following on from the 
discussion on Wood in the previous Chapter, we have the potential here of a state which 
is too-much focused on accumulation, and directly engaging in the sphere of production 
through the disciplining of labour. In this situation we can generalise that the second 
task (legitimation) is likely being eschewed. The appearance of a ‘neutral’ state, then, 
underpins capitalist production, and means that class conflict and struggle is often 
directed toward and managed by the state, despite its internal biases formed by the social 
structure in which it is situated. The fact that the state manages class struggle is therefore 
fundamental for the ongoing processes of capital accumulation. The revelation of the 
class character of the state can be a crisis of legitimisation.  
 
The mediation of these contradictory purposes is necessary to reproduce the state-
relation. O’Connor goes on to outline one way in which the tension of the state’s dual 
purposes might be assuaged: ‘the state must involve itself in the accumulation process, 
but it must either mystify its policies by calling them something that they are not, or it 
must try to conceal them (e.g., by making them into administrative, not political, issues)’ 
(1973: 6). In other words, the process of depoliticisation is one which attempts to 
obfuscate the role the state is playing in accumulation – this may become more (or less) 
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necessary, depending on the conditions of accumulation, and the relative power of 
classes within the state. O’Connor points to the fact that states have to secure the 
‘conditions’ of production which are not naturally preserved by the capital relation. This 
is partially achieved by providing economic processes with a kind of ‘extra-economic’ – 
or political – legitimacy:  
 
Historically, states have developed institutions and regulations for moderating class conflict, 
including arbitration courts, labour relations boards and legislation providing frameworks 
for the conduct of negotiations over the employment relationship (Cahill 2014: 70). 
These institutions afford a degree of protection and bargaining power to labour. But 
they also help to sustain production relations by masking them as equal and fairly 
adjudicated relationships. This state function simultaneously impedes and enables capital 
accumulation. Further conditions which the state ensures, in order to facilitate continued 
accumulation – conditions which may not emerge otherwise – include: the reproduction 
of labour power, including concerns such as housing, transport, and education; the legal 
enclosure of land and natural resources, transforming these into what Polanyi called 
‘fictitious’ commodities; and the creation and maintenance of fiat money. Without each 
of these mediations, and many others besides, markets could not operate. However, the 
maintenance of these conditions also often create a site of further contestation, and real 
emancipatory potential. An instrumentalist reading would dismiss these institutions as 
instruments to ensure continued class domination; relative autonomy, and the dialectical 
method of historical materialism more generally, see the dual roles of reproduction and 
contestation as inseparable.  
 
While these mediations do provide a visible and ideological foil to mask the inequities 
produced by the expansion of capital, and deflect opposition to workplace surplus 
extraction toward the state as a site of struggle, these processes do limit in a concrete 
way the relatively ‘boundless’ forms of capital accumulation that would take place were 
the state acting solely on behalf of the capitalist class. The incredible increases in 
production and accumulation during the two world wars is evidence of this potential. 
Indeed, it was during the war, not after it, that US manufacturing achieved its dominant 
position within the world economy (Cameron and Neal, 2003: 359). And yet these 
moments also highlight the reasons why the state cannot intervene in such a way 
indefinitely, or in any conjuncture. That is to say, the contestation of rationing and state 
control of production was highly contested, even in war time (Rowse, 2002: 93), and 
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certainly did not present with the same ability to reproduce which we see in the normal 
capitalist separation of the political and the economic. While a ‘capitalist state’ may be 
fundamentally concerned with creating the conditions for capital accumulation, this 
practically involves a diverse set of processes that disarm potential contests to the system 
and continue to project an image of the state’s neutrality to the wider public. 
 
This, however, leads us to a reason why grouping violent and non-violent forms of 
‘authoritarianism’ together might be theoretically problematic. Let us pause for a 
moment, and consider the state-theoretical implications of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
directly. Following from O’Connor, non-violent forms of authoritarian (neoliberalism) 
– such as depoliticisation of, say, regulatory policy – operate (or are designed to operate) 
in such a way as to maintain (reproduce) the state relation, and social property relations. 
A violent intervention in the productive sphere, however, has the potential to create a 
crisis of legitimisation in a qualitatively different way to that of an apparently non-violent 
intervention6. As argued in Chapter One, non-violent interventions in the process of 
accumulation can create problems for legitimisation, as the state apparatus becomes less 
responsive. But is this the same process as, say, the direct policing of protest? At the 
very least, these two process would seem to be operating on different time horizons – 
an element of the periodisation problematic which we will return to further on in this 
chapter. But while this close engagement with O’Connor raises another facet of our 
problematisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, the vast majority of the approach 
outlined here is congruent with Bruff’s theorisation: 
The state’s materiality, as the crystallization of various compromises between different social 
groups, inevitably renders as a multilinear, uneven, and contradictory process any attempted 
reshaping of the state’s social purpose…I view authoritarian neoliberalism as a response both 
to a wider crisis of capitalism and more specific legitimation crises of capitalist states. 
Therefore, authoritarian neoliberalism simultaneously strengthens and weakens the state as 
the latter reconfigures into a less open and democratic polity. (Bruff, 2014: 119, 124). 
There is no barren functionalism in Bruff’s treatment of the state; rather, it is nuanced 
with contingency, multi-scalar and -temporal, levels of analysis, and an understanding 
that crisis-management never solves contradictions, but merely displaces or delays them. 
Broadly speaking, the state-theory of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is similar to (if not the 
same as) that of Nicos Poulantzas – much of which we have relied upon here. In 
                                                          
6 Such mediations only appear as non-violent under a narrow, negative definition of violence: the absence of physical 
confrontation. The fundamental structural violence of the capitalist relation is, however, clear when one takes a 
broader, positive definition of peace, such as that developed by Johan Galtung (1969). 
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particular, Poulantzas’s concept of ‘authoritarian statism’ (1978: 203) contributes much 
of the state-theoretical framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. One particular aspect 
of this overlap is the ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic which Poulantzas (1978: 246) 
attributed to authoritarian statism, whereby more-obvious forms of coercion within the 
site of the state result in ‘major dislocatory effects within the state’. For Bruff, too, these 
forms of intervention result in a deepening of crisis within the state, as well as more 
broadly at the level of the political. The fact, however, that this authoritarian tendency 
is seen as rearing its head in relation to crisis raises another aspect of state theorisation, 
to which we now turn. 
 
The state creates the ‘rules’ which are necessary for the functioning of markets. The state 
too, in its bourgeois-democratic form, depoliticises the social property relations of 
production. These two general statements fall within the two roles of the state: 
constitution of markets, and the reproduction of market society. The crisis tendencies 
within the former, however, make the latter more difficult. Here we are concerned with 
the role of the state in relation to economic crisis. While there is endless contention as to 
the nature of economic crises under capitalism, and their possible causes – does the rate 
of profit necessarily fall? Are crises accelerating or deepening? – for our purposes here 
it is relatively uncontentious to say that ‘capitalist development is marked by recurring 
economic crises’. For a system which is marked by contradiction and crisis in this way, 
it begs the question: ‘how is capitalism reproduced’. The answer would seem to be the 
state: 
For, although state intervention cannot change the objective nature of capitalism and its 
laws, it can influence their forms of appearance and development. [During the post-war 
period] these measures ranged from countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies through 
state sponsorship of R&D, investment, and production to direct involvement in key areas of 
production through the growth of public enterprise (Jessop, 1982: 49). 
Understood in this way, the response of states to this crisis can be read as attempts to 
‘fix’ this fundamental contradiction between the interests of the capitalist and worker in 
successive, temporary ways. Take, for example, the crisis of the 1970’s. Toward the end 
of the Keynesian era wages were not just keeping pace with productivity increases, but 
in real terms often outstripped them, due to the maintenance (or, perhaps, allowance) 
of moderate inflation. This fed into the legitimation crisis between state and capital, in 
which capital withheld or displaced investment, and so inflation became the immediate 
target of those governments such as Thatcher’s and Reagan’s, which looked to re-
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balance this political tension. And while these strong states were willing to allow the 
consequence of depressed wages and increased unemployment resulting from tighter 
monetary policy, the political promises of increased prosperity had to be maintained (for 
a time).  
 
Figure 1 - The crisis sequence in the US  
 
(Source: Streeck, 2014: 42) 
 
Thus, increased worker prosperity via the co-existence of near full employment with 
continued wage growth, was now relocated to a rapidly increasing reliance on social 
security systems across these neoliberalising political economies, resulting in public debt 
replacing wage growth as the key source of demand which fuelled capital accumulation. 
Counter to neoliberal theoretical ‘free market, small state’ postulates, social spending 
often increased alongside the suppression of wages and the abandonment of full 
employment as a policy goal (Streeck, 2014: 40). Continuing this broad-brush narrative, 
public debt only lasted a short while as a prosperity-stopgap, as much of the OECD was 
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forced to go through a period of fiscal consolidation during the 1990’s, pressured to do 
so by nervous bond markets. The story from here is more familiar to contemporary 
audiences, as the period from around 1993-2008 was of course defined by rapid 
increases in private debt, encouraged by state managers both directly and indirectly 
through low interest rates, deregulation, and continued wage suppression (Cahill, 2014: 
141). These three phases of crisis, and crisis management – inflation, public debt, then 
private debt – can be illustrated empirically, as the following figure shows (Figure 1). 
But whether the narrative used to explain them accurately describes why states acted 
these ways is another matter.  
 
While these empirical developments can indeed be traced in this way, does this imply that 
the state acted consciously and instrumentally to solve each crisis as it arose, for the deliberate purpose of 
reproducing capitalism? In short, no. The longer answer relies on an appreciation of the fact 
that the state does not reproduce capitalism for the sake of capital, but rather state 
managers operate under their own imperatives and incentives, creating this effect 
(Panitch and Ginden, 2012: 7).  
 
But this statement raises again the question of ‘who or what comprises the state’. Jessop 
(1999: 7) has suggested that the state presents as an ‘institutional ensemble’, which 
immediately problematizes the treatment of the state as a unified actor. From this point, 
it can also be said that there are likely to be contradictions between these many 
institutions – not only do civil society actors struggle with each other within the state 
apparatus, but the apparatus itself also operates with and against itself. This complex 
relationship between civil society and the state apparatus is perhaps best captured in the 
work of Gramsci, and his theorisation of the ‘integral state’. For Humphrys, 
 
Civil society and political society are better conceptualised not as geographical 
locations, but as different sites of social practice: civil society is the location of 
hegemonic practice and political society is the site of direct domination (Humphrys, 
2015: 48).  
 
In this sense, the state cannot be understood solely through reference to an institutional 
location, but must necessarily also include the relations between civil society and political 
society as well. Take Gramsci himself: 
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the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the 
ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci 1971: 178, Q13§17; 244, 
Q15§10).  
Thomas (2009: 137) has argued that ‘the concept of the integral state was intended as a 
dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society’; or, as Morton 
succinctly puts it, ‘this alternative conception of the state is inclusive of the realm of civil 
society’ (Morton, 2007: 120).  
 
This Gramscian perspective on the state complicates the treatment of the state as either 
a coherent actor, or as a set of institutions somehow separate from the society in which 
they exist. Ultimately, however, as important as these insights are, treating civil society 
and the state as existing in ‘dialectical unity’ is a perspective characterised by a high level 
of abstraction. For Humphrys, the approach of ‘relative autonomy’, as articulated by 
Panitch and Gindin (2012), as well as Poulantzas and Miliband, is too small a lens, as it 
excludes class struggle outside of the state: ‘capitalist society, like other class societies, the 
struggle between classes is fundamental to comprehending how society is maintained 
and what the conditions are for its overthrow. For Panitch and Gindin, as for Poulantzas 
and Miliband, the nature of the state is not derived from these fundamental social 
activities’ (Humphrys, 2013, online). Surely, however, none of these state theorists 
would disagree with the statement that class struggle is central under capitalism? Indeed, 
Poulantzas (1978: 137) has defined the state as the crystallisation of the balance of class 
forces. If the approach of ‘relative autonomy’ is guilty of these sins, it makes such 
abstractions (different to the integral state, though not necessarily higher) in order to 
focus on what drives change within the shape of the state. 
 
To return again to O’Connor, the state must maintain accumulation in the general sense 
(not necessarily accumulation for specific capitals) because the state relies on this 
ongoing accumulation for its own existence (i.e. taxation). Another material basis for 
this state imperative is that  
 
Economic crises in capitalism [sometimes] result from crises of confidence on the part of 
capital; they are not technical disturbances but legitimation crises of a special kind. Low 
growth and unemployment [can be] the result of ‘investment strikes’ on the part of owners 
who invest their capital but refuse to do so because they lack the necessary confidence 
(Streeck, 2014: 23). 
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This makes clear the interpenetration of both accumulation and legitimisation: 
expectations on the parts of both capital and labour act as material drivers for state 
action, communicated in the constitutional-democratic state form via taxation and 
elections. This is what is meant when the state is described as ‘relatively autonomous’ – it 
is autonomous in that there is no generalizable way in which the state functionally 
represents the interests of capital, but this is ‘relative’ in that the state ultimately operates 
under its own material pressures to reproduce capitalist social relations.  
 
With the general theorisation of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state, we arrive at the 
level of abstraction of Poulantzas (1978: 204), when he argued that ‘authoritarian statism 
is bound up with the periodisation of capitalism into distinct stages and phases’, and that 
‘authoritarian statism hinges upon those transformations in social classes, political 
struggles and the relationship of forces which mark the current phase’. Changes in the 
form of the state are a necessary outcome under this generalised theory of the state, and 
provide a way to consider how we periodise capitalism. This relates directly to how we 
are to evaluate the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, as clarifies what it is that is 
supposed to have changed. Also relevant here is the further development of the 
argument raised in the first chapter, regarding the sustainability of authoritarian state 
strategies. The apparent class-neutrality of the state is an important aspect of the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations, and processes that limit the reflexivity of the 
state to popular demands – such as depoliticisation, and authoritarian statism – 
effectively politicise the state itself. This is the dialectical process to which Poulantzas 
(1978: 205) referred as the ‘tendency to strengthening-weakening of the State’, and has 
direct bearing on our understanding of the material conditions addressed by Bruff, 
Tansel, and others researching under the rubric of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. With 
these two points established, we can move to survey various attempts to periodise 
capitalism. 
 
Periodising Capitalism, Periodising the State 
There is a tendency within academia to always see the current conjuncture as either the 
end of an era, or the beginning of a new one. Some of these assertions may be correct, 
but they cannot all be. In a fallacy of composition, if each announcement of ‘ending’ 
and ‘beginning’ was true, then nothing would ever actually exist – at least not long 
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enough to warrant framing as a distinct phase of capitalist development. Within 
comparative political economy, declarations of ‘endings’ include: ‘the end of 
corporatism, the end of the nation state, the end of Modell Deutschland, and so on’ 
(Albo, 2005: 63). Those announcing forms of ‘the new’, meanwhile, have provided 
‘numerous forecasts of a ‘new capitalism’: post-Fordism, cosmopolitan democracy, 
diversified quality production, the borderless world, and so on’ (ibid). This trend has 
continued apace since Greg Albo made the above observation in 2005. Since then, we 
have seen the many premature proclamations of the ‘end of neoliberalism’ on the one 
hand, and, conversely, the claim of Bruff and others that we are witnessing the ‘rise of 
authoritarian neoliberalism’ on the other. The latter of these being not the end of 
neoliberalism (a la those who saw state interventions post-2008 as antithetical to the 
small-state logic of neoliberalism) but rather a qualitative change in the way the state 
manages social relations under a still-hegemonic neoliberalism.  
 
And so, we arrive at a problem. If your conception of the world was entirely drawn from 
this academic literature, then it might seem that things are constantly ending and 
beginning, and never simply ‘being’, or staying the same. Part of the reason for this is 
the many and multiple perspectives and scales at which change can be observed. There are changes 
in: methods of production; ways of organising labour; the intensity of work; race and 
gender relations; the organisation of domestic labour and care work; changes in the 
realization of value; changes in state-institutional structures; and many other vantage 
points besides. Put simply, locating change depends on the unit and focus of your 
analysis. Similarly, the spatial and temporal scale at which analysis is undertaken will 
produce radically different results: local, national, regional, international and global 
scales, all multiplied by the temporal horizons of the annual, electoral, decadal, ‘long 
centuries’, and even civilizations. And so, when you identify change in your unit of 
analysis, there is an implicit argument that yours is the correct vantage point from which 
to plot historical change. This mode of framing tends to bring in the assumption that 
whatever you’re periodising changes as a whole. Put differently, arguments around 
periodisation often assume that theirs is the only vantage point, and tie all change to that 
particular variable. So, e.g., if you have ‘Fordist’ capitalism and ‘post-Fordist’ capitalism, 
it treats both as essentially whole, coherent systems. This assumes away the possibility 
that different spheres of society have changed at different points, and for different 
reasons. For example, monetary policy and labour law clearly interact as part of the same 
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system, but have quite different logics of change. This is borne out through 
understandings of the uneven plane of action that is the state, considered above. ‘To 
assume that the same periodisation fits both, so that we have, e.g., ‘Fordist’ monetary 
policy and ‘Fordist’ labour law, and that these change concurrently in an internally 
related process, is to assume that there is some systemic essence of ‘Fordism’ that 
explains both’ (Beggs, 2016, online; see also Althusser, 2015 [1970]: 181).  
 
And yet, we must not let this cautionary note dissuade us against periodisation entirely. 
An evacuation of historical change from our analysis would hamstring us in any attempt 
to explain the real, lived experiences of capitalism of people around the world, and also 
impinge on any utility of our analyses within the strategic arena. This is not to say that 
Althusser’s work is guilty of such an evacuation, but is rather a reminder that theoretical 
purity can easily slip into ‘violent abstraction’ (Sayer, 1987). A case where this danger 
has presented is the approach of Open Marxism. Exploring this approach, and criticisms 
of it, is a worthwhile endeavour here as it illustrates the need for periodisation, while 
also giving us a window into Bruff’s own thinking on this issue, as he is himself involved 
in mounting the critique of Open Marxism.  
 
This approach is defined by: ‘a critique of the separation of state and civil society and of 
politics and economics; a focus on the social class antagonism of capital and labour as a 
relation in and against domination and exploitation; and a theory of the state as an aspect 
of the social relations of production’ (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 469). To be clear, this 
approach is not without merit – however, the Open Marxism’s emphasis on the state as 
a ‘relation of production’ result in a refusal to ‘distinguish between different forms of 
state’ (ibid). Quite simply, they reject periodisation in toto. Or, in the words of the 
approach’s proponents: 
 
The relevance of the issue of historical periodisation is this: whoever divides history into 
‘periods’, whether or not these periods be termed ‘modes of production’, is thinking of form 
in a genus/species way… Dialectics comes into its own as the critique of, precisely, such a 
division into stages. Critique comes into its own dialectically, as inherent in the movement 
of contradiction and, so, an open Marxism is able to demystify the notion of new times in a 
forceful way (Bonefeld, Gunn, and Psychopedis, 1992: xvii). 
This approach reduces all of capitalist history to the capitalist social relation of 
production. And while Open Marxism dismisses periodisation for a different reason 
than seen above – indeed, Althusserian structuralism is one of the reasons behind the 
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genesis of this approach – the normative implication is similar. This implication is the 
crux of the critique which Bieler, Bruff and Morton bring against Open Marxism: 
Open Marxism’s universal focus on the capital relation renders it unable to conceptualize 
‘production’ as anything other than the expression of the dictates of the movement of value... 
a lack of subtlety in distinguishing specific phases of capitalist development (epoch) from 
determinate historical moments (conjuncture), or variant relations between state and capital 
that have shaped different forms of state… Accepting the capital relation as the singular 
constitutive source of human social practice and, by extension, world historical development 
means that all social forms are reduced to the capital relation: capital, is capital, is capital 
(Bieler, Bruff & Morton, 2010:30-31). 
There is neither strategic, nor theoretical utility in seeing constant change; similarly, there 
is no utility in totalising all history into one theoretical category. Indeed, one of the 
strengths of the ‘relative autonomy’ perspective on the state is that it is very sensitive to 
changes in the form of the state, and to shifts in the balance of class forces which drive 
state change (Poulantzas, 1978: 17).  
 
And so, with that state theorisation in the back of our minds, we move now to consider 
a more satisfactory methodology of periodisation. The remainder of this chapter will 
consider several approaches to this challenge – in particular, ‘long waves’, Gramscian 
periodisation, and the regulation approach. The reason for this engagement is that the 
concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ rests on a claim that there has been a qualitative 
change in the way the state operates – away from seeking consent and toward more-
authoritarian forms of reproduction, including the foreclosure of various forms of 
contestation, as well as more-direct coercion. And yet, this is hedged by suggesting that, 
perhaps, this shift is not a permanent one, but rather a ‘sticking plaster’. A qualitative 
argument such as this is difficult to test. But before we even attempt a discussion on the 
validity of this position, we need to arrive at the same vantage point from which to 
consider historical change. That is to say, change can be viewed from the perspective of 
different spheres, actors, or issues, with a wide variety of scopes and scales used to 
contrast current conjunctures. There are many continuities between the pre- and post-
2008 contexts, and if any of these are given analytical priority, then you will necessarily 
see ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as a spurious claim to difference. If, however, you are 
concerned with the horizons for possible strategies on the part of labour, operating 
within the strategic-relational field of the state, then you might be closer to the vantage 
point of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Before we ask if there has been a change, we need 
to agree that this is the most important location to look for change.   
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‘Long Waves’ 
Perhaps the most common appreciation of ‘periodisation’ is that of universal, ‘long-
wave’ change – periods which are broken up according to units of analysis such as epoch 
or empire. A key example here would be Giovanni Arrighi (2010), his ‘Systemic Cycles 
of Accumulation’, and the broader World Systems approach. These periods are roughly 
measured as ‘long centuries’, which all share ‘a fundamental unity of the primary agency 
and structure of world-scale processes of capital accumulation: 
A Genoese cycle, from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries; a Dutch cycle, from 
the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries; a British cycle, from the latter half of the 
eighteenth century through the early twentieth, and a US cycle which began in the late 
nineteenth century and has continued into the current phase of financial expansion (Arrighi, 
2010: 6-7). 
These periods quite obviously overlap. The simplistic assumption that periodisations 
rest on clean breaks in history – pivoting at clear points, defined by policies, prices, or 
events, where one stops and the other starts – befuddles an accurate understanding of 
history. (Indeed, part of the knee-jerk reaction against ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
assumes this kind of change). But even while operating at the same scale, this does not 
guarantee agreement. Against these four ‘long centuries’ stand another four, similar-
length, periods – the ‘secular cycles’ presented by Fernand Braudel (1984), which relate 
closely to Kondratieff (1984) cycles (forty to sixty year waves between points of high 
and low growth). These secular cycles are, however, based on key price indicators, such 
as gold (see Figure 2).  
 
In Figure 2, we can see the incongruence of Braudel’s periodisation (the peaks of waves 
marked *) and Arrighi’s own ‘long centuries’, or systemic cycles of accumulation 
(marked tº – t¹, t¹ – t², etc). Others (Mandel, 1995; Glubb, 1978) have drawn different 
dates, and different pivot-points, between the dominance of one empire to another, or 
one price-cycle to another; these details aside, the generalizable point here is that these 
approaches see periods as global, universal frames. Bringing detail back in, however, we 
should not treat all global periodisations as similar. The contention between Arrighi 
(2010) and Braudel (1984) is evidence of this. Although similar in length, there is no 
correspondence between Braudel’s secular price cycles and Arrighi’s systemic cycles. In 
this difference we arrive at an issue which parallels ours: how to choose between rival 
approaches to the periodisation of capitalist development? Arrighi gives us a possible 
answer: 
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Figure 2 – Long centuries and systemic cycles of accumulation  
 
(Source: Arrighi, 2010: 220) 
 
Faced with a choice between two kinds of cycles, we have opted for systemic cycles because 
they are far more valid and reliable indicators of what is specifically capitalist in the modern 
world system… [Kondratieff cycles] are certainly not reliable indicators of the contractions 
and expansions of [capital]… Profitability and the command of capital over human and 
natural resources can decrease or increase just as much in a downswing as in an upswing. It 
all depends on whose competition is driving prices up or down… Nor do price logistics… 
seem to be specifically capitalist phenomena (Arrighi 2010: 7). 
 
In other words, Braudel’s focus on price movements is not necessarily representative of 
changes within the social relations of production. In contrast, the vantage point from 
which Arrighi has chosen to observe change is one sensitive to the specificities of 
capitalism, and one which is sensitive to capital itself.  
 
This does not mean Kondratieff, or secular, price cycles are rendered useless, but simply 
makes an argument based on vantage point; if one is looking to understand capitalism 
as a social system, rather than a purely economic one, then one has to use the appropriate 
categories. For Arrighi, a ‘systemic cycle of accumulation’ is the world-systemic 
extrapolation of Marx’s essential formula of capital: M-C-M’. Put differently, the two 
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phases of transformation – M-C and C-M’ – are seen to correspond to the two phases 
of capitalist empires. MC represents a period of material expansion, whereas CM’ 
corresponds with a turn to speculative financial activity as the dominant mode of 
accumulation: 
 
In phases of material expansion money capital “sets in motion” an increasing mass of 
commodities (including commoditized labor-power and gifts of nature); and in phases of 
financial expansion an increasing mass of money capital “sets itself free” from its commodity 
form, and accumulation proceeds through financial deals (as in Marx’s abridged formula 
MM) (Arrighi, 2010: 6). 
 
To return to the central question, restated: is the vantage point of long-centuries, world-
systems, and the dominant form of accumulation the appropriate one to understand all 
change within capitalism? Not at all. This might seem like an unnecessary point to clarify; 
unfortunately, it is all too necessary. When Bruff (2016, online) responded to a query on 
his periodisation of authoritarian neoliberalism, he argued that: ‘there is no expectation 
that authoritarian-neoliberal-type processes unfold simultaneously everywhere, or 
indeed that they will unfold everywhere – as my work on capitalist diversity shows, 
unevenness is very much part of capitalism, regardless of the era’. This response assumes 
that the questioner was reading authoritarian neoliberalism as a universal, totalizing 
frame, in the vein of these ‘long waves’ above. This defence, taken with Bruff’s other 
work (Bruff, Ebenau and May, 2015; Bruff and Horn, 2012; Bruff, 2011), can be 
understood to rely on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach: in this view, ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ is simply another possible variation, a state form which distinguishes one 
place from another. But surely questioning the periodisation of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ does not assume such a totalization? It is a temporal critique as much as 
it is a spatial one. Of course, there are states and spaces which, in the current 
conjuncture, do not exhibit authoritarian-neoliberal-type characteristics. But in those 
spaces that do, should we treat these changes as ‘qualitatively distinct’, within that 
context? 
 
But let us take a space which Bruff has attributed these characteristics to – the UK. The 
Office of Budgetary Responsibility is named by Bruff (2014) as being an example of this 
pivot. Yet, as the work of Gamble (1994: 174-206) shows, there were distinctly 
authoritarian characteristics seen in the neoliberalism of the Thatcher government. 
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Querying the legitimacy of describing authoritarian neoliberalism as a ‘qualitative 
change’ in the balance between coercion and consent in the post-GFC context does not 
imply a reading of this concept as totalising. More simply, the ‘long wave’ approach to 
the problem of periodisation is not the only one. If the only defence given for the lack 
of historical specificity within the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ framework is that 
“capitalism is varied”, then many will remain unconvinced. Even (or, rather, especially) 
with a sensitivity to the uneven and combined development of capitalism, this critique 
still stands as the single greatest challenge to the utility of the framework. Authoritarian 
neoliberalism, then, should not be considered a ‘long wave’, nor a world-wide change. 
What other methodology, then, can we apply to the task of periodising capitalism, while 
being sensitive to local specificities, from a vantage point which more-explicitly includes 
the state in view? Let us turn to a methodology of periodisation which Bruff himself has 
used: Gramsci, and the conceptual pairing of ‘organic’ and ‘conjunctural’ change.  
 
Enter Gramsci 
Gramsci’s concern with history and historiography is well known: ‘indeed, a study of the 
‘theory of history and historiography’ constitutes the first subject of the proposed study 
plan that he wrote on the first page of his notebook’ (Thomas, 2009: 246, see also 243-
306). The vast majority of literature on Gramsci which engages with questions of 
‘history’, however, gravitate around questions historicizing Gramsci himself (see Morton, 
2007: 24), or concern themselves with the related concept of ‘praxis’. Here we will focus 
on a different aspect of Gramsci’s historiography. In his own words, 
“A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct 
relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural… The dialectical nexus between 
the two categories of movement, and therefore research, is hard to establish precisely” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 178; Q13, §17). 
On the distinction between the conjunctural and the organic, Gramsci noted ‘the 
conjuncture can be defined as…. being in movement, i.e. as constituting a process of 
ever-changing combinations’ (1971, 148-9; Q17, §37). Although even organic periods 
are certainly not static, this emphasis on movement, on being unstable, is important; the 
conjunctural, it can be said is defined by crisis:  
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, 
despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing 
structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome 
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them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that 
it has been superseded) form the terrain of the “conjunctural”, and it is upon this terrain that 
the forces of opposition organise (Gramsci, 1971: 178; Q13, §17). 
This presents a problem for ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. As is widely acknowledged, 
neoliberalism has been in crisis since 2008. By its own argument, authoritarian 
neoliberalism is an attempt to maintain neoliberal-type accumulation, in the face of 
growing opposition, by shifting political forms. Gramsci (1971: 177; Q13, §17) also 
asserted, drawing on Marx, that ‘no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has 
first developed all the forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations’7. It is not 
a significant leap to see that neoliberalism has always had a strand of authoritarianism 
within its ‘internal relations’ – both in thought and practice. Indeed, this has been 
mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, and will be discussed further in Chapter 
Three. This all would suggest, then, that the period post-2008 is better understood as 
the playing out of the tendencies of neoliberalism in toto, in the face of ongoing crisis 
and emerging opposition, rather than a newly emerging organic set of relations which 
we might expect to last for some time. 
 
Let us consider this more closely. The example that Gramsci used to concretely 
demonstrate his categories was the period of France, between the Revolution in 1789, 
and the Paris Commune in 1870-1. For Gramsci, the failure of the Commune, and the 
assertion of the new bourgeois class, was the final playing out of the ‘internal relations’ 
set in motion by the events of 1789. This entire period of almost a century can, then, be 
seen as ‘France has now enjoyed sixty years of stable political life only after eighty years 
of convulsions at ever longer intervals: 1789, 1794, 1799, 1804, 1815, 1830, 1848, 1870’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 180; Q13, §17); put differently, an organic period is one of relatively stable 
hegemony, whereas conjunctural periods are periods of crisis and upheaval, where that 
hegemony is being directly contested. In Gramsci’s own words: 
 
It is precisely the study of these “intervals” of varying frequency which enables one to 
reconstruct the relations on the other between the development of organic movement and 
conjunctural movement in the structure (Gramsci, 1971: 180; Q13, §17). 
                                                          
7 “No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is no room in it have developed” 
(Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy). 
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One of the few examples of engagement with these methodological categories, Bieler, 
Bruff and Morton (2010) – in their critique of Open Marxism –highlight this Gramscian 
caution regarding the method of periodisation: 
As Gramsci has counselled, distinguishing between ‘organic’ (relatively permanent) and 
‘conjunctural’ (occasional, immediate, or accidental) movements is essential when developing 
an historical methodology to understanding the contradictions and causes of capitalist 
development (Bieler et al, 2010: 31)). 
Gramsci challenges us to be more careful in conflating the ‘conjunctural’ and the 
‘organic’. This is a useful way to reframe our questioning of authoritarian neoliberalism: 
are these expressions of authoritarianism an ‘organic’ change – that is, relatively stable 
new historical moment – or, simply something more occasional?  
 
Although Gramsci was not insensitive to the uneven nature of capitalist development, 
we should emphasise that even an ‘organic’, relatively stable period is not a totalizing 
period. Even if it was established that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is an ‘organic’ change 
– a difficult task, to be sure – this does not necessarily need fall into the totalization 
cautioned against above. It is simply to say that these changes to the state are in direct 
relation to our period of crisis, that this crisis is widespread, and that in the absence of 
(progressive) mitigating or countervailing conjunctural factors, we can reasonably expect 
to see this expression of the state spread to similarly crisis-affected spaces – albeit, in a 
way which is patterned by the specificities of different states and locations. This is 
precisely the treatment of neoliberalism as a spatially and temporally variegated process, 
encompassed under the frame of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore, 2010). From this perspective, neoliberalism has always been a deeply 
variegated thing. ‘Actually existing neoliberalism’ is always treated as a process, a thing 
in motion, for this very reason; rather than being a static state, achieved in a universal 
way, it is better conceived of a direction of change, which ‘fails forwards’. In this way, 
we might think of authoritarian neoliberalism as an emerging tendency within that 
broader process, cropping up in a variegated form, but more and more regularly as the 
contradictions of neoliberalism play out. If the turn to ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ really 
can be found to be ‘organic’, in the Gramscian sense, then it would be a sound basis for 
periodisation. Bruff, then, through collaboration with Bieler and Morton, has provided 
the very yardstick which his later theorisation must be measured against. But, such a 
claim must be tentative, and ready to be empirically disproven. There is no positive 
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method that could prove such a change is organic; or, put differently (in Bruff’s own 
words), a ‘qualitative change’ in capitalist social relations. 
 
Confounding the question of whether this current change can be seen as ‘conjunctural’ 
or ‘organic’ further, is the fact that this distinction is being made in real time. That is, we 
are observing events as they unfold, and trying to determine their quality without the 
benefit of hind sight. The difficulties of this particular task were apparent to another of 
our interlocutors – Nicos Poulantzas. Poulantzas (1973: 60-62, 110-112), in his analysis 
of ‘the transition to democracy in Southern Europe’, was attempting a ‘real-time 
periodization in order to identify feasible horizons of political action’ (Jessop, 2008: 
133). In this sense, Bruff is not only relying on the state-ontological work of Poulantzas 
in theorising ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ – he is bringing the project of ‘real-time 
periodisation’ forwards to the current conjuncture. The inevitable messiness of this task 
should be understood by all those who critique or dismiss the framework. In particular, 
as seen in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire (1977), as well as the complexity of different types 
of period (the dualism of ‘organic’ and ‘conjunctural’ periods put forward by Gramsci is 
in no way exhaustive), this task is complicated further by the multiple, overlapping 
temporal dynamics of political and economic events. Some strategic-selective actions 
operate immediately, while others have temporal delays of months, years, decades, and 
even centuries. When we look at the current conjuncture, there are moving parts of 
these temporal processes which cannot yet be seen reflected in empirical developments, 
making prediction difficult. The ways in which these delayed processes then interact 
with extant and developing processes in the future pushes that difficulty closer to 
impossibility. Even if the claim can be made that certain fractions of capital are operating 
within the field of the state in order to limit the possibilities of future democratic action, 
and that this is being done consciously, in order to solve problems of accumulation in a 
period of economic stagnation, there is no guarantee that this selective purpose will 
result in the desired outcome – longer-term dynamics of demand, accumulation, and 
legitimisation set in motion by both previous and future actions of other actors may very 
well countervail against the successful operation of the first actor(s).  
 
The question remains, however, does the Gramscian distinction between conjunctural 
and organic historical movements vitiate the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’? If 
it is claimed or expected that this state-form will become a stable form for a significant 
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period of time in one or more nation-states, then yes. Similarly, any approach to 
periodisation which conflates all historical change into a single type of period will fail to 
properly account for ongoing change, failing to locate the causal mechanisms driving 
that change. But if, however, we move forward with a sensitivity to Gramsci’s 
distinction, we position ourselves in a far stronger position. Real time periodisation is a 
difficult task, but at the very least we can keep in mind that changes emerging may simply 
me conjunctural upheavals, in a period of crisis. These are, nonetheless, important to 
identify – but it is a caution which Bruff unfortunately does not include in this piece of 
work. A research agenda based around the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
would do well to relocate Gramsci within the historical methodology being employed.  
 
The Regulationist approach 
In parallel with the ontological assumption of simultaneous continuity/discontinuity 
outlined above, and working toward a resolution of this paradox, we have the 
Regulationist approach. This tradition was built on the foundation of Michel Aglietta’s 
doctoral dissertation – later published as a monograph, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: 
The US Experience (2015 [1979])8 – which, importantly, departed from the treatment of 
social reproduction of capitalism as essentially automatic: ‘we deny that what exists does 
so automatically. The notion of reproduction then becomes necessary’ (Aglietta, 2015 
[1979]: 12). Reproduction, in this view, is not a continuous, uninterrupted process, 
however. In seeking to move past the ahistorical nature of neoclassicism (Aglietta, 2015: 
10), the crisis-ridden history of capitalism brings the opposite of ‘reproduction’ – that 
is, ‘rupture’: 
When actual social systems are studied, historical experience confirms that transformation 
means rupture, qualitative change… these two notions of reproduction and rupture confront one 
another in sterile opposition, each simply excluding each other, as long as the system is 
defined in the manner of the various conceptions of equilibrium… The attempt to define 
the regulation of a system in movement leads to a different conception of the system. It 
implies the conception of a hierarchy in the constitutive relationships of the system, and not 
merely functional interdependence (Aglietta, 2015 [1979]: 12, emphasis in original).  
Encapsulated in this passage we have several key points: first, is the assertion that 
historical change has happened, and that that change has been punctuated with periods of 
crisis, leading to ‘qualitative change’; second, that the historical existence of both 
                                                          
8 Or, to be more precise, this work was first published in French, Régulation et crises du capitalisme (1976), before being 
translated into English three years later. 
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continuity and change demands a theoretical explanation – one which equilibrium-based 
approaches especially are unable to provide; and third, that this problematic is best 
solved through an explanation based on a hierarchical interaction of the relationships 
that define the social system. It is particularly in this last assertion that the Regulationist 
approach maintains a connection with previous structural Marxisms; in contrast with, 
say, the Open Marxist approach, regulationists do not allow the determination of 
capitalist relations to be opened up entirely to the possibilities of contingency. In a 
similar vein to the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state, there are, ultimately, some structural 
conditions which must be met in some way. 
 
How those conditions are met, however, are open to many possibilities. At this point, 
we must bring in some definitions. Although the methodologies of the Regulation 
Approach are many, there is a conceptual pairing which is central: 
 
(a) The ‘Regime of Accumulation’ (RoA) reflects the way surplus is distributed between 
capital and labour in each period so that production is coordinated with demand. It 
encompasses the essential economic conditions (technology, the labour process and the 
combination between the departments of production) for the operation of the system 
and is posited at the level of given economic structures. 
(b) The ‘Mode of Regulation’ (MoR) designates the institutional forms and social 
compromises that are necessary for the reproduction of the RoA. The MoR is less 
determinate than the RoA, since it relies on historically specific factors. It encompasses 
the modalities of wage determination, the forms of competition and coordination of 
economic activity, the structure of the international system, the state management of 
money and the cultures of consumption (Mavroudeas, 2012: 305).  
In terms of the hierarchical articulation of these two conceptual groupings, it is seen that 
there are multiple possible ‘modes of regulation’ for any one ‘regime of accumulation’ – 
that is, that the mode of regulation is open to historical contingency, crisis and change, 
possibly even within an ongoing regime of accumulation. Regimes of accumulation are, 
of course, also open to crisis and change, but the ‘base’ (accumulation) is given primacy.  
 
A brief, stylised example might be that after the crisis of Fordist-type accumulation 
based on widespread, stable growth of industry, the regime of accumulation came to be 
increasingly defined by financialised, speculative accumulation. Within that financial 
regime of accumulation, the institutions (particularly the state) and ideologies of the 
global North have been characterised by a neoliberal mode of regulation Although 
always contested at some level, the reproduction of this mode of regulation has, 
especially since 2008, fallen into crisis. Although neoliberalism quite apparently survived 
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the immediate fallout of the global financial crisis, one of the key contradictions created 
by this mode of regulation – that is, anti-politics – would seem to be leading toward new 
forms of state and politics: an example of the former being Brexit, and an example of 
the latter being the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of 
America. What this brief stylised example shows is how the interaction of ‘regimes of 
accumulation’ and ‘modes of regulation’ provide a basis for explaining historical change, 
and periodising capitalism. Put more simply, ‘the regulation approach periodizes capitalism 
on the basis of the historically contingent correspondence between RoAs and MoAs’ 
(Mavroudeas, 2012: 307). 
 
Although the regulation approach was not a response to, or a development of, David 
Harvey’s conceptions of ‘spatial fixes’, ‘temporal fixes’, or ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ (see 
Jessop, 2006), we can ourselves conceive of these separate approaches as related. That 
is to say, both Harvey’s historical geographic materialism, and the regulation approach, 
are concerned with the ways in which capitalism ‘resolves’ crises of the system. This is 
seen in a summary of regulationism provided by Heino: 
 
Capital accumulation, and the tendential laws governing it, can be guided and regularised 
through a contingent, historically variant combination of economic and extra-economic 
factors in a distinctive institutional matrix, vitiating, deferring or displacing the various 
contradiction encoded in capitalism’s DNA and reproducing the capitalist mode of 
production… Such institutional fixes to the paradoxes of capitalist social relations achieve 
only provisional and temporary measure of success. Regulation cannot absolve capitalism of 
its contradictions; indeed, the attempt to regulate particular paradoxes tends to exacerbate 
others, unleashing disequilibria which ultimately undermine the coherence of any particular 
regulatory phase (Heino, 2014: 2). 
 
In this sense, the regulationist approach is in line with its historical materialist genealogy, 
by articulating a dialectical relationship between regulation and rupture. In a survey of 
the approach, with particular emphasis on how regulationist approaches understand the 
periodisation of capitalism, this is an important point to note – in particular, it is 
important for how we might understand the changes associated with ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. If we are to glean insight into a methodology of periodising capitalism 
from the regulation approach, this contribution would be wholly unhelpful if it did not 
maintain this dialectical thread. Although the actual application of these methodologies 
to the history of capitalist development, especially in its neoliberal phase, will only be 
attempted in the third chapter of this thesis, we have (in chapter one) already found that 
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any such methodology must be sensitive to the contradictions created by ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’, if we are to better understand the ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic 
introduced by Poulantzas, and relied upon by Bruff.  
 
Toward a methodology 
This chapter has drawn on insights from a range of locations – critical realism, ‘long 
wave’ theory, Gramscian perspectives, and regulation theory – for the purpose of 
drawing strands of insight from each. The task now is to weave those strands together. 
The first of these insights is that the various components of 'vantage point' - focus and 
units of analysis, scale, and scope – are absolutely crucial (Ollman, 2015). This in the 
sense that the length of periods, and the points at which they shift, are totally tied to 
that which one includes in view; an analysis of changing class dynamics within the 
context of the United States, in the twentieth century, will produce a radically different 
periodisation to an analysis of natural commodity trade during the hegemony of the 
United Kingdom. Even simply considering labour law instead of monetary policy, within 
an identical time-frame and spatial context, may produce a different periodisation. While 
each of the processes named above might, in some way, be related, this does not mean 
that we can reduce them to one analytical unit, nor assume that change occurs across 
these different spheres all as a response to the same causal mechanisms. Understanding 
the significance of 'vantage point' in this way, we must be sure to be explicit with our 
vantage point, in order to avoid spurious disagreements, or the issues of talking past one 
another.  
 
In the interest of avoiding spurious criticisms or dismissals, the next point which we can 
derived from the preceding discussion is that periodisation does not rely on clean breaks. The 
simple fact that a particular empirical variable was expressed both before and after a 
supposed shift in period does not, in and of itself, vitiate that periodistion. If this was 
the case, one would (as an extreme example of this logic) have to subsume the capitalist 
period into the feudal period, simply because monarchies exist before and after this 
asserted change. This insight is gleaned from the critical realist approach. Markets pre- 
and post-dated the emergence of capitalism, and there are still remnants of feudal social 
relations comingled within our contemporary capitalist social relations. Critical realism 
gives us a deeper understanding of why periodisation might still be justified, despite 
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these confounding empirical examples. Touched on at the outset of this chapter, a demi-
regularity is a temporary regularity expressed within the actual, and observed in the 
empirical (Jessop, 2005: 41). A shift in these demi-regularities might see the continuation 
of an empirical observation, while changing the underlying mechanisms producing that 
outcome or expression. This kind of ontological claim is, of course, highly complex and 
contested – we cannot go into detailed discussion or proof here. It is enough for our 
purposes here simply to note two things: that periodisation rests on certain ontological 
assumptions; and that critical realism offers an ontological position which might support 
this task. But, crucially, using critical realism as a starting point does not prescribe a 
theoretical or empirical vantage point from which analysis must be made; it can be seen 
as congruent with a variety of approaches – Gramscian, world-systemic, or, from the 
regulationist approach. To state this again, in the context of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, 
the simple existence of authoritarian states before 2008 does not mean that 'authoritarian 
neoliberalism' is a false periodisation. Rather, the burden of proof is shifted to show that 
the role played by the authoritarian state form is in some way different. To be clear, we 
have not yet explored this secondary problem – at this stage, we are simply making the 
problem more apparent.  
 
The next point to be drawn out of the above discussion is the Gramscian distinction 
between 'conjunctural' and 'organic' change. Here the question is not 'whether change 
has occurred', but rather 'what is the quality of that change'.  Or, to put this differently, 
how permanent is 'authoritarian neoliberalism'? Will this be the predominant state form 
for decades to come? Or are we simply observing the 'morbid symptoms' (to borrow 
another phrase from Gramsci) of the current period of ongoing crisis, which may well 
be replaced with a more-permanent (stable) period in a few years? This is a question 
which is doubly hard to answer. First, due to the simple fact that there is no positive(ist) 
test, with which to determine if these current institutions and relations are conjunctural 
or organic. Second, as experienced by both Marx and Poulantzas (among others), is that 
these challenges are further compounded by attempting periodisation as events unfold. 
Due variously to the differing temporal dynamics of various actions, policies, and events 
– as well as, potentially, shifting causal mechanisms at the level of the 'real' resulting in 
changes to things seen as regularities in the 'actual' – we cannot truly know the 
ramifications of various contradictions and processes until they have played out – if not 
fully, then at least in a more-complete form.  
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Conclusion 
 
The assertion that we are witnessing the ‘rise of authoritarian neoliberalism’ is a 
contentious one, and rests upon a variety of subsidiary claims and assumptions. 
‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’ also resonates immediately with the current context, 
marked by developments such as: the 2016 British referendum, in which British people 
voted to leave the European Union; the apparent dissolution of ‘liberal democracy’ in 
Turkey, the state which until recently was heralded as a regional leader in combining 
liberalism and Islam (Tuğal, 2016); and, of course, the election of a billionaire right-wing 
populist demagogue as President of the United States of America. In this context, it is 
often difficult to step back, and to consider the kinds of sub-claims and assumptions 
which constitute the framework of 'authoritarian neoliberalism'. Rather, the temptation 
is simply to take the theorisation as complete, before moving on to consider empirical 
case studies. This thesis seeks to take that step back, and consider more closely the 
theoretical – in part, to head off critiques which might dismiss the term out of hand. 
With a more-robust theorisation, we will be better placed in the debates ahead, as 
scholars attempt to understand these historic shifts.  
 
This chapter has considered just a few of those claims and assumptions. In particular, 
that the state is not an instrumentalist tool, captured and determined by the interests of 
capital; that the ontology of the state – and of capitalism itself – is open to variation; that 
this variation is (as it changes) a basis to break up (conceptually) the development of 
capitalism into distinct periods; and that these periods are not universal, but are subject 
to temporal and spatial variation. Put simply, 'authoritarian neoliberalism' makes claims 
which fall into the broader debates around state theorisation and the periodisation of 
capitalism. These claims are, however, relatively implicit – the concept is not clearly 
situated within these debates. This chapter has attempted to locate where and how 
'authoritarian neoliberalism' might intersect with these two areas of contention.  
 
This task is somewhat easier in the case of the 'state'. As Bruff (2014: 119) emphasises, 
‘the state is emphatically not a predetermined entity whose function is to act in a 
monolithic manner in the name of capital’. This is a nod toward broader debates, making 
clear what Bruff believes the ontology of the state to be – implied in the above is a 
rejection of Marxist-Leninist-type treatments, which see the state as a mere tool of 
92 
 
bourgeois class domination.  The complete inverse of this position – liberal pluralism – 
is, however, equally limited. It is for this reason that both liberal pluralism and Leninist 
state theories were contrasted above. Although the debate on state theorisation is not 
reducible to a trichotomy, we here have presented 'relative autonomy' as a more-
satisfactory treatment of the state; one which would support the state-ontological 
assumptions underpinning 'authoritarian neoliberalism'. Nestled within 'relative 
autonomy' are the material factors which ultimately shape (if only in part) state action. 
These material factors can be extended beyond simply the reliance of the state on 
taxation revenue, and, by extension, capital accumulation – in particular, to consider 
crises of legitimisation, as well as accumulation. Here we have considered briefly how this 
might relate to the contradictions specific to the process of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’; 
how a general theory of the state as ‘relatively autonomous’ highlights the 
unsustainability of ‘authoritarian statism’ in general, speaking to the crisis of the state 
which is exacerbated by the process labelled as ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Although 
this is a connection which cannot be fully established here, this thesis suggests that 
pursuing these insights through an engagement with the literature surrounding ‘anti-
politics’ may well be a way forward for the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ research agenda.  
 
A question this chapter has raised is, if periodisation is such a fraught endeavour, should 
we bother at all? In the words of Jameson (2002: 29), ‘we cannot not periodise’. If the 
purpose of our philosophy is not only to understand the world, but also to change it, 
then periodisation is a necessary task to that end. Periodising capitalist development, 
and attempting to explain contemporary dynamics – what is different about them, and 
what is the same – is a crucial task. Yet, we must understand that real-time periodisation 
is, ultimately, fallible; and, that our tentative periodisations must be fit for purpose. That is 
to say, when we decide between vantage points, or when we consider two conflicting 
periodisations made from the same vantage point, the first question we must ask is ‘does 
this perspective reveal more than it obscures’? Or, even before that question is asked, 
we must ask ‘what is the purpose of this periodisation’? Only then can we attempt to 
answer whether or not that theorisation is appropriate.  To approach these questions, 
we must finally arrive at the history of neoliberalism. By considering that broader history, 
as well the supposedly-distinct current context, we can bring these insights regarding 
periodisation to bare on the recent history of capitalism. In doing so, we will find that 
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an attempt to analytically separate current moments of authoritarianism from previous 
examples is, in fact, a ‘violent abstraction’.  
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Chapter Three 
Violence of Abstraction, Violence in Neoliberalism 
 
The imperilled state of democracy in the current conjuncture is widely appreciated 
(Ferguson, 2006; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013; Brown, 2015). The emergent framework of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ offers a way to understand how that apparent decline in 
democratic possibilities is related to, and driven by, the process of neoliberalisation. By 
returning to the work of Nicos Poulantzas, Bruff (2014) and others (Tansel, 2017) make 
the claim that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the state post-2007 
‘toward constitutional and legal mechanisms’ of discipline and coercion, and ‘away from 
seeking consent’ for neoliberal strategies (Bruff, 2014: 116). For Bruff, although 
authoritarian statist strategies have existed in prior stages of neoliberal development, 
and, although these changes occur at different times and in different ways, it is still 
theoretically and conceptually important to distinguish the current phase of 
neoliberalisation from its previous forms. This thesis does not challenge the assertion 
that there are distinctly and characteristically anti-democratic developments occurring at 
different scales, and in many places, in the current conjuncture – far from it. These 
developments are distressing, and theoretically significant in terms of our understanding 
of capitalist development. But the question remains: is it useful to definitively separate 
the current phase of neoliberalism? Does the argument that there has been a qualitative 
change in the state reveal something of the essence of the moment? Or does it obscure 
the actually existing history of neoliberalism – and capitalism more generally – and in 
doing so, reify general tendencies as something new and different? These are the 
questions being brought to bear in this chapter, and in this thesis. 
 
We return here to Sayer’s argument around the ‘violence of abstraction’ (1987). The 
framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is itself an abstraction, emphasising some 
aspects of history, while de-emphasising others; but does this perspective clarify or 
obscure? For Sayer (1987: 149), ‘theory should be abandoned if it gets in the way of 
95 
 
knowledge’. One error along the road to theory which must vitiate the utility of that 
theory is the failure to develop ‘propositions’ toward an actual ‘explanation’:  
 
giving a causal explanation necessarily involves ‘elaborating’ a theory of causal mechanisms. It 
is only such a theory which makes a series of propositions into an explanation… We do not 
explain things such as Protestantism or law by their functionality but their genealogy (Sayer, 
1987: 125, emphasis in original).  
Put simply, if ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ cannot forcefully articulate the difference 
between the authoritarian statism of Poulantzas’s day, and the authoritarian statism 
which supposedly operates in the post-2007 era, then it will struggle theoretically and 
strategically. This can be articulated in the terminology of the regulationist approach 
discussed in Chapter Two: has the context of accumulation and reproduction changed 
in such a way as to prompt a qualitative transformation of authoritarian statist forms? 
And if there are contextual drivers which induce authoritarian statist responses, have 
those underlying drivers changed? A periodisation claim which does not present answers 
to these questions is shaky, at best.  This chapter will argue that by abstracting the 
current, post-Global Financial Crisis context, and the role of authoritarian state forms 
within it, away from the broader history of neoliberalisation, a ‘violent abstraction’ is 
made. One of the principal reasons for this is that the very conjunctural developments 
which the framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would seem to speak to – issues 
surrounding the ‘strengthening-weakening’ of the state, such as the crisis of legitimacy 
in politics and the state – cannot be explained if one excludes earlier neoliberal 
authoritarianisms from view. This chapter seeks to bring a theoretical concern for the 
‘violence of abstraction’ together with the distinctly violent and coercive history of 
neoliberalism, in order to better assess the claims of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Before 
we move to outline that history, however, let us recall that which has come before. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis elaborated the theoretical challenges facing the concept 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. The chapter considered research undertaken under 
different rubrics, which overlap, or at least intersect, with the concerns of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. These included ‘depoliticisation’, ‘new constitutionalisation’, the 
approach of Political Marxism, as well as that of uneven and combined development. 
These spaces of conceptual overlap raise questions regarding the specificity of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ which are yet to be answered. Most importantly, it should 
be seen that the material conditions that these literatures were responding to are real 
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challenges – as important as theoretical and conceptual clarity is, it is the specificity of 
historical moments which is our key concern. In engaging with these other literatures, 
however, some insights were drawn which might usefully augment ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’, rather than simply dismiss it. In particular, through a ‘first cut’ of the 
state, here from the perspective of Political Marxism, mechanisms were outlined which 
might bear out the ‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic which Poulantzas (1978: 248) 
associated with authoritarian statism, including the revelation of the state’s relative class 
character at that particular conjuncture. Later in this chapter the ramifications of this 
particular contradiction will be considered. Principally, however, the first chapter sought 
to deepen the critique of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ beyond those limitations that are 
more-immediately apparent, mounting both theoretical and historical challenges to the 
specificity of the ‘authoritarian neoliberal’ claims.  
 
With this critique more-fully articulated, the second chapter of the thesis looked to 
develop the methodological tools necessary to approach questions of periodisation. 
Through a ‘second cut’ of state theory, and a consideration of the state as a manager of 
capitalist crises, we find that periodisation and state theory are closely intertwined. In a 
wide-ranging survey of approaches to the task of periodisation – spanning ‘long wave’ 
approaches, Gramscian approaches, and the perspective of regulationist theory – useful 
insights of each were identified. First among these was the understanding that vantage 
point is a crucial aspect of periodisation, and that disagreement over appropriate 
periodisation is often simply due to differences in perspective. Also important was the 
understanding that a periodisation is not necessarily global or universal. The implication 
of this is that the unevenness of capitalist development is not a sufficient defence of 
periodisation claims. Perhaps the most significant insight drawn out from these 
approaches, however, was the distinction between ‘conjunctural’ and ‘organic’ periods, 
as well as the necessity to relate periods back to the issues of accumulation and 
reproduction. 
 
This third chapter, then, will be an attempt to bring that theory to bear on the actual 
history of neoliberalism, to finally develop an evaluation of the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. It will do so by considering three empirical ‘moments’ of authoritarianism 
within the neoliberal frame: Pinochet’s Chile, Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, and 
the Greek experience of authoritarianism under the framework of the European 
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Monetary System (EMS). These ‘moments’ have been chosen for specific reasons, and 
are in their own right significant challenges to the periodisation claims implied within 
the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ framework. They should also, however, be seen as 
indicative of a wider tendency within neoliberalisation to rely on authoritarian-type state 
structures to insulate policies against popular challenge.  Despite this plethora of cases, 
those of Chile, the UK, and the EU have been chosen for particular reasons. The reason 
for the first and second cases is that these are the examples which will most likely be 
used by critics of the framework. As part of the widespread genesis narrative of 
neoliberalism, Pinochet and Thatcher have both been characterised as authoritarian in 
some way – these two cases must be considered if a judgement is to be developed as to 
whether understanding authoritarian neoliberalism as a distinct historical period is valid. 
The third case is relevant, as the structure of the EU is discussed by Bruff (2014) himself, 
in the original theorisation of authoritarian neoliberalism, and warrants inclusion on this 
basis. The latter part of this chapter will then return to the claims made by Bruff and 
others. With these claims made clear, and the three ‘moments’ of authoritarianism 
outlined, we will finally be able to draw together some conclusions regarding the utility 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as a framework to understand our contemporary world.  
 
The argument developed in this chapter is that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ cannot be 
sustained as a period in its own right. The concept presents neither a methodology, nor 
evidence, to support the claim that contemporary authoritarian state transformation is 
‘qualitatively distinct to the kinds which preceded 2007. If those claims are ejected, 
however, the insights of Gramsci regarding ‘conjunctural’ verses ‘organic movements’ 
push us to consider whether authoritarian neoliberalisation might be better conceived 
as the playing out of the broader process of neoliberalism in general, convulsing through 
a period of organic crisis, rather than as a period in its own right. This Gramscian 
perspective is also closely related to the real contribution offered by this emergent 
framework: through its focus on changes to the state which concurrently strengthen and 
weaken it, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ puts a name to a particular contradiction. By 
focussing less on drawing arbitrary lines of periodisation, and more on the generative 
mechanisms which are creating change, a useful contribution can be made to 
understanding our current global political economy. 
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Pinochet’s Chile 
The experience of neoliberalism in Chile is ‘one of the most storied episodes in the 
history of neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010: 108). One reason for this is the fact that Pinochet’s 
economic reforms are commonly seen as the ‘first’ example neoliberalisation, and used 
as a marker of the breakdown of state-led strategies. Beginning in the spring on 1973, 
these changes preceded the market-based reforms of both Margret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan. Chile’s neoliberalismo is also memorable for its dramatic narrative: the 
combination of a CIA-sponsored military coup d'état; the overthrowing a stable, 
democratically elected government; and the striking use of violence under the junta 
government, all combine with the visible involvement of well-known Northern 
intellectuals – Milton Friedman was joined in supporting the Pinochet government by 
many economists, such Arnold Harberger and Friedrich von Hayek, among others – 
and their students, the ‘Chicago boys’. The prominence of Chile in the history of 
neoliberalism poses a problem for the conceptualisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
– not least because the term was used before Bruff introduced it, to describe this very 
historical moment (Taylor, 2002: 51). Here we will briefly engage with the popular 
narrative surrounding Pinochet’s government, and the involvement of Northern 
academics, before moving to consider the role of authoritarian state strategies more 
closely. 
 
The conventional story is well known: the University of Chicago Department of 
Economics, led by Friedman and Harberger, developed an alternative approach to the 
dominant Keynesianism of the time. Through targeted scholarship programmes, and 
other means, the University of Chicago then taught this approach to large groups of 
Chilean graduate students who were studying in the US. When these students returned 
home, they took up positions within the civil service, and then convinced Pinochet – 
who already had a dislike of unions – of the merits of their newfound free-market 
economic policies. As a result, ‘Pinochet effectively handed control of economic policy’ 
to the ‘Chicago boys’ as they had become known, who ‘led by [Sergio] de Castro, would 
staff the key [economic] positions’ in the junta government (Peck, 2010: 108). This clean 
narrative is presented in a particularly compelling way by Naomi Klein (2007), and is 
repeated by many (e.g. Steger and Roy, 2010: 100). Unfortunately, it obscures much 
detail – in particular, it unduly elevates the importance of the global North within this 
causal chain, reducing the importance of indigenous, Southern experiences, motivations 
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and struggles (Connell and Dados, 2014; Valdés 1995; Silva 1996; Moulian 2002; Winn, 
2004). Most popular Northern analyses of neoliberalismo spend more time talking about 
the University of Chicago than existing struggles around agriculture and land ownership 
within Chile (see Zetlin and Ratcliff, 1988). They also skim over the manifest failings of 
state-led developmental strategies (Stillerman, 2004: 164), which led to neoliberalism 
being domestically embraced as a development strategy: 
 
The Chicago Boys—and the other players in the making of the dictatorship’s economic 
policy—were not offering General Pinochet a textbook of economic theory. They were 
offering a solution to his main political problem: how to get legitimacy by economic growth, 
satisfy his backers in the Chilean propertied class, and keep the diplomatic support of the 
United States, without giving an opening to his opponents in the political parties and labor 
movement. Neoliberalism as a development strategy met those needs (Connell and Dados, 2014: 
122, emphasis in original).  
 
In fact, the actual role of Northern academics in this project was summarised early on 
by a New York Times editorial in 1975, which queried the way in which academics were 
lending legitimacy to the authoritarian government (New York Times, 1975, in Peck, 2010: 
109). It is a shame that this clarity, which did not emphasise their ideas as causal, was 
forgotten along the way. An understanding of the emergence of neoliberalism in Chile 
should then be grounded in an understanding of the domestic struggles around capitalist 
development – of which struggles around land reform are just one example – as well as 
how import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) had started to express real material 
failures. Friedman, Harberger, and their students played a role, but to prioritise their 
causal influence, divorced from an understanding of domestic struggles, is certainly a 
‘violent abstraction’.  
 
We must, however, move contentions regarding causation aside somewhat. This small 
survey cannot begin to develop an argument around the emergence of neoliberalism in 
Chile – and this is not the aim of this section. Rather, the Chilean experience of 
neoliberalismo is of pressing relevance to our understanding of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. If the very first instance of neoliberalisation was one marked by obviously 
authoritarian state forms, and a far greater emphasis on imposing coercion rather than 
seeking consent, then how can Bruff make the claim that authoritarian neoliberalism 
marks a shift away from seeking consent? Whether this is due to an overemphasis on 
the current moment, or due to geographical focus, we will consider further on. Either 
way, let us move beyond a myopic focus on ‘the Chicago boys’ and their epistemological 
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influences, and instead focus on the detail of the different forms, expressions, and 
moments of authoritarianism under Pinochet – our purpose being to draw a thumbnail 
sketch of the character of the Pinochet government.  
 
It is important to ground this discussion in real, lived experience. Language such as 
‘coercion’ and ‘repression’, in isolation from anecdotal evidence of the arbitrary violence 
of a regime such as Pinochet’s, evacuates meaning. Away from the abstractions of 
theory, take the following passage relating the overthrow of President Allende by the 
military in Chile, in September 1973: 
On September 11, 1973, we awoke to a country in turmoil. What many people had predicted 
was actually happening: the armed forces of Chile were staging a coup d’état to overthrow 
democratically elected President Salvador Allende… On the evening of September 13, a 
group of soldiers, led by a captain, came to our home and proceeded to search for weapons. 
When they didn’t find any, they took my father away with them. They also took our books 
about socialism or left politics, and we found out afterward that such books had been burned. 
About an hour later they returned for my older brother and he was taken, beaten up and 
brought back to us. The captain said to my mother, “Here’s your son – we brought him back 
so he can work for you, because we executed your husband” (Aguilera and Fredes, 2003: vii).  
Although the authoritarian nature of the Pinochet regime has become part of the general 
history of neoliberalism, the brutal details of state-led coercion too-often fade into the 
background. The reality is that ‘capitalism and freedom’ did not prove as symbiotic as 
Friedman (2002) promised. Neoliberalism was introduced under Pinochet through 
authoritarian means: ‘a military coup backed by the traditional upper classes (as well as 
by the US government), followed by the fierce repression of all solidarities created within 
the labour and urban movements which had so threatened their power’ (Harvey, 2005: 
39). There is some contention regarding the actual number of civilians who were 
detained, imprisoned, tortured, or executed, but most believe that the number of 
persons who ‘disappeared’ equal at least three thousand (Solimano, 2012: 23). Further, 
‘at least 80,000 were imprisoned, and 200,000 fled the country for political reasons’ 
(Klein, 2007: 77). While many of these expressions of state violence were random or 
arbitrary, there was an underlying logic of suppressing sources of potential resistance – 
left-leaning intellectuals or teachers, unionised workers, and journalists, in particular. It 
is not controversial to assert that such concerted state violence has the effect of 
curtailing formal democratic procedure, or political engagement more broadly. In this 
sense neoliberal economic policies were, in the first instance, instigated in parallel with 
direct political repression (Taylor, 2006: 51-55). 
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Pinochet’s authoritarian violence was not just direct however, but also structural. Put 
simply, the economic violence of the neoliberal policies, being implemented 
concurrently with direct suppression of resistance, is of equal importance in 
understanding ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. In 1975, the junta government ‘cut public 
spending by 27 percent in one blow – and they kept cutting until, by 1980, it was half of 
what it had been under Allende’ (Klein, 2007: 82). Under the direction of the ‘Chicago 
boys’, an economic agenda was pursued that included ‘abolishing price controls, 
deregulating markets, reducing import tariffs’, as well as de-nationalizing property and 
industries previously seized by Allende’s socialist government, as well as pursuing 
‘external credits’, through negotiation with the IMF and World Bank (Solimano, 2012: 
25). Consolidating these austere fiscal policies was a concerted effort to undermine, 
break up, and target organised labour and trade unions (Stillerman, 2004: 124; Taylor, 
2006: 49). This process was justified in part by reference to the role of wage claims in 
driving the significant levels of inflation effecting the country. The political power of 
unions was further undermined by policies, including the above, which increased 
unemployment, and thus the bargaining power of labour in the workplace. In the face 
of severe state-led austerity, ‘a profound contraction of demand as recession set in and 
wages plunged to under two-thirds of their former value in two years’, whilst the number 
of people receiving those reduced wages shrank as ‘unemployment climbed above 15%’ 
(Taylor, 2002: 52). Far from being the real world expression of ‘free market economics’, 
as some characterise it, the sum of these policies was, in reality, an active state 
intervention into the market, in order to undermine sources of potential opposition.  
 
Although the rapid ‘marketisation’ of state policy in Chile – or, ‘shock doctrine’, as Klein 
(2007) called the process – did reduce inflation (from 340 percent in 1975 to 9.5 percent 
in 1981) as well as drive increased GDP growth, this success was short-lived. It was also 
felt incredibly unevenly. These macro-level figures, often toted by neoliberal apologists 
as evidence of the “cruel-but-kind” nature of market-based reforms, mask entirely the 
incredible inequality that these policies promoted; GDP figures mask that most benefit 
went to a few firms, most of which were based in the US. With financial instability, and 
crises of the current accounts balance, rearing their heads in the 1980s, even this 
generalised ‘success’ was undone.  Crucially, however, neoliberalismo in Chile was not 
undone. To explore this, we need to consider the third pillar of Pinochet’s rule – 
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alongside direct political violence, and rapid marketization of fiscal and monetary policy, 
the use of legal and constitutional mechanisms proved to be one of the most enduring 
(but least discussed) aspects of this authoritarian period. 
 
In 1980, through a tightly controlled plebiscite, General Pinochet brought a new 
constitution into force. This constitution effectively enshrined the core tenets of his 
government’s neoliberal platform: 
 
The 1980 constitution legally sanctioned the immense powers that had already been adopted 
by General Pinochet and promoted three major tenets of neoliberalism – the supreme value 
of private property, severe restrictions on the state in its economic role as producer (with the 
exception of its copper industry the main provider of funding for the military), and a severe 
clampdown on labor rights (Solimano, 2012: 36).  
Although some of the executive powers gifted to the president in the 1980 constitution 
have since been wound back, these economic constraints on democratically elected 
governments continue to this day. As a result, there have been ‘restricted political 
representation of positions that do not fall within the agenda of (restricted) democracy 
and free-market economics’ (Solimano, 2012: 37) since the demise of the military regime. 
Indeed, although the constitution was altered in 1989 to remove the dictatorial powers 
of the president, the constitution has been widely seen to have ‘made it vastly more 
difficult, if not impossible, for the citizenry to challenge the business-military 
domination of Chilean society’ (Chomsky, 1999: 9).  
 
One example of this ‘constitutionalisation’ of neoliberalism in Chile relates to the scope 
of activities which a trade-union can pursue. Under Article 19(19), voluntary unionism 
is enshrined in the constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1980) – a tool 
used to lower union density, and thus power, around the world, though not always via 
constitutionalisation. Further, under the same article, ‘Union organizations and their 
leaders may not intervene in political partisan-activities’ – an open-ended provision, 
which can be (and has been) interpreted in ways which undermine the ability of unions 
to engage in a democratic process, even post-Pinochet. As discussed earlier in this thesis, 
Bruff (2014: 116) emphasises the increased reliance on constitutional and legal 
mechanisms, to foreclose avenues of resistance to neoliberal policies, as being 
definitional to ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ in the contemporary conjuncture. The 
implications of the 1980 Chilean constitution, as pertaining to Bruff’s theorisation, will 
be drawn out further on. We should, however, note here that constitutional and legal 
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mechanisms have always been a part of the history of neoliberalism; ‘That is neoliberal 
democracy in a nutshell: trivial debate over minor issues by parties that basically pursue 
the same pro-business policies regardless of formal differences and campaign debate’ 
(Chomsky, 1999: 9). Although polemic in tone, Chomsky here highlights that de-
politicisation in its various forms are definitional to actually existing neoliberalism.  
 
General Augusto Pinochet, and the junta government he led in Chile, have been the 
subject of many studies and histories. A comprehensive history, or even historiographic 
survey, is not the purpose of this chapter. This ‘brief history’ of Chilean neoliberalismo has 
highlighted three key forms of authoritarianism relating to ‘market-based’ governance. 
First, although language of national interest and ‘stability’ were used to justify the 
programme, direct coercion played a more material role in the imposition of reform, 
and the neutering of resistance. Second, that direct violence was compounded by the 
violence of the economic programme, which also reduced resistance through the 
outlawing of unionism, as well as the material compulsion toward the broad-based 
acceptance of lower wages, due in part to reduced welfare spending. And finally, that 
these reforms were consolidated through legal means, which have limited avenues of 
opposition to neoliberal governance, even in the current post-Pinochet, ‘democratised’ 
context. If ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is to be embraced as a useful category and 
research programme in the current conjuncture, a comprehensive answer must be 
presented to the challenge arising from this discussion of Chile, that “neoliberalism has 
always been authoritarian”. Further, the history of state violence being used to break 
resistance to emergent neoliberal reforms is hardly limited to one aberrant Southern 
example – as mentioned above, this is a hallmark of the history of neoliberalism, not 
least of Thatcherism. We turn now to consider this second ‘moment’ of neoliberal 
authoritarianism. 
 
Thatcherism 
The global crisis of the 1970’s, emanating from the US (see Gamble and Walton, 1978; 
Brenner, Brenner and Wilson, 2010), was, for various reasons, particularly acute in the 
United Kingdom. This was noted by Stuart Hall: ‘few would deny that, since the political 
debacles of 1972 and 1974, and the economic recession after 1975-6, the crisis has 
reached a qualitatively new stage’ (Hall, 1988: 123). This is the pre-history of political 
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and economic crisis, from which Thatcherism emerged: ‘neither the weakest economies 
with the strongest labour movements, like Great Britain, nor the strongest economies 
with the weakest labour movements, like Japan, remained immune’ (Brenner, 2006: 23). 
The economic crisis of the early 1970’s was marked by the theoretically-improbable 
emergence of ‘stagflation’ – concurrent growth stagnation and inflation (Cameron and 
Neal, 2003: 390). Political crisis then emerged from the successive failure of 
governments on both the left and right to present or implement solutions to these 
ongoing issues (Poulantzas, 1978: 204). Gramscian analyses of this period have 
characterised it as one of ‘organic crisis’, marked by a failure to cohere a hegemonic 
power bloc (see Jessop et al, 1988). 
 
This is the context in which Thatcher’s government emerged – a distinctly anti-
conservative Conservative movement. The early years of the Thatcher government were 
not, however, immediately successful – either in solving these deep economic issues, 
nor in converting electoral success into hegemonic dominance. Part of this was due to 
the contradictory imperatives which the government was attempting to balance:  
 
The dilemma which the Thatcher government faced from the outset was how far to continue 
the defensive and short-term policies of its predecessor, and seek to cushion and to smooth 
economic decline by whatever combination of measures lay to hand, and how far to break 
with that pattern and make a bold attempt to reverse Britain’s economic fortunes… This 
made the early period of the Thatcher government appear as a highly unstable and 
transitional phase. The government was pursuing two contradictory strategies simultaneously 
(Gamble, 1981: 207, 212). 
 
Consider an example. One of the most popularised examples of Thatcher’s 
‘authoritarian populism’, as Hall described it (1988: 138), was the breaking of the miners’ 
strike in 1984 (Harvey, 2005: 59). It is easy to treat this moment as a device with which 
to generalise about the entire period of Thatcher’s government. As significant as this 
event was, this should not obscure the deeply contradictory early stages of Thatcherism. 
It is in the uneven application of such policies, and concerted efforts to capitalize on 
conjunctural events, that we can locate a (fallible) attempt to consolidate hegemony. In 
this early, contradictory phase of Thatcher’s government ‘trade union power was being 
weakened by high unemployment, and pay settlements were falling, but no direct assault 
on trade-union organisation had materialised’ (Gamble, 1981: 212). Thatcher’s war on 
unions was not an automatic expression of ideas through the state, but a project which 
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was created gradually, and deeply connected to the context of crisis in which it emerged. 
Although crises are over-determined (Hall, 1988: 128) – that is, unable to be tied directly 
to one cause or another – it is crucial to understand the emergence of Thatcherism in 
this context. Only then might we approach an understanding of the emergence of 
authoritarian state forms in this period. 
 
One reason an understanding of Thatcherism – and the authoritarian aspects of 
Thatcher’s Tory government – is necessary, is to ground analysis in the drivers behind 
state change. Put differently, the period of Thatcherism was not a clean departure from 
existing trends of crisis management, but rather a continuation of struggles around 
accumulation and legitimacy faced both by earlier governments, and by governments in 
other developed economies at the same time. It is for this reason that we can bring 
Poulantzas’s concept of ‘authoritarian statism’ to bear, despite its conceptualisation pre-
dating the emergence of Thatcher. In the words of Andrew Gamble (1994: 181), ‘the 
concept of authoritarian statism has a crucial bearing on how Thatcherism itself has 
been explained’. Faced by the crisis of the 1970’s, states around the global North seemed 
to need to deepen Keynesian-type crisis management; there was an imperative to ‘widen 
the basis of consent for measures of state intervention, such as prices and incomes 
policies and public-investment policies (Gamble, 1994: 181, see also Bulpitt, 1986). 
Although these deepening interventions were occurring during the 1960’s – many of 
them successfully – the consent for these types of programmes began to break down in 
the face of the economic downturn. With the failure of consent-based strategies, a shift 
to coercion began to occur. The failure to legitimize continuing state intervention 
 
Brought a shift away from consent towards coercion. The state seized new powers to impose its 
policies; gradually the democratic aspects of political life began to be eroded and every base 
of independent countervailing power to the state came under threat (Gamble, 1994: 181, 
emphasis added). 
Thatcherism, in this light, only came together as a hegemonic strategy once the approach 
of authoritarian statism was employed (see also Strinati, 1983; Hall et al, 1979). We 
should here note the parallel between Gamble’s claim regarding Thatcherism, and 
Bruff’s claim regarding a qualitative shift from consent-based strategies to coercion in 
the post-2008 conjuncture (but hold this aside for consideration further on). This 
argument, however – that the crisis of the 1970’s led the state to contingently adopt 
106 
 
strategies of discipline, policing, and depoliticisation – is summarised concisely by 
Poulantzas himself:  
The whole of the current phase is permanently and structurally characterized by a sharpening of the generic 
elements of political crisis and state crisis – a sharpening which is itself articulated to the economic 
crisis of capitalism. Authoritarian statism appears also as the result of, and as a response to, 
the sharpening of those elements of crisis (Poulantzas, 1978: 206, emphasis in original). 
The economy of the United Kingdom was, in the 1970’s, in a deep crisis. This economic 
crisis was linked to broader international issues relating to accumulation. States across 
the global North were each struggling to cohere policy responses, and political 
legitimation of those policies, leading to internally related political and state crises. One 
contingent response of states in the face of these material constraints was to expedite 
policies, to silo decisions away from the purview of elected officials, and to ‘police the 
crisis’ in a more militaristic fashion. Thatcher’s government, in this vein, can be 
described as one pursuing ‘authoritarian statism’.  
 
This general point is also found in Stuart Hall’s work on the concept of ‘authoritarian 
populism’, who argued that ‘this double movement – creeping authoritarianism masked 
by the rituals of formal representations – is what gives a particular historical specificity 
to the present phase of crisis of the state/crisis of hegemony’ (Hall, 1988: 126). Hall 
explicitly agrees with Poulantzas, but goes further in considering the way in which 
‘authoritarian statist’ strategies approach the challenge of legitimisation and 
reproduction: ‘what it [authoritarian statism] omits is the steady and unremitting set of 
operations designed to bind or construct a popular consent to these new forms of statist 
authoritarianism’ (Hall, 1988: 127). This is the question which ‘authoritarian populism’ 
attempts to answer. These frameworks are complimentary, rather than exclusive, and 
both provide insight into the Thatcherite ‘moment’ of authoritarianism.  
 
But what do we mean when we say that Thatcher was authoritarian? This claim does 
not imply that Thatcher was as violent or dictatorial as Pinochet, or any other spurious 
comparison to conventionally-authoritarian despotism. The claim rests on the 
understanding that authoritarianism, rather than being antithetical to democracy, as it is 
commonly conceived, can co-exist:  
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Authoritarian statism is included towards a gradual transformation that has critical effects on 
the functioning of the liberal democracy by incapacitating political parties, the parliament, 
the judiciary and some sections of the bureaucracy, and empowering the technocratic-
minded elite within the executive branch (Bekmen, 2014: 47). 
In this sense, then, we can characterise particular actions of Thatcher and her executive 
as being authoritarian. One example of this was her turn toward a more ‘presidential’ 
leadership style. Under Thatcher’s government, many decisions which were previously 
made by cabinet bypassed this arena. Her sidelining of cabinet was institutionally 
supported, and had the effect of taking power out of the hands of elected ministers, 
granting it instead to an inner circle of unelected advisers – ‘Thatcher established a 
strong link between her inner circle and the Treasury in the form of a Cabinet 
subcommittee called the ‘E committee’’ (Gallas, 2015: 137). The result of this was that 
‘the involvement of Cabinet in economic policy matters was minimal’.9  
 
Another illustrative example is the ‘Financial Management Initiative’ (1982, see Fry, 
1988), which imposed strict cash limits on public service departments, having the effect 
of legally restricting the autonomy and policy scope of individual departments (Gallas, 
2015: 138). If de-politicisation is conceived of as reducing the parameters of policy 
possibilities, foreclosing particular approaches, then this was indeed the effect of the 
FMI. There were many similar impositions of efficiency and cost-reduction onto the 
public service. The effect of these changes was to enshrine the primacy of Treasury in 
all policy-making:  
Mrs Thatcher and her Treasury team ensured that the regime could not be questioned in 
official circles. Whether or not civil servants thought it was correct (and the majority did not, 
before the mid-1980’s) they accepted it as their framework of reference (Middlemas, 1991: 
259, in Gallas, 2015: 138).  
In a broad strategy, which reduced the scope of opposition to the policy programme of 
the day, these bureaucratic changes dovetailed with an increased ‘reliance on coercive 
authority and repressive apparatuses of the state in disciplining the economic and the 
political struggle, in the context of crisis’ (Hall, 1988: 136). Drawing on Stuart Hall again, 
we find a broad sweep of policies and state changes which together represent a 
significant change in the balance of coercive activities: 
We have in mind here the extension, over the period, of police power and surveillance of 
political groups and individuals; the use of police and legal apparatuses in a wide area of 
social conflicts; the role of the judicial forces in containing the economic and industrial class 
                                                          
9 There is a parallel here to the ‘camarillas’ [cliques] who struggled over influence within Pinochet’s government 
(Zeltin and Ratcliff, 1988).  
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struggle; the employment of new judicial instruments – the Industrial Relations Act, legal 
constraints on picketing and strikes; the extension of the conspiracy charge and political 
trials; the abuse of habeas corpus under the loose definition of ‘emergency’ (Hall, 1988: 136). 
This same thrust is corroborated by a recent study by Gallas (2015: 141), who noted that 
‘despite its hostility to state spending, it raised police wages, bought new equipment and 
increased the number of officers. There was a 20 percent increase in police staff between 
1980 and 1989, and a real-term rise of the Home Office budget by 55 percent’. Gallas 
also notes the pressure Thatcher’s circle put on the judiciary regarding ‘tougher’ 
sentences, and introduced new custodial punishments (ibid). Also in line with Hall, it is 
important to note that these types of extensions of state violence went hand in hand 
with a rhetorical commitment to law and order. The Thatcher government spent its early 
years pursuing contradictory policies, caught between an intellectual aversion to 
Keynesian stimulatory policy, and a material context which necessitated continued 
softening of the economic downturn. It was only through the vehicle of authoritarian 
statism and authoritarian populism that the Tory government could cohere a hegemonic 
project, and finally pursue their electoral goals. Thatcher may have never formally 
suspended parliament or the rule of law10 – the traditional definition of authoritarianism 
– but this minimal test of democracy does not give appropriate weighting to the 
concerted violent and coercive methods used to curtail resistance during Thatcher’s 
neoliberal turn.  
 
The most iconic example of this kind of state strategy was, of course, the National Union 
of Miners (NUM) strike of 1984-5. The strike was provoked by extensive waves of 
redundancies and pit closures – a state policy justified by the comparatively cheap cost 
of imported coal. Lasting almost a year, the breaking of this particular strike (there were 
plenty of others during Thatcher’s prime ministership) has been widely seen as a pivotal 
moment for the UK labour movement, marking its decline (Harvey, 2005: 59). Even at 
the time it was clear that the strike was economically irrational, costing the state billions 
of pounds over its duration (Gamble, 1994: 192) – that the government was prepared 
to absorb such costs, while also pursuing fiscal discipline in other areas, speaks the 
explicitly class-based nature of the neoliberal project. As to whether the violence of the 
state (police) against the workers and their families constitutes an example of 
                                                          
10 It may be argued that the Falkland’s War might constitute such a breach of democratic norms, but this thesis is 
concerned with ‘authoritarian statism’ in the Poulantzasian sense – state management of the economy and society – 
rather than overt ‘war’. 
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authoritarianism, the answer is complicated. From the perspective of the UK legal 
system at the time, trade unions had very few rights when it came to strikes and picketing 
(McIlroy, 1985: 101-103), and police were within their rights to ‘keep the peace’. The 
role of legal mechanisms in legitimising obviously violent state actions is, however, 
precisely the point. Now, of course this is not to say that any expression of state violence 
through the police targeted at unions is necessarily authoritarian. What we can note is 
how changes in law played out at the time, and what the relative effect(s) of these changes 
were. The key piece of legislation here is the 1980 Employment Act, which markedly 
reduced existing rights of workers to strike and picket (ibid: 103); it is not simply the 
existence of a legal monopoly of violence that ‘authoritarian statism’ is found, but rather 
in observable changes to the bounds of that violence, understood in relation to a context 
of struggle. And so, just as was the case with Pinochet in Chile, direct state violence is 
paired with legal changes. These legal changes had the effect of limiting the political 
voice of the unions, and justified the breaking of the strike in 1985. Put plainly, 
Thatcher’s ‘authoritarian statism’ was defined by both violence, and legal foreclosure of 
protest. 
 
The government of Margret Thatcher – one of the earliest examples of neoliberalisation 
in the global North – was a moment of authoritarian state forms and actions. The 
construction of a hegemonic project surrounding neoliberal economic policy was, even 
at this point, marked by a distinct proclivity for coercion. This holds direct ramifications 
for our understanding of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. With this history in mind, it 
becomes even more difficult to maintain that the post-2007 context is marked by a shift 
toward using legal and constitutional measures to foreclose democratic contestation of 
policy, considering this very strategy played a key role in the birth of neoliberalism in 
the first place. How is an understanding of the current period deepened by de-
emphasising the continuities of the current moment with historical tendencies? Surely, 
then, we are approaching the point where we can reject the claim that the 
authoritarianism expressed post-2007 is ‘qualitatively distinct’? For this comparison, we 
need to consider some of the detail of this current ‘moment’; the case pointed to by 
Bruff as evidence of the ‘rise of authoritarian neoliberalism’ – the European Union. 
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The European Union 
The European Union (EU) is replete with contradictions; from its very origins, there 
have been tensions between, on the one hand, a cosmopolitan internationalism, which 
rejected the horrors of nationalism and the world wars, and, on the other, the creation 
of a strong economic zone which might stabilize the global economy (Varoufakis, 2015: 
71-74). Debates as to whether the EU should be seen as a triumph of humanity’s 
peaceful potential, or a glorified economic cartel, will not be settled here (indeed, this 
dualism is really a false choice, obscuring a far more complex history). Rather, we are 
concerned with how the material realities of the Union – and, in particular, the strictures 
of the European Monetary System (EMS) – might be characterised as authoritarian in 
some way. Indeed, both projects – cosmopolitan and corporatist – have had tenuous 
relationships with democracy. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, an early advocate of 
Paneuropa, once stated that he thought the integration of Europe would allow nations to 
‘supersede democracy’, replacing this inferior populist system with a ‘social aristocracy 
of the spirit’ (Rosamond, 2000, in Varoufakis, 2016: 58). This is not to say that all 
intellectual currents supporting the notion of European integration were anti-
democratic – many were deeply democratic. It does, however, highlight the uneasiness 
of this relationship. Similarly, those who conceive of the Union as first and foremost an 
economic institution point toward the foundations of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), and the way in which this cartel ‘openly and legally, controlled 
prices and output by means of a multinational bureaucracy vested with legal and political 
powers superseding national parliaments and democratic processes’ (Varoufakis, 2016: 
59). Put simply, the European Union, and its multiform institutions, have a complex 
(and not always complementary) relationship with democracy, which traces back to the 
emergence of the union.  
 
While the origins of the European Union are contradictory, it would be misleading to 
say that the political and economic crises facing Europe today are simply the logical 
extrapolation of a contradiction set in motion in 1950. The process of integration has 
gone through several phases, with corresponding changes to the structure of the union; 
changes which have not occurred outside of global political economic developments, or 
without the input of human agency. Broadly speaking, this development can be divided 
into a Fordist period, and a neoliberal one. Shaped by the Bretton Woods system, and 
further developed by the Marshall Plan, Europe did initially pursue policies of 
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integration which supported wage-led growth, and broad welfare systems (Cameron and 
Neal, 2003: 365). However, ‘As this system succumbed to its internal contradictions in 
the 1970s, the(re)launching of the single market and the EMU spearheaded the 
neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in the 1980s and the 1990s’ (Ryner and Cafruny, 
2016: 7). This neoliberalism has been incredibly durable during the post-2007 crisis of 
the Eurozone; and yet there are those who see the neoliberalism of this crisis – 
protracted for a decade now – should be seen as a separate period again. How, then, 
should we understand this complex institution? 
A comprehensive study of this history, or even the role of authoritarianism within it, is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, with the discussion of the perils of 
periodisation fresh in our minds from the second chapter of this thesis, even the broad-
brush claims made above are problematic.  Rather, this brief engagement will consider 
key moments within the history of the EU which speak directly to the framework of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. This is done, however, with full appreciation of the 
impossibility of ever fully understanding something as complex as the EU. This point is 
made usefully by Bruff (2017: 150): 
Full comprehension of the world in all its complexity is highly unlikely… this is especially 
the case for the EU, which is a multilayered, multifaceted entity of considerable complexity 
and which has evolved radically since its beginnings in the 1950s… a full, comprehensive 
and in-depth knowledge of the EU is impossible. 
This brief engagement with the history and structure of the EU fall short of completion 
– that objective is itself impossible. But, in the face of this epistemological quandary, 
Bruff draws usefully on a methodological precept offered by Gramsci: ‘even if the facts 
are always unique and changeable in the flux of movement of history, the concepts can 
[and must] be theorised’ (Gramsci, 1971: 427, in Bruff, 2017: 152).  And so, with caution 
and complexity in mind, let us consider the relationship between the EU, and 
authoritarianism. 
 
One such institution, nestled within the EU, is the Euopean Monetary System (EMS). 
An insight into why a focus on the EMS is, in this regard, necessary can be found in the 
words of a surprising individual – the above-maligned Margret Thatcher. For on 
November 22, 1990 – on the very day she was removed as leader of the Conservative 
Party – Thatcher made a comment during question time about the idea of a currency 
union, and a then-hypothetical European central bank, which was incredibly prescient: 
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The point of that kind of Europe with a central bank is no democracy, taking powers away 
from every single Parliament, and having a single currency, a monetary policy and interest 
rates which take all political power away from us… a single currency is about the politics of 
Europe, it is about a federal Europe by the back door… Now where were we? I am enjoying 
this (Hansard, 1990: para 451). 
While the authoritarian parallels between a European Monetary System and her own use 
of authoritarian methods of governance was apparently lost on her, Thatcher made a 
key point: ‘Thatcher’s precious point was that controlling interest rates and the supply 
of money is a quintessentially political activity which, if removed from the purview of a 
democratically elected parliament, would occasion a steady descent into 
authoritarianism’ (Varoufakis, 2016: 97). To speak in more concrete terms, however, an 
example of this is found in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which ‘mandated a series of 
criteria for member states to be included in the EMU (such as low budget deficits and 
low inflation), which by default took priority over alternative socioeconomic goals such 
as full employment and reduced inequality’ (Bruff, 2017: 154). In this sense, the EMU 
is part of a broader context, in which there is a clear trend away from democratic input 
into policy making within the structure of the EU. It is a process labelled by Cahill (2014: 
107) as the ‘institutional embedding’ of neoliberalism, ‘a framework of rules and 
obligations’ is put in place which ‘privilege and commit states to neoliberal forms of 
regulation and response’ – a process of Poulantzas’s ‘authoritarian statism’ which differs 
only on scale of operation, rather than effective outcome.  
 
In trying to understand the shape and character of authoritarianism within the structure 
of the EU, the most resonant example upon which to focus is the recent case of Greece, 
and the referendum of July 2015. Having, since 2010, gone through several rounds of 
sovereign-debt bailouts, successive Greek governments have signed ‘Memoranda of 
Understanding’ with their creditors (the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, and the International Monetary fund). These memoranda have 
‘not only created a condition of limited sovereignty, but also acted as a disciplinary 
mechanism, whereby the constant supervision and evaluation of the Greek economy 
and state functions are regulated through loan payments’ (Sotiris, 2017: 171). Although 
these kinds of authoritarian interventions should always be recognised as such, the 
referendum instigated by the Syriza government made this particularly stark. On the 5th 
of July, more than 61 percent of voters voted oxi, or ‘no’, to the proposals of the Troika. 
This vote carried no weight in bailout talks, and the Greek government were eventually 
forced – through disciplinary measures, such as an immediate cap on the European 
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Central Bank’s (ECB) liquidity injections, and mass panic surrounding the availability of 
people’s savings (Sotiris, 2017: 179) – to concede to another round of cuts: a goal of 
0.25 percent fiscal deficit, increases to the age of pension eligibility, cuts to the social 
welfare system totalling 0.5 percent of GDP each year, further labour market 
deregulation, and many other austerity measures besides (Stewart, 2015, online). In this 
way, the already-embedded authoritarian tendencies of the structures which make up 
the Eurozone – the European Commission (EC) and ECB, especially – were revealed; 
a resounding referendum, and a clearly-failing (assuming the goal of achieving fiscal 
balance) austerity program, were both ignored. Instead, policy was made in the same 
way it was through the ECSC: policy was dictated by financial, rather than democratic, 
actors and institutions. Even before the Greek situation came to this point, Bruff 
recognised this case as being an exemplar case of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’: 
 
Measures possessing quasi-constitutional status have constituted a growing part of the 
conditions attached to bailouts in Greece… such impositions are not just reactive, occurring 
after a bailout has been requested, but are also increasingly pre-emptive, locking in neoliberal 
governance mechanisms in the name of necessity, whatever the actual state of play (Bruff, 
2014: 123). 
 
There are a myriad of vantage points from which one might consider how the 
‘institutional embedding’ of neoliberalism within the EU has limited democratic control 
over policy making – Sharpf (2010) has, for example, has emphasised the 
constitutionalisation of competition law and deregulation, whereas Bruff (2017) has also, 
elsewhere, emphasised the European ‘Social’ Model (ESM) has also played a key role, 
through the hardening of ‘soft’ law. Susan Watkins (2012: 6-7) has emphasised the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESMe) as another location of authoritarian-type 
limitation of democratic policy making. Wolfgang Streeck (2016: 148) reinforces the 
choice to focus on monetary policy, in arguing that ‘monetary union [in the case of 
Greece] thus ‘spills over’ into a form of political union, at the cost of democracy in the 
South – where the budget-making power of parliaments is transferred to the supervisory 
apparatus of the EU and the IMF’. The above focus on the EMU, and its ramifications 
in terms of Greece’s experience of austerity, does not detract from the importance of 
other moments of ‘authoritarianism’. It is simply the case that this instance provides a 
clear illustration of two key points: that authoritarianism can indeed be keenly felt, even 
when surrounded by the trappings of formal democracy; and that these current, ongoing 
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examples bring immediate heuristic weight to the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’.  
 
And yet, surely there is a problem here. It is certainly true that the Troika has effectively 
bypassed the ability of the Greek parliament to control their own fiscal policy, labour 
market, and regulatory environments. But it is equally true that the same would be true, 
if one replaced the antagonistic role of the Troika, with a different trio – the IMF, World 
Bank, and WTO; or the ‘unholy trinity’, as Ha-Joon Chang (2008: 15) calls them – and 
the victim country with Argentina. Or Nigeria. Or Zaire. Put simply, the experience of 
Greece would seem to mirror that of a range of countries from the global South, during 
the period of ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs) and the Washington 
Consensus (see Stiglitz, 2002; Chang, 2008). Thus, despite the best intentions of its 
proponents, there is a potential here for sliding into eurocentrism, through emphasising 
the novelty of these (Northern) instances of authoritarianism, without giving 
appropriate weight to the many and multiple parallels with prior moments of 
authoritarian neoliberalism (in the global South).  
 
Throughout these three ‘moments’ of authoritarianism within the history of actually 
existing neoliberalism, three common themes have emerged: state forms have shifted to 
quarantine particular policies away from the control of democratically elected 
representatives; this process has often involved legal and constitutional means; and that 
these forms of structural repression of discontent are often re-enforced through directly 
violent means. Despite these commonalities, there is an argument that there has been a 
qualitative shift between the former two cases – Chile and Thatcherism – on the one 
hand, and the latter – the EU – on the other. This poses a direct challenge to the 
conceptual framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’: why emphasise the current 
period as different, when it presents so many continuities with the period that 
supposedly preceded it? We move now to evaluate the claim, that the ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ of the post-2007 context is somehow distinct. 
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Toward a periodisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
The claim that authoritarian neoliberalism represents a ‘qualitative change’, a shift ‘away 
from seeking consent towards coercion’, is a contentious one. Even before one gets to 
the deeper methodological questions as to how these types of claims could be made or 
supported, a far simpler question arises: “surely neoliberalism has existed in 
authoritarian forms before”? The centrality of the stories of General Augusto Pinochet’s 
junta government in Chile, and of Margaret Thatcher’s violent breaking of the miners’ 
strikes, to the well-known narrative of the turn from active state-management of the 
economy in the 1970’s and 1980’s will be, for many, the first thought when presented 
with the emergent framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. And while these historical 
experiences form a significant aspect of the critique of the concept of authoritarian 
neoliberalism developed by this thesis, they are not the only issue. Challenges to the 
theoretical and historical specificity of the concept span: the conceptual overlap between 
authoritarian neoliberalism and ‘depoliticisation’; the problem that depoliticisation in 
some sense is, per the approach of Political Marxism, definitional to capitalism; and even 
that critiques of Political Marxism, from the approach of uneven and combined 
development, also pose a conceptual challenge, rather than offering succour. Behind the 
veil of these concepts, the real challenges posed to the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ are the material conditions which scholars such as Wood or Rioux were 
studying. Whether those conditions are found in the enclosure movement in England, 
or the current and continued abuse of indentured labour in globalised commodity 
chains, the conditions which these competing approaches seek to understand are 
conditions which pose a challenge to the historical specificity of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’. It is not simply the existence of competing frameworks which challenges 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, but also the historical processes which they each seek to 
understand. By exploring the implications of these various approaches and frameworks, 
this thesis has effectively deepened the critique of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’.  
 
As stated at several points, however, this critique does not aim to reject the framework 
entirely. In the course of this critique, there has been an attempt to highlight those 
elements of the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ approach which are suggestive of a useful 
theoretical lens. This task has also involved making more explicit aspects of method, 
which might assist in making a more-nuanced assessment of the prospects of the 
framework. In terms of the former, Bruff’s incorporation of the ‘strengthening-
116 
 
weakening dynamic’ first presented by Poulantzas (1978: 246) has been seen to “name” 
a particular contradiction set in motion by ‘authoritarian statist’ change. This aspect of 
Poulantzas’s own concept, ‘authoritarian statism’, was never exhaustively theorised, 
however – which mechanisms might operationalise this ‘strengthening-weakening’ was 
never made clear. Existing research agendas around depoliticisation, and Political 
Marxism, would seem to be congruent here, possibly even taking Poulanztas’s work 
further. Similarly, the consideration of state theory, and the social relations which ‘state 
theory’ attempts to understand, within this thesis – particularly that of O’Connor – also 
adds weight to the theoretical and historical action of this contradiction. Should this 
process indeed be one of the ‘strengths’ of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (conceptually 
speaking), then this actually reinforces the above issues of periodisation. That is to say, 
should ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ in practice work to undo itself, then this raises 
questions about the kind of change that it represents. By considering various approaches 
to the task of periodisation, the insights of Gramsci regarding ‘conjunctural’ verses 
‘organic movements’ push us to consider whether authoritarian neoliberalisation might 
be better conceived as the playing out of the broader process of neoliberalism in general, 
convulsing through a period of organic crisis, rather than as a period in its own right.  
 
‘Authoritarian neoliberalism’, as a conceptual framework, stands accused of a lack of 
historical and theoretical specificity. At this penultimate stage of the thesis, we have 
considered these theoretical and historical challenges, as well as explored some of the 
methodological tools necessary to evaluate these challenges. Before that argument is 
finally developed, however, we must return to the source. Many of the claims of Bruff 
and others, in the theorisation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, have been quoted 
throughout this thesis. We return here to those claims, in fuller detail – if we are going 
to deliver an evaluation of the framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ we would do 
well to have that framework clear in our minds. 
 
 
Understanding the claims: period or emphasis? 
Although the term ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ has been deployed previously (Solfrini, 
2001; Taylor, 2002), its introduction as a discrete framework for understanding the post-
2007 conjuncture was first articulated in the form of a research note by Bruff (2012), 
and then a longer article (2014), which has been cited by one hundred subsequent articles 
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and books11. Since then, the concept has been featured in several national and 
international conferences12 – scholarly developments which are, themselves, expressions 
of the material conditions of the current conjuncture. The most significant example of 
the emerging popularity is in the collection States of Discipline: Authoritarian neoliberalism 
and the contested reproduction of capitalist order, edited by Cemal Burak Tansel (2017). The 
significance of all of this is that there is a growing trend to understand the material conditions 
of the current conjuncture through the lens of authoritarian neoliberalism. At stake is not only an 
intellectually sound understanding of historical change, but also effective political action. In 
order to faithfully reproduce the claims made by the proponents of this emerging 
approach, we will move through a series of important quotations. We will consider the 
definition of the term, ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, the processes which are supposedly 
encapsulated within it, and defences of the term offered. In simple terms, according to 
the abstract of Bruff’s Rethinking Marxism article: ‘we are witnessing the rise of 
authoritarian neoliberalism, which is rooted in the reconfiguring of the state into a less 
democratic entity through constitutional and legal changes that seek to insulate it from 
social and political conflict (2014: 113). This claim is made more fully further on: 
In the absence of a hegemonic aura, neoliberal practices are less able to garner the consent 
or even the reluctant acquiescence necessary for more “normal” modes of governance. Of 
particular importance… is the increasing frequency with which constitutional and legal 
changes, in the name of economic “necessity,” are seeking to reshape the purpose of the 
state and associated institutions… [this involves a] recalibration of the kinds of activity that 
are feasible and appropriate for non-market institutions to engage in, diminishing 
expectations in the process; and the reconceptualization of the state as increasingly 
nondemocratic through its subordination to constitutional and legal rules that are deemed 
necessary for prosperity to be achieved. In sum, we are witnessing the rise of authoritarian 
neoliberalism (Bruff, 2014: 115-116, emphasis in original).  
Importantly, this original theorisation does not treat the pre-2007 history of 
neoliberalism (nor capitalism in general) as a process or period free from violence, 
coercion, or authoritarian state forms: 
Authoritarian neoliberalism does not represent a wholesale break from pre-2007 neoliberal 
practices, yet it is qualitatively distinct due to the way in which authoritarian tendencies… 
have come to the fore through the shift toward constitutional and legal mechanisms and the 
move away from seeking consent for hegemonic projects (Bruff, 2014: 116, emphasis in 
original).  
                                                          
11 According to Google Scholar, at time of writing. 
12 A series of panels on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ were planned for the European International Studies 
Association conference in Izmir, September 2016, before the conference was cancelled due to turmoil in Turkey at 
the time. The concept was also featured on two panels at the concurrent International Initiative for the Promotion 
of Political Economy conference, in Lisbon. An early form of the argument made in this thesis were presented at 
the latter. 
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This partial acknowledgment of the historical role of authoritarian state strategies is 
perhaps the most important moment in Bruff’s article, and is the crux of this thesis. 
What does it mean, for something to be ‘qualitatively distinct’, and yet not a ‘wholesale 
break’? Evidently this semantic sleight of hand is supposed to absolve the framework of 
issues surrounding periodisation; for, if the concept does not claim to be wholly new, 
then the sin of reification is surely avoided? But, as we have seen in Chapter Two, 
periodisation – even when done deliberately – does not rely on clean breaks. By claiming 
that there has been a qualitative change in the state post-2007, there can be no doubt 
that this is a historical claim. Even more problematic is the fact that this historical claim 
is made, without ever explaining how such a change might be measured or proven. 
 
This initial framing is further supplemented by Tansel, both in definition, and in 
qualification. For Tansel, contemporary authoritarian neoliberalism 
 
… reinforces and increasingly relies upon (1) coercive state practices that discipline, 
marginalize and criminalize oppositional social forces and (2) the judicial and administrative 
state apparatuses which limit the avenues in which neoliberal policies can be challenged. This 
argument should not be read to the effect that the deployment of coercive state apparatuses 
for the protection of the circuits of capital accumulation is a new phenomenon, nor should it 
lead to the assumption that the pre-crisis trajectories of neoliberalization have been exclusively 
consensual (Tansel, 2017: 2, emphasis in original).  
And yet, having acknowledged that capitalist states have often, in different times and 
places removed barriers to accumulation via ‘violent, disciplinary and anti-democratic 
means’ (ibid), the justification of difference provided is really quite vague. Authoritarian 
neoliberalisms are supposedly distinct from these previous authoritarian forms in that 
they: 
1. Operate through a preemptive discipline which simultaneously insulates neoliberal policies 
through a set of administrative, legal and coercive mechanisms and limits the spaces of 
popular resistance against neoliberalism (Bruff 2014: 116); 
And 
2. Are marked by a significant escalation in the state’s propensity to employ coercion and 
legal/extra-legal intimidation, which is complemented by ‘intensified state control over 
every sphere of social life… (and) draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 
“formal” liberties’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 203-204) (Tansel, 2017: 3, emphasis added). 
 
The above passage from Tansel is, however, an example in point: the supposed 
difference of the post-2007 period is defined by reference to Poulantzas, published in 
1978 – was Poulantzas not responding to conjunctural developments in his own time? 
Or was he rather simply prophesizing what would happen thirty years hence? Tansel 
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also goes on to claim that authoritarian neoliberalism is a ‘historically specific set of 
capitalist accumulation strategies’ (ibid: 6), without stipulating what makes them 
historically specific beyond these two vagaries of ‘pre-emption’ and that these changes 
present a ‘significant escalation’. How are we to prove ‘preemption’, with the 
complexities of agency implied? And by what measure do we detect a ‘significant 
escalation’ of authoritarian statist transformations? Is there a quantitative or qualitative 
indicator that might measure or evince this process? With the three moments of 
authoritarianism within the broader history of neoliberalism considered, as well as 
discussions surrounding the complexity of periodisation in mind from the previous 
chapter, the problematic nature of Bruff and Tansel’s claims should be immediately 
apparent.  
 
And yet, while there is clearly a claim that something ‘new’ is going on in the current 
conjuncture, there would also seem to be a parallel claim: that the ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ framework might be useful to understand the broader history of 
neoliberalism. Contributions to States of Discipline (Tansel, 2017) span case studies on 
Cambodia (Springer, 2017), China (Lim, 2017), Egypt and Morocco (De Smet and 
Bogaert, 2017), and Turkey (Ozden, Akca and Bekmen, 2017), among others. Across 
these chapters there is an argument that historical processes of neoliberalization have 
involved a strengthening of the state along authoritarian statist lines – they do not seem 
to emphasise a post-2007 change. This leads Tansel (2017: 16) to offer that ‘retracing 
the histories of neoliberalisation in those cases through the lens of authoritarian 
neoliberalism becomes paramount to contextualise and understand’ how these state 
processes have changed over time. A sensitivity to these variegated Southern experiences 
also leads Tansel (2017: 13) to note that ‘in many ways, European societies are now 
being subjected to the same pressures and disciplinary conditions that numerous 
countries in the global South have faced through conditions attached to their 
internationally sanctioned debt and bailout programmes’.  
 
These two comments, taken with the case studies mentioned above, leads to a different 
inflection of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ than as a post-2007 phenomena: perhaps 
authoritarian neoliberalism is better understood not as a periodisation claim, but as a 
contribution to the larger debates surrounding what we mean by neoliberalism in general. 
In this sense, we should be locating the claims of Bruff, Tansel, and others, alongside 
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existing contributions to the definitional debate surrounding neoliberalism: next to the 
ideational (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Mirowski, 2013); next to the Foucauldian 
(Dardot and Laval, 2013; Brown, 2015); along-side the institutional and regulationist 
understandings (Braithwaite, 2008); in collaboration with existing Marxian 
understandings (Davidson, 2010; Cahill, 2014). In this sense, authoritarian neoliberalism 
could be read as an emphasis or clarification of the nature of neoliberalism, in a similar 
fashion to ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and 
Tickell, 2002), or ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill, 1995) – they each add an adjective or 
descriptor which stipulates which definition of ‘neoliberalism’ is most useful. I would 
argue that the emerging research programme surrounding authoritarian neoliberalism 
has not yet formulated a position on which task it is prioritising: clarification and 
emphasis spanning a broader neoliberal history, or change and periodisation within the 
neoliberal frame.  
 
Against ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
In evaluating the emerging framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, there are 
significant grounds against the theoretical and historical specificity of the term. This 
thesis has outlined several of these challenges: there is considerable conceptual overlap 
with the existing concept of ‘depoliticisation’; the distinction made by the authors (Bruff, 
2014: 116; Tansel, 2017: 10) between authoritarian neoliberalism and both ‘new 
constitutionalism’ and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill, 1995; Gill, 2008) is unclear; the 
specificity of the claim that expectations in the political process are diminished is also 
challenged by the fundamental axioms of the Political Marxist approach, which would 
see this process as definitional, and ongoing, under capitalist social relations more 
generally; and, simultaneously, those critics of Political Marxism who see this approach 
as obscuring the enduring violence of capitalism would also be sceptical of claims that 
there has been a qualitative change away from consent, back toward coercion. Indeed, 
when conceived of as a world-system, neoliberal history can be seen to have actively 
involved and promoted slavery relations in some parts of the world (Rioux, 2013). The 
purpose of the first chapter of this thesis has been to show in detail the theoretical 
intersections between ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ and extant concepts – and by 
implication, similarities between the material conditions prompting this earlier research, 
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and the current conjuncture – highlighting that this emerging research programme will 
face challenge on theoretical grounds, as well as historical.  
 
These theoretical issues are also entwined with a complex global history of both 
capitalism generally, and neoliberalism more especially. Throughout this third chapter 
we have considered three moments of authoritarianism – Pinochet, Thatcher, and the 
subordination of Greek democracy to the structures of the EMS. With more space and 
time, we could just have easily discussed Suharto’s Indonesia (see Blakeley, 2009: 88-91), 
Columbia (Bailey, 1965), or India (Chatterjee, 2008), just to name a few other examples. 
There is obviously difference in each of these countries experience of neoliberalism – 
this is precisely what is emphasised by those who speak of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2009). Similarly, the state transformations across these 
places which might be broadly characterised as ‘authoritarian-statist’ are also variegated; 
while Poulantzas was noting a general turn toward authoritarian statist state forms 
during the tumultuous 1970s, he would not have argued that Pinochet and Thatcher’s 
governments transformed the state, limiting democratic appeal, in identical ways. The 
similarities are, however, theoretically significant: across the three case studies explored, 
legal mechanisms were used to circumscribe resistance to neoliberal policy platforms; in 
all three cases material changes to the institutional structure of states were used to limit 
the scope of democratic input into policy processes; and in all three cases, the violent 
arm of the state was used to constrain protest and resistance to the above changes. These 
three common themes – legal mechanisms, de-democratisation of state policy making, 
and direct violence – resist the analytical separation which the framework of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would seek to apply. And yet, that is precisely what the 
framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would seem to do; according to the 
periodisation claims of Bruff, the temporal location of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
(post-2007) makes it a part of a qualitatively different state process. All periodisation is, 
of course, an abstraction – but is this separation perhaps a ‘violent’ abstraction? Does it 
obscure the process it attempts to explain? 
 
The second chapter of this thesis brought together various approaches to the 
periodisation of capitalism, in order to better make an evaluation of the specificity of 
authoritarian neoliberalism. Crucial points drawn from this discussion include an 
understanding that periodisation does not have to be built around ‘long waves’, spanning 
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centuries, and does not hinge on clean breaks between periods. In line with this latter 
point, advocates of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ do not argue that capitalist history has 
not been violent, or that authoritarian statist interventions have not pre-existed the post-
2007 period (Tansel, 2017: 2). But in making the claim that there has been a qualitative 
shift away from consent-based strategies, towards more coercive ones suggests a 
periodisation of sorts; that the role of these strategies in the maintenance of both 
neoliberal accumulation regimes and state legitimisation has somehow changed. This is 
precisely what we can draw from the regulationist approach to periodisation: that 
differences and similarities in state form must be understood relative to contextual issues 
surrounding accumulation and reproduction. This periodisation methodology is 
incredibly significant here. It is not the existence of authoritarian states in previous 
neoliberal periods which vitiates the framework of authoritarian neoliberalism, but the 
purpose of those earlier strategies. For the argument to hold, it must be articulated how 
and why these state transformations are occurring for different reasons. For this reason, 
Tansel’s acknowledgement of the violent and sometimes-authoritarian history of 
capitalism and neoliberalism does not defend it from criticism. To dismiss this criticism, 
further theoretical and empirical research into current forms of authoritarian statism 
must show that the role played by these strategies in the reproduction of capitalism is 
somehow different to those seen previously. This challenge has not yet been adequately 
addressed.  
 
For ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
The purpose of this thesis is not to reject ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ entirely, or to 
deny the conjunctural importance of research of this kind; the purpose of this thesis is 
to both highlight the significant challenges which face the emerging framework, 
cautioning that an under-theorised framework will struggle to withstand criticism within 
the broader debates surrounding neoliberalization, while also highlighting the strengths of 
the approach, and possibly looking for suggestive directions which may both fortify the 
framework, while also contributing to material struggles around these repressive changes 
around the world. There is no doubt that the empirical events which the framework is a 
response to – from Greece, to Turkey, to Brazil – are historically significant, and linked 
in some way to the current organic crisis of capitalism. And while ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ may be on unstable ground in making claims that these processes are 
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somehow qualitatively different to those that came before, this analysis of contemporary 
state transformation is not without insight. By building on Nicos Poulantzas’s 
‘authoritarian statism’, I would argue that one of the most significant contributions of 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is to put a name to a particular contradiction which is 
traversing states and polities around the world. The contradiction which is implied here 
is that ‘an increasingly authoritarian state is simultaneously strengthened and weakened 
by this shift toward coercion’ (Bruff, 2014: 120). For Poulantzas (1978: 246), 
authoritarian statism ‘is itself partially responsible for creating new forms of popular 
struggle’ due to the way in which this state strategy weakens the legitimacy of the state, 
deepening state crisis. Further ‘these struggles exhibit a characteristic anti-statism… 
[and] even though the movement is located ‘at a distance’ from the State, it sets up major 
dislocatory effects within the State itself’ (ibid). This strengthening-weakening dynamic 
has been touched upon at various points throughout this thesis. I would argue that this 
is the real contribution offered by Bruff (2014) and those who have followed him. To 
put this differently, work which considers the deepening of ‘authoritarian statism’ in the 
current conjuncture provides another perspective from which to consider the broad 
trend of ‘anti-politics’, as it offers a generative mechanism (authoritarian statism) to help 
understand this process.   
 
A comprehensive definition of the concept and condition of ‘anti-politics’ is beyond the 
scope of this argument. Generally understood, however, there is an emerging interest in 
the growing schism between civil society and the state (see Tietze and Humphrys, 2014). 
Relatedly, the late Peter Mair (2013) went through in great detail the development of 
popular disinterest and disillusionment with the democratic political process, across the 
1990’s and 2000’s, tracking a widespread trend of lower voter turn-out, lower political 
party membership, and lower political engagement. The general decline of social 
engagement with political processes, and the resultant decline in the relevance of the 
democratic process is now well observed (see also Ayers and Saad-Filho, 2014; Streeck, 
2014; Anderson, 2006; Maus, 2006; Clarke, 2011; Ferguson, 2006). This process has 
been labelled by some as ‘anti-politics’ (Tietze and Humphrys, 2014) – in the words of 
Colin Hay (2007: 1), people have come to believe that politics ‘is not all that it was once 
cracked up to be’, and so increasingly disengage with the political process. This 
deepening of political and state crises may be seen to be connected to Poulantzas’s 
conception of the authoritarian state, and even more importantly, as generative of the 
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success of ‘anti-establishment’ political movements – ranging from Brexit and Trump 
on the one hand, across to the success of Podemos in Spain on the other. Our purpose 
here is not to provide a comprehensive theoretical survey of ‘anti-politics’, nor to map 
its many empirical manifestations in the current global political economic crisis. The 
point is a simpler one: that perhaps the greatest utility offered by ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ is a renewed focus on the contradictions inherent to authoritarian statist 
strategies. Further to this, I would argue that an explicit engagement with debates around 
‘anti-politics’ would be a particularly fruitful direction for the programme.  
 
If we take this suggestive focus on the contradictions currently traversing states and 
societies together with an understanding of the tendency of neoliberalisation to utilise 
authoritarian statist and authoritarian populist strategies, then the analytical strengths of 
this research programme are made clear. This can be brought out even more clearly if 
we return to the insights of Gramsci, discussed briefly in the second chapter – namely, 
the distinction between conjunctural and organic movement, as well as the related 
concept of ‘organic crisis’. Consider again the quotation included there: 
 
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, 
despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing 
structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome 
them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that 
it has been superseded) form the terrain of the “conjunctural”, and it is upon this terrain that 
the forces of opposition organise (Gramsci, 1971: 178; Q13, §17).  
 
This deeply entrenched crisis, which expresses through its tumult the contradictions 
inherent within current economic and social relations, and which must be overcome 
through the creation of a new hegemonic project, is the ‘organic crisis’. In this sense, we 
can link Thatcher, and the crisis-management of her government, to the current 
conjuncture; the authoritarian statism of Thatcher, and the deepening of that state form 
under successive prime ministers in the UK, can be seen as a partial determinant of the 
anti-political, anti-establishment rupture that is the British referendum to leave the EU 
– or, ‘Brexit’, as it has become commonly known. This connection – which highlights 
the potential strengths of a renewed attention on authoritarian statism combined with an 
understanding of the difference between conjunctural and organic shifts – is precisely 
the direction taken recently by Jessop to understand Brexit:  
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we should look beyond the immediate political situation and particular political conjuncture 
in which the referendum occurred to the wider domestic and international contexts. The 
integral economic context domestically was a protracted crisis of Britain’s flawed post-war 
Fordist economy and, relatedly, of its insertion into the circuits of Atlantic Fordism and the 
world market, evident from the mid-1960s onwards. Politically this was associated with a 
crisis in the state form and state strategies. This crisis occurred because the state lacked the 
capacities to engage in statist intervention, or effective corporatist coordination, or a 
consistently rigorous laissez-faire line and therefore oscillated uneasily among different 
strategies that all failed in their different ways in different conjunctures (Jessop, 2017: 134).  
 
An understanding of Brexit is not assisted by removing it from the context which 
generated it. If the history of actually existing neoliberalism, and its authoritarian statist 
tendencies, is not artificially separated into distinct analytical categories (as a rigid 
interpretation of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would suggest), then the framework may 
actually enrich our understanding. Put simply, the concept of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ presents the potential to offer a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the current conjuncture. Arguing that there has been a qualitative 
change beyond the playing out of a period of generalised organic crisis is, however, 
problematic, and detracts from this potential. It is through building explicit connections 
between a study of how authoritarian statism has occurred, and continues to occur, 
within the broader context of neoliberalism, and how these state transformations are 
related to the processes of ‘organic crisis’ and ‘anti-politics’, that a useful analytical 
direction is found for the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’.  
 
Conclusion 
The title of Jairus Banaji’s book, Theory as History (2010), is an epistemological argument: 
that neither theory nor history provides an adequate understanding of the world, and 
that we must utilise both, in a dialectical method. To reference another important title, 
while this thesis may not have fully achieved the ‘dance of the dialectic’ (Ollman, 2003), 
it has tried to incorporate both theory and history into its critique of the emergent 
framework of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. Building on the theoretical critique offered 
in the first two chapters, this chapter has focussed on three ‘moments’ of 
authoritarianism within the broad history of neoliberalism in practice. Through these 
cases, the variegations of appearance – elements such as spatiality and temporality – 
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have been moved aside, emphasising instead the commonalities across these distinct 
moments. These commonalities correspond precisely with those elements of the current 
conjuncture which have been identified by the approach of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ 
as qualitatively different. This poses a direct challenge to the historical specificity of the 
concept.  
Although Bruff, and the others embracing this framework, do explicitly acknowledge 
the historical role of authoritarian statist forms, and the role of violence more generally 
in the reproduction of capitalist social relations, this caveat is not sufficient. Implied in 
the framework is an argument that the contextual conditions of accumulation and 
reproduction have somehow changed, and that this gives current expressions of 
authoritarian statism a qualitatively different raison d'être. This claim is highly contentious; 
it either needs to be evinced far more convincingly, or jettisoned from the framework 
entirely.  
This does not, however, vitiate the theory entirely. This chapter has also highlighted 
perceived strengths of the approach, and pointed towards directions which future 
research ought to consider. Chief among these is the focus on the ‘strengthening-
weakening dynamic’ associated with authoritarian statist transformations. First 
conceived by Poulantzas, and incorporated into the framework of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ by Bruff, this moving contradiction is far from fully theorised.  Earlier in 
this thesis, it has been suggested that some of the state-theoretical insights of E.M. 
Wood (1981), and O’Connor (1973), may provide mechanisms which generate this kind 
of outcome. Most interesting, however, is the potential link between research into the 
contradictions inherent to authoritarian statism, and the process and outcome of ‘anti-
politics’. These are, I hazard, more-fruitful directions of the research programme 
associated with ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, than attempts to artificially separate out 
periods within the history of actually existing neoliberalism – especially when one 
considers that the entire history of neoliberalism can be conceived of as one of ongoing 
– albeit uneven – organic crisis.  
At the very outset, Bruff touched on the true nature of the process of authoritarian 
neoliberalism, through an epigraph drawn from Gramsci: ‘The crisis consists precisely 
in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great 
variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci, 1971, in Bruff, 2014: 113). The 
(significant) error here was to prioritise the crisis of 2007 in the theorisation, rather than 
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linking this process back to the earlier crisis of the 1970s. Another suggestive comment 
is in Bruffs comment that ‘the attempted “authoritarian fix” is potentially more of a 
sticking plaster than anything more epochal’ (Bruff, 2014: 125). Here it is almost as 
though Bruff is alluding to his previous work, where (in collaboration with Bieler and 
Morton), emphasis was placed on Gramsci’s distinction between ‘organic’ and 
‘conjunctural movements’ (Bieler, et al, 2010: 31).  
All of this might be summarised by two issues: one of scope, and one of method. If we 
see the crisis of 2007 as disconnected from the crises that preceded it, then the 
abstraction made is becomes a ‘violent’ one. Similarly, if there is no sensitivity to which 
movements are ‘organic’, or relatively permanent, as opposed to the more-occasional 
and immediate ‘conjunctural’ movements, then the theorisation made will fail to 
accurately explain historical change. A return to these questions of scope and method 
will enable the approach of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ to consider again the nature of 
the claims being made. This will lend authority to the approach, enabling it to offer its 
real contribution – an understanding of the current crises of economy, state, and politics, 
and the relationship between authoritarian state forms and the similarly-important 
process of ‘anti-politics’.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The Global Financial Crisis has had – and will continue to have – momentous 
ramifications. One such ramification has been renewed attention to the concept of 
rationality within orthodox economics (Cassidy, 2009). The idea that markets, and the 
people who comprise them, are not rational is not, however, particularly surprising to 
those on the outside of this orthodoxy – political economists, for example. The myth of 
the rational actor has been widely dismissed, well before the 2008 crash (see Lawson, 
1997). And yet, despite this broad-based understanding within the post-positivist social 
sciences, it is all too easy to forget that the kinds of cognitive biases and group-think 
dynamics which so obviously impact on the decisions of individuals within markets can 
also impact on us as well – scholars – in the process of our research.  
 
I would hazard that there is just such a cognitive bias at play with the widespread 
embrace of the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as a useful designation for the 
current conjuncture – the bias toward quantification. The claim that there is a qualitative 
distinction between the state pre- and post-2008 – a ‘shift toward constitutional and legal 
mechanisms and the move away from seeking consent’ (Bruff, 2014: 116) –resonates 
heuristically. Not only does this claim imply the ability to actually measure such a pivot, 
it also validates that feeling that the current historical moment is an important one. 
Given the strong historical materialist background of many of them, I doubt that any of 
the scholars associated the emerging literature on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would 
argue that such a crude quantification is possible. Certainly, the blunt tool of Freedom 
House’s annual freedom reports (e.g. Freedom House, 2017) cannot be considered a 
sufficient tool to understand the hugely complex object of study that is the ‘state’, let 
alone provide an adequate comparison of the uneven and combined development of 
states in an international context. And while this caricature is somewhat unfair, there is 
an element of this style of positivism implied in the claims of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’; to say that neoliberalism has always had authoritarian tendencies, but that 
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this tendency has somehow produced ‘a significant escalation’ (Tansel, 2017: 3) of 
authoritarianism in the current conjecture implies that this is something that can be 
measured.  
 
Let us approach the problem of understanding the current conjuncture from another 
angle. Wolfgang Streeck has suggested that we are indeed seeing the emergence of a new 
phase of capitalist history. Rather than tying this periodisation to a change in the 
construction of neoliberal hegemony, however, Steeck draws a different distinction: 
 
Trump’s demolition of the Clinton machine, Brexit and the failure of Holland and Renzi – 
all in the same year – mark a new phase in the crisis of the capitalist state system as 
transformed by neoliberalism. To describe this phase I have proposed Antonio Gramsci’s 
term ‘interregnum’, a period of uncertain duration in which an old order is dying but a new 
one cannot yet be born. The old order that was destroyed by the onslaught of the populist 
barbarians in 2016 was the state system of global capitalism. Its governments had neutralized 
their national democracies in post-democratic fashion so as not to lose touch with the global 
expansion of capital… What the still to be created new order will look like is uncertain 
(Streeck, 2017: 14).   
 
From this view, the real root of historical change is in the breakdown of neoliberal 
hegemony, as opposed to a supposed change within the neoliberal period, toward 
different state strategies of hegemonic cohesion. Also significant here is Streeck’s 
characterisation of the neoliberal order – which the ‘interregnum’ marks the prolonged 
death of – as ‘post-democratic’. Put differently, authoritarian statism is not only 
tendential within the entirety of the neoliberal period, but it is also partially causal of the 
current popular turn towards anti-establishment politics.  
 
As we have noted at several points, periodisation is essentially a question of vantage 
point. Periodisation of the entire social system is ultimately problematic. Despite this, as 
Jameson (2002: 29) emphasised, ‘we cannot not periodize’. The necessity of this is drawn 
in no small way from the connection between theorisation and praxis, or a desire for 
scholarly efforts to support and inform struggle. The alternative to periodisation is 
reducing capitalist history to a totalizing social relation – precisely the outcome of the 
approach of Open Marxism: ‘critique comes into its own dialectically, as inherent in the 
movement of contradiction and, so, an open Marxism is able to demystify the notion of 
new times in a forceful way’ (Bonefeld, Gunn, and Psychopedis, 1992: xvii). The 
strategic implication of this puritanical theoretical position is that all struggle must be 
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explicitly tied to the dialectic of the capital-worker social relation. We must reject this 
paralysing position. And so, we are both to reject the possibility of definitive 
periodisation, while also rejecting the alternative of not periodising at all. The solution 
of the paradox is to enter into a conversation as to whether the periodisations we draw 
are useful ones, or whether they constitute ‘violent abstraction’, in the sense articulated 
by Sayer (1987). Periodisation cannot be arbitrary – it must be clear as to the vantage 
point used, and why that perspective is the most useful for that particular issue. Arguably 
‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ does this. Bruff openly accepts the existence of previous 
forms of authoritarianism within capitalist development, but believes a point of change 
can be located at the GFC, where there was an intensification of the process of 
authoritarian statist-type interventions. The argument here is that this abstracts violently, 
as theoretically prioritizing the period post-2007 obscures the very generative 
mechanisms of the current crisis – i.e. those examples of authoritarian statism which 
have been co-produced by neoliberalism over decades.  
 
The social world is far too complex to be fully comprehended. As discussed in the first 
chapter, this incomprehensibility is compounded by the material structure of capitalism, 
a set of social relations that (through fetishism) always appears in disguise. In the face 
of this complexity, any attempt at theorisation will necessarily be fallible. Understanding 
this, the question must always be kept in mind, ‘does this abstraction make the real world 
easier or harder to understand’? This is the same test that must be applied to rival 
periodisations. If one draws inappropriate spatial boundaries around an inquiry, this 
abstraction will hinder understanding – one cannot understand, say, levels of migration 
into a country without also considering the global context of where those migrants are 
coming from, and the reasons for their movements. Similarly, if a periodisation draws 
inappropriate temporal boundaries around a question, the answer may be obscured.  
 
This thesis has argued that if the periodisation claim within the current conceptualisation 
of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ is retained, then this creates a violent abstraction – it 
obscures that which it seeks to understand. By theoretically prioritising recent 
authoritarianisms, and deprioritising the authoritarian history of neoliberalisation more 
generally, we fail to understand the dynamics driving the current crisis of capitalist states, 
and the dynamics driving historical change. This can be seen in the twin contributions 
of Streeck (2017) and Jessop (2017), who both see the current crisis an ‘interregnum’, 
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between the gradual breakdown of neoliberal hegemony, and the emergence of an 
alternative hegemonic mode of organisation. In this sense, the whole history of 
neoliberalism feeds into the current crisis, rather than just the past ten years. As 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, Gramsci (1971: 177; Q13, §17) asserted, 
drawing on Marx, that ‘no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has first 
developed all the forms of life which are implicit in its internal relations’13. It is not a 
significant leap to see that neoliberalism has always had a strand of authoritarianism 
within its ‘internal relations’ – both in thought and practice. Rather than the post-2007 
phase being a qualitative change in the relationship between authoritarian statism and 
neoliberalism, it is part of a broader history whereby all the contradictory tendencies 
implied within a hegemonic order gradually play out (though not in a determined 
fashion, to be sure). It is not only the ‘authoritarian statism’ of the post-2007 period that 
is producing current state crises, but rather the entire history of neoliberalism must be seen 
as feeding into the current upheaval. 
 
The concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ would seem to be a problematic proposal. 
It draws an arbitrary point of change at the Global Financial Crisis, but never suggests 
a method for detecting or measuring such a change. It would also seem that while 
periodisation is always necessary, this particular periodisation gets in the way of that 
which it seeks to understand – the current crisis of legitimacy traversing states across 
the globe. And yet this thesis does not aim to dismiss the contributions of Bruff (2014; 
2017), Tansel (2017), and others using this conceptual frame. Rather, the purpose here 
is to present a sympathetic critique, a conceptual refocussing of what has been a largely 
empirically-driven literature, and to suggest possible future directions for the research 
programme. So, where is this redemption to be found? 
 
Building on the foundation of Nicos Poulantzas’s concept of ‘authoritarian statism’, 
Bruff has argued that ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ dialectically strengthens and weakens 
the state:  
an increasingly authoritarian state is simultaneously strengthened and weakened by this shift 
toward coercion as new forms of popular struggle set up “major dislocatory effects within 
the state”,  
                                                          
13 “No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is no room in it have developed” 
(Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy). 
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and, also, that  
these contradictions are sharpened in times of capitalist crisis, and the authoritarian statist 
response is “partially responsible for new forms of popular struggle”14, characterized by an 
antistatism that resists both the greater investment of state power into everyday life and the 
state’s increasingly coercive nature (Bruff, 2014: 120).  
 
This is the strength of the approach of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ – it refocusses 
attention on an under-theorised, and oft-forgotten aspect of Nicos Poulantzas’s state 
theory: the contradictory nature of authoritarian-type state strategies. The 
‘strengthening-weakening’ dynamic, which plays out as an authoritarian statist 
government undermines its own legitimacy, puts a name to a particular contradiction 
which has patterned the way authoritarian statist strategies have effected neoliberal 
hegemony – a contradiction which should also be seen as partially causal of the current 
shift toward anti-statist movements and struggles. Put simply, it is possible that Bruff – 
via Poulantzas – is contributing to an understanding of ‘anti-politics’. By questioning the 
contradictory nature of authoritarian statist interventions, under the rubric of the 
‘strengthening-weakening’ dialectic, it may be possible to argue that the authoritarian 
nature of neoliberalism is partly generative of the political upheavals which mark the 
current crisis of the state and politics. Above it was suggested that the anti-establishment 
sentiment which drove Brexit may well be related to this process. But as Poulantzas 
argued, this process is not unidirectional, or a necessarily regressive process; sometimes 
depoliticisation can result in radical politicisation in other spheres. I would tentatively suggest 
that one case which this approach may well help us understand is the astonishing success 
of the Labour Party in the 2017 UK general election. In particular, record rates of voter 
turnout among young people, and the recent surge of party membership within the 
Labour Party (Travis, 2017), both buck the anti-political trends noted by Mair (2013). 
The temporal proximity of these events and the completion of this thesis mean this 
claim cannot be substantiated in a concrete way; this example is raised here in the 
Conclusion simply to point toward possible directions for future research, and to 
highlight the potential utility of ‘authoritarian statism’ as a dialectical lens.    
The contributions of those authors working within the framework of authoritarian 
neoliberalism are not limited simply to reminding us of a particular facet of Poulantzas’s 
work. The impressive empirical work done teasing out the real and concerning patterns 
                                                          
14 Double inverted commas here indicate quotations drawn from Poulantzas (1978: 246). 
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of authoritarian statism across states and scales – spanning Turkey, Greece, China, 
Cambodia, and more – is hugely important. It is equally important, however, that a 
problematic aspect of the concept’s theorisation does not cloud this contribution. And 
as it stands, the periodisation claim associated with ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ does 
just that. This violence of abstraction should not distract from the actual violence of 
neoliberalism. 
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